POL S 7 Lecture Notes - Lecture 5: Bargaining, Preventive War, Gulf War
Document Summary
The bargaining theory of war: a simple model representing a disagreement. Represents potential gains and losses and ultimate outcome of war between two actors as a bargaining interaction. Bargaining range: deals that both states prefer to war. Bargaining model assumes that all issues are easily divided into increments. If issues are indivisible, there may not be possible divisions that lie within the bargaining space. Jerusalem claimed as a capital and holy city by several groups and faiths. Yet, virtually all issues are divisible in practice, especially if we allow side payments. Commitment problems arise when states cannot credibly promise to use force. Promises are credible only when they are in the self-interest of actors to carry. Bargaining over issues that affect future power. P represents probability of victory for both sides. Future power distribution following the rise of state a. Power shifts, and the potential outcomes, deals, and bargaining range change.
