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Lecture 35

PHIL 320A Lecture 35: PHIL-320A,University of Arizona,TextbookReadings(p35)


Department
Philosophy Main
Course Code
PHIL 320A
Professor
All
Lecture
35

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35
- 2. silenced opinions sometimes contain a portion of the truth, thus the generally accepted
beliefs do not have the whole of truth, so it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the
remainder of truth has any chance at being supplied
- 3. even if a received opinion is truth, if it exists without being contested, it will most likely be
held as a prejudice, with little comprehension of its feeling on rational grounds
- 4. meaning of doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost of its effect on character and
conduct
- question about restrictions on free speech come to a fundamental objection those who do
this, who are intemperate, ignorant, etc., should not be stamped as morally culpable
- opinion ought to determine its verdict by the circumstances of the individual case
- real morality of public discussion whatever opinion one may hold who has calmness and
honesty to see the other side
Chapter 39: Feinburg on Offense to Others p.445
- part 1: offensive nuisances
- annoyance, fear, anxiety etc. are not in themselves necessarily harmful
- therefore the harm principle cannot justify interferences with the liberty of some citizens
- “offense” = universally disliked mental states caused by wrongful conduct of others
- law that interferes with citizens must be by virtue of the “offense principle”: the prevention of
offensive conduct is properly the state’s business
- the need to prevent some people from wrongfully offending others as a need for coercive
legislation
- believes offense is surely less serious than harm
- the law should not treat offenses as if they are serious
- question is whether there are any human experiences that are harmless in themselves yet so
unpleasant that we can rightly demand legal protection from them even at the cost of other
persons liberties
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