POSC 396 Lecture Notes - Lecture 3: Regime Theory, Coordination Game, Hegemony
Document Summary
Both solutions are pareto-efficient (extracting the maximum out of the game collectively. Which solution do you choose: focal point: a solution that will be used in absent communication, something that seems natural, special or relevant to the group, shelling"s definition of focal point. Problem: different actors get different benefits from different outcomes. There is an incentive to not cooperative (there is no incent to defect) In this system of anarchy, i am not bound to my contract, only recourse is power, dominance of power. (might makes right) Yet, cooperation still occurs (how?: creating focal points : might have been set up a hegemon in which its effects still lasts, socialization towards cooperation, transformation of single-play to iterated game. With regimes, there is more information and less uncertainty, known costs of cheating. What is the role of power in negotiations (krasner"s argument) Impact of power of cooperation (the regime theory assumes formal igos able to counter the input of its members)
