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IR 3.10.docx

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Political Science
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Kelly Greenhill

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IR 3.10 Security Issues I Clash of Civilizations—Samuel Huntington • civilization: the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species; it is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people • why will civilizations clash? o irreconcilable differences o familiarity breeds contempt o ascendance of religion o fear of western cultural hegemony o culture less transmutable o growth of economic regionalization/intra-civilizational trading blocs • Huntington’s civilizations: o Western o Confucian o Japanese o Islamic o Hindu o Slavic-Orthodox o Latin American o African • racist bastard • borders of civilizations? • intra-civilizational conflicts and tensions Conventional Deterrence • deterrence: the use of threats and other measures to dissuade a party from using force or other instruments of persuasion to pursue its foreign policy decisions (focus on future behavior) o viewed to be less difficult  maintenance of status quo o effective deterrence  weigh level of self-interest  create and convey a commitment to defend important interests, through threats of punishment (retaliation) • threats must be credible and potent • must also be backed up by capabilities and resolve  weigh also level of adversary’s interest, capabilities, and resolve o types of deterrence  general deterrence: seeks to prevent potential challenger from making threats  immediate deterrence: seeks to prevent a state from carrying out its threats (crisis deterrence)  either type can be direct (to protect you) or extended (to protect others) o immediate deterrence sequence:  challenger decides whether to attack  defender decides whether to fight  slides* slides* slides*  solve game through backward induction • defender would choose option with the higher expected payoff • LOOK AT SLIDES PLEASE • consider a model that includes general deterrence; immediate deterrence becomes an issue only if general deterrence fails • when defenders are highly resolved, most likely lead to failure of immediate deterrence war • general deterrence should succeed most often when the defender
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