Industriousness and enthusiasm are the cornerstones for the pyramid of
Also important: self control and confidence.
Do not use passive voice when writing bill.
o Avoid “will be” and instead assign a specific Secretary/bureaucratic
organization to enact policy
Labeling your bill
o S. 123 = bill in the Senate
o H.R. 123 = usual law/statute. For it to pass, needs the okay of the
Senate and president’s signature/veto override
o H. Res. 123 = Resolution expressing will of the House. E.g. “Resolved,
the House congratulates…”
H. Res. = can also be a rule in the House
If H. Res., does not need the okay of the Senate nor president’s
o H. Con. Res. 789, or H. J. Res. 789 = Concurrent or joint resolution.
Used in cases where you need the okay of the Senate but not the
president’s signature. Examples:
Fix the time that Congress adjourns
Specifies the time and place and rules of a state-of-the-union
speech (president gives speech in a joint session)
Resolution that both House and Senate agree on
Majority party gets more seats than fair percentage in Rules Committee
(usually around 2 to 1 ratio)
Equal representation in the Ethics Committee
Transitivity and Majority Rule
o If A P B and B P C, then A P C
o “Is the cousin of” binary relationship that is not always transitive
o “defeats by majority rule” is not transitive
o Condorcet Paradox
1. A 1 B P1C
2 B P C P A
3. C 3 A P3B
A defeats B (2 to 1). B defeats C (2 to 1). However, C defeats A.
McKelvey Chaos Theorem
o Suppose B is a policy, say a bill. Say C is a policy that an agenda setter
really likes (it can be any policy). Then there exists policies Z1, Z2,
Z3,…Zn such that Z2 defeats B, Z2 defeats Z1, Z3 defeats Z2,...,Zn
defeats Zn-1 ad C defeats Zn. o That is, let B be the bill. Suppose you pick a policy C. Then, I as the
agenda setter, as the agenda setter, can choose a set of amendments,
such that I can ensure that C is the final bill.
o Let B = (6,6,6,6,6); C = (10,19.98,0.02,0,0). Pick a Z1 so I can get C.
o Z1 = (7,0,0.01,7,15.99)
o Note Z1 defeats B (Region 1, 4, and 5) and note that C defeats Z1
(Region 1, 2, and 3)
The MVT predicts that one alternative will defeat all others. This seemed to
be true in the minimum-wage vote but not in our transportation-bill vote.
o Minimum wage vote had transitive preferences. No transitive
ordering of group preferences in the transportation bill game.
o New question though, why no transitive ordering of preferences in the
transportation bill game?
o There are 5 dimensions in the transportation bill game (or you could
say because the bill had to add to 30, there were really only 4, i.e. (x1,
x2, x3, x4, 30-x1-x2-x3-x4)
What is diagonal politics?
o Casting an issue in non-traditional coalition structures
o Bundling two or more in non-traditional ways
o Example: restricting campaign donations (Democrats liked) bundled
with requiring judges to draw district lines (Republicans liked as
Problems with majority rule
o Not necessarily transitive
o Does not take into account intensity of preference (consider one
dimensional policy space and applying MVT when a bare majority
differs a lot with a group on other side of spectrum)
o Might systematically exclude some members
From Madison: “Tyranny of the majority”
Won’t be a problem because coalitions will be fluid
(large republic argument)
Lani Guinier, says otherwise in “Tyranny of the Majority”:
Coalitions are not fluid, especially racial minority
groups (who are excluded
Solution: alternative system to majority rule. Instead of
current institution, “take turns” on who gets control
Groseclose-Milyo “Choosing a restaurant problem”
Nobody gets their least favorite choice
Suppose there are 3 people who have to choose
between 8 restaraunts
Stable with n people so long there are at least n+1
First person chooses 8^(2/3)=(8^1/3)