POL-UA 700 Lecture Notes - Lecture 14: United Nations General Assembly, High Middle Ages, Lex Mercatoria
19 Jan 2017
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Organizational size and results: large organizations, free riding, weak enforcement, shallow demands on members meaningless compliance, sub-optimal advancement of goals, small organizations, must limit objectives, expansion puts objectives at risk, attract sincere members meaningful compliance. Can we have real cooperation: are an organization"s objectives excludable or non-excludable, are an organization"s outputs rival or non-rival, how does the organization disseminate information among members (law merchant, Bbb, iaea inspectors, courts) can induce cooperative behavior -> repeated prisoners. Dilemma: law merchants: people in high middle ages at champagne festival in france, would sell information (fulfilled contract or not) -> went out of business, they incentivized people to always uphold their contracts, therefore lm never needed. Strategies for solving problems: coordination/coercion, distribution/transfers, monitoring/reporting, sanctioning, grim trigger, flexibility, narrowly targeted, broadly targeted. Raises the cost of cheating but may harm the punisher in the long run. If [r/(1-delta)] > t + [(delta*p)/(1-delta)], it pays to cooperate.
