PHI 107 Lecture Notes - Lecture 14: Polskie Radio Program Iii, Asteroid Family, Folk Psychology

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Thomas negal what is it like to be a bat? . A dualist objection both to functionalism and identity theory similar to. Getting functional role right is not enough to guarantee to that it actually has the experience. Third argument against functionalism: mental properties in danger of ending up again as epiphenomenal. The underlying physical realizers do all the causal work. Once the neural structures do their part, there is nothing left for mental properties or types to do. Our ordinary folk notions of ind and mental kinds--belief, desire, intention--are unscientific and not likely to not correspond to anything real in the brain. We eliminate things people used to believe from our theories as we get better knowledge. According to the eliminativist we should stop describing ourselves in terms of our minds and just describe ourselves in terms of brains and brain processes.

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