PHIL 22.docx

18 Pages
91 Views
Unlock Document

Department
Philosophy
Course
Philosophy 22
Professor
Guven Guzeldere
Semester
Spring

Description
God partakes in everything around us. Capacity for sensitivity in that little thing you’re designing (to model mind) Know whether thing has a mind or not if thing can interact with the world. Single cell organism IF receptor has no way of receiving, no value. Has to have something that translate signals so that the organism can do something.  make surface to receive and reacts. EX: radiation received by receptor, it moves, organism move away/toward light.  evolution: if what it does is useful, it will stay. Processor/nucleus of cell  building block of mind Not only look at little things, also needs to look at the collective. What is the relationship between the brain and the mind? The emergence of the mind Who/what else has a mind the organic world/the artifacts? Thought experiment Neuroscientist named Mary, the super color vision scientist. Raised in black and white, never saw in color. Complete knowledge of color vision. For the first time, in presence of colors. Will there be a new piece of information she can learn? Jackson first argued yes. Complete knowledge in the brain does not give complete knowledge in the mind. Brain and mind related. Mind distinct existence from body? Substantialism? Soul vs mind: for religious people, the same thing. Mind’s Place in Nature C1: mind= brain (identical) Central thesis to the identity theory C2: mind survives death of body C3: brain doesn’t survive death of body C4: mind != brain (distinct) [1-3] inconsistent, [2,3,4] consistent If the mind and brain are not the same thing: 1 logical consequence: there has to be at least 1 property where one has that property, but the other one doesn’t. M != B  Ǝ a [ (Ma and >Ba) or (>Ma and Ba)] Leibniz’s Principle Identity of Indiscernables Indiscriminiability = share all features Identical = be one and the same thing Looking form god’s pt of view 1. Indiscriminability of identicals a. If 2 things are identical, there’s no discriminating feature where we can recognize such as one of them has it, but the other one doesn’t. b. Identity logically implies indiscriminability c. Counter example? Doutable? 2. Identity of indiscriminables a. Indiscriminability logically implies identity. Graham proposed mind != brain ‘cause A: Property to survive bodily death Recreatability/Duplicatibility of the brain but not mind. Physicalism B B’ | M | doesn’t guarantee ! M’ IF we duplicate the physical base, do we get the essence? Let’s say brain = whole nervous system + hormones At one moment in time, make a duplicate of you, is the mind duplicated? Can we transfer memories/experience to a physical representation? Actually not going through the experience = not the same mind? Teleportation: disassembling & assembling: similar to duplication, but most people think they’re the same person What makes us the same person as we are not the same question as duplication’s mind the same. We may lose the sameness within a millisecond, but what about the moment of duplication? The same? At the moment of duplication, if you’re healthy, would the duplication still be healthy. If you have a disease, the duplicated would have the disease? If you’re a great athlete, will the duplicated be the great athlete? Why some features have duplicability? But why not brain? Great athlete? Can we even quantify that? Athlete has to have the mentality too, but there are physical aspects of it. We don’t want to think about us as brain chemicals, we want to think us as abstract, complex beings, capable of being original. A spiritual question. Are we nothing but a bunch of chemicals put together in a certain way? The result of it working in a complex way? Mind-body problem philosopher, Descartes (renaissance: a philosopher, mathematician, Cartesian coordinate, physicist) His solution to the mind-body problem: look at all the things existed in the world Res extensa: we extended things (extended) Escaping a place in space Everything that occupies space, could not possibly do anything Res cognitas (thinking) Could not be occupied in space. -These categories are mutually exclusive. -Together all inclusive  Consequences: You cannot annihilate the body. Concern: how are we going to explain how this particular mind is related to this particular body? Any mental processes you have are in physical space. (Things that happen to the brain affect the thoughts. Things in the thoughts affect the body.) The nature of the Mind-Body Relation 1. Descartes 2. Substance vs Property 3. Frege’s Solution Graham also argues about the metaphysical property of after life, life of the mind without accompany of a body. Structure of course 1. Ontological questions (MB problem) (1/3 of class) a. Mini-inclass-exam 2. Eprotemological questions of other minds, robots a. Presentation teamwork 3. Self, will, rationality 4. Term paper Reflection pieces: comments, paste into thread. Recap: Descartes: Two ontological categories of beings: extending or thinking thing (exclusive, either/or). The world is inhabited by bodies: they’re not thinking. Human = different category of being that somehow interacts with the body. Different (two) components of metaphysical substance. When this component of our union dies, the other might go on living: possibility of after life. Descartes – Cartesian framework, dualism: things have 2 substances. People think it’s not scientific. Alternative version of dualism: propertilism. Substance vs property Properlism says: it’s not there are 2 different categories of metaphysical things. There are bodies of various sources, some are complex enough that they have physical properties, they also have mental properties, both depend on 1 substance: the body. If body decays, lost both physical and mental properties.  This view is more easier to defend One way to look at the MB if you don’t want to be dualist is to perhaps say they’re the same thing, but that’s too superficial. Add: but they’re conceptualized “accessed” come to be known in 2 different ways. One of the most important philosophers of the 21 century wrote a short paper, making a dissection about reference (things you point to with your thoughts). There may be more than 1 way of conceptualizing one thing, more than one sense of one thing. Frege’s Solution He did not intend to talk about the MB problem. Are simpler minds connected to simpler souls? Descartes says there’s a chiasm between a minded and unminded thing. The knowledge argument 1. Pessimistic science explanation a. Pessimistic position is designed to undermine some form of physicalism, arguing that Mary the super color scientist, even though she has all physical facts, she has learned one more fact: what it’s like to see in color. 2. Optimistic science explanation a. Two responses: 2a. No surprise 2b. So what? Argument about Mary supercolor scientist, in response to 1: no surprise, no new fact. The other response is make that a new knowledge, but so what, but that has nothing to do with the truth about dualism. Ontological Problem; dualism (life after death) This week: -Knowledge argument -Ontology Toolkit -Dualism (Substance vs property) Next week: -Dualism cont -Identity Theory Group presentation about animal mind. Check whether a machine has intelligence. Knowledge Argument Identity Theory: some say states of mind are one of the same as the brain. Imagine in the future, you know everything about your brain, complete knowledge, some answered we still wouldn’t know everything about the mind  therefore not the same thing. A present time question: you’re alive, you’re wondering about yourself, formulate about your mind or your subject’s mind: If you have all the facts about that person’s brain. Can mind access the brain’s memories? I might not remember everything there is, if I scan my brain, then there I can find it dormant. People make irrational decisions sometimes. If we trace logical path of decisions, we can’t trace everything if we know everything about the brain. Supervenence: the brain supervene on the mind. There is something that happens in the mind, something changes in the brain: there will be some trace of it in the brain. If we can track the brain in real time, you might be able to find out from the mind. Is the brain a closed system? Since the mind is distinct from the mind, this assembly starts spiking not because of its own operation but because of something outside affecting it. For any causal affect, there is always a link? When look at philosophy literature, so controversial but can write a dissertation on what a property is. We’ll have to steer clear of a lot of complications. Ontology Toolkit a. Things: objects. b. Properties: features that distinguish one object from another. Features that may be intrinsic, like mass. Features that may be extrinsic. Properties are features that you use to say one object from another. i. Difference: Fundamental vs emergent properties, intrinsic vs extrinsic. ii. Fundamental: doesn’t change, doesn’t depend on anything else being the case. So if you have some body of water, that water’s mass is fundamental, as long as it’s the same body of water, the mass is the same. Almost always come out something from intrinsic. iii. Emergent: depends on smaller elements being interactions with another in a particular way. Solidity emerges, it can also disappear. Water doesn’t stay solid or liquid. iv. Intrinsic: Material institution v. Extrinsic (relational): Value. Money’s value. If there is no US, a bill has no value. The value it has depends other kinds of properties being in place: has to be printed by one institution. “being an uncle” has nothing to do with intrinsic properties: what makes me an uncle is the fact that my brother has a child. I was not one at one point in life. But the state of mind has change: went from non-uncle to uncle. “being known as the midnight DJ” you knowing that doesn’t change anything about me. You didn’t know about it until now. But it’s still can attributed to me. Has to do with knowledge or lack of knowledge. Intrinsic vs extrinsic important to understand functionalism. To get over propertilism faces, this can be traced to the sense of a thing as opposed to their references, the thing that we’re talking about. c. States: time-stamped instance of an object having the properties that it does. d. Events/Processes: one state evolving into another is a process/event. Something that takes over a period of time. 1. Monism vs Dualism a. Monism: one kind of stuff. Monisce camp. Doesn’t make you automatically a materialist (world is made of material). i. People who are materialists like to call them physicalist, the kinds of stuff that physicists study. ii.Naturalists: more positive pinch, emphasize everything being a part of everything in nature. We don't have features that go beyond everything else in nature. Certain modesty. Less human centric view. iii.You can think that there’s nothing material: everything is our perception, all mental. iv. Something that maintains the illusion to support that human is the only thing. v. You can be a substance monist b. Two fundamental categories of being Dualism (Substance) “Life after Death” 1. Interactionist 2. Non-interactionist [parallel temporal harmony] Can matter stuff and mind stuff interact with one another? Matter-stuff: physical, nature, res extensa Mind-stuff: thoughts, feelings, perceptions “feeling of hunger” “desire to eat chicken masala” Realm of non-physical, non-spatial, Res cognitans, mental Link between? Non-causal systematic correlation, Initial set-up by God. Reconciliation when mind can absorb stimuli: mind doesn’t sense the stimuli. But if it does response (two clocks running in parallel), make sure at the right time in your mind, certain thoughts feelings occur. Leibniz: claim to have discovered calculus with Newton. Pre-established harmony God did it in human, but not animals? Leibniz didn’t explain a lot in animals Malebranche Actively maintained Mind-body correlation (God) Every time you desire water, god makes your body move to the water. “After-life” Disembodied Re-embodied the body attracts you to bodily/physical affairs. Hunger, go to the bathroom, libido. When body is no longer there, you’re liberated. Need union of the mind and the body. If there is no body, still have our thoughts feelings, can you still have the same mental capacity, things that happen in the mind still be the same without the body?  Can’t give somebody a hug without body. Vision: we look at the world from a vantage point, certain perspective. Without space, body, look at the world from which vantage point? Think about the knowledge argument. You might remember things when you have the body, you can’t experience new things. Can we experience pain the same way? Can God really understand humans when he doesn’t have human body? Re-embodied into what? A better body? At the height of your youth? Doesn’t give family union (22-yr old grandma) Dualism (Property) 1. Epiphenomenalism 2. Panpsychism 3. Elemental property 4. Dualism 5. Interactive dualism Section 1 Identity claim: superman and Clark Kent are one person. Those sensations and those molecules moving are one and the same thing. Identity theorist: Neural activity causes the sensation? NO. The neural activity IS the sensation. Maybe they’re linked the way that you can never find one without the other. Nonetheless, 2 things there. Phenomilism: M Mental sensation | N Neural activity Claim aout the causal relation that this mental state enters into. Punch in stomach --? Feel pain. PN, causes pain. In response to that pain: B (behavior) I engage in to response to that. M  B N has to place some causal role in the behavior. N  B? So there are 2 causes for B = over-determined. Undesirable situation. (over determined = If neural activity doesn’t occur, mental state is good enough to occur. I still would have double over.) Problem for the dualist. Problem for dualist: causation. This is one of the way it comes up. Phenomenal dualist: doesn’t want to give up these 2 things as being the same thing. Doesn’t want to give up the dualist claim, but doesn’t want to endorse the over determination  Mental state doesn’t cause behavior. They are caused by neural state, but doesn’t cause anything. More desirable position. Want to claim as little to make it more defendable. What’s wrong with this view? Why people don’t agree with this view more?  Why did we come here to this room? You have believe section is in sever 112. Can’t do that for a phenomist because I believe the belief as a causal thing. Can’t say a simple thing such as I go to section because I believe section is here. People are unsatisfy. Epiphenominoism. Pan-psychism: a property dualist view of the mind. History back to ancient Greece. Han psychism: ultimately our brain is atoms (physicists view = placeholder). Collection of atoms: take one atom, that atom doesn’t substantiate any mental property. Take another atom to take together with the other one. Pair doesn’t have mental property. Bring 3 , 4rd th = panpsych argue at some point it’s magic: there are thoughts. At what point, we start put together the atoms and we hav
More Less

Related notes for Philosophy 22

Log In


OR

Join OneClass

Access over 10 million pages of study
documents for 1.3 million courses.

Sign up

Join to view


OR

By registering, I agree to the Terms and Privacy Policies
Already have an account?
Just a few more details

So we can recommend you notes for your school.

Reset Password

Please enter below the email address you registered with and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Add your courses

Get notes from the top students in your class.


Submit