WWS 300 Lecture Notes - Lecture 7: Incentive Compatibility, Pareto Efficiency, Indifference Curve

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In the 2nd best, equality of utility isn"t incentive-compatible. In the first best, equality and efficiency are compatible. In the laissez faire, jill is better off than jack. The possibility set is biased in favor of jack. All swf with less than infinite inequality aversion would choose an allocation in which jill is worse off than jack. Jill is more productive, it is better to make her work but that reduces her utility. In the slide that talks about the second best: Lower than the equality line isn"t possible because jill would be. Way better off than jack, and that isn"t fair. Slide: even a maximin swf would choose an allocation where jill is better off. You want pareto efficient points, and that will still leave jill as better off than jack, meaning it is still unequal. Better social cohesion, more contribution to public goods.

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