PHIL 346 Lecture Notes - Lecture 34: Thought Experiment, Individualism

• School: University of Arizona
• Department: Philosophy Main
• Course: PHIL 346
• Professor: All

Document Summary

We have no reason to expect this equation to have a useful solution. It asks for a property y such that the crimson things are exactly those red things that have y. The only natural suggestion is: y = crimson. The crucial point in the preceding discussion is the assumption that obliquely occurring expressions in content clauses are a primary means of identifying a person"s intentional mental states or events. The cases we discuss will involve extensional differences between obliquely occurring counterpart expressions in that-clauses. In such cases, it is particularly natural and normal to take different contents as identifying different mental states or events. 2. counterfactual supposition the conterfactuality in the supposition touches only the patient"s social environment. 3. an interpretation of the counterfactual case for counterpart expressions in the content clauses that are actually and counterfactually ascribable are not even extensionally equivalent.