POLI 12 Lecture Notes - Lecture 19: Game Theory
Lecture 19
The International System: It is anarchic, there is no legal authority higher than states hat can make
and enforce binding laws. There’s no “world” government. So the UN doesn’t have enough power to
bind states to their will, membership is also voluntary.
States have interests (ie: their leaders have interests). We assume that states are rational and want to
further their wellbeing. Actors adopt strategies based on their interests and what they believe are a
best response to others’ strategies.
Cooperation and Bargaining:
• Cooperation: An integration in which two or more adopt policies that make at least on actor better
off, relative to the status quo, without making the other worse off.
• Bargaining: An interaction in which the actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at
the expense of another.
Cooperation:
Why do actors fail to cooperate?
• Actors might have a unilateral incentive to defect: For example the US and USSR during the Cold
War, both are better off if they stop building nukes as they are expensive, but if you stop building
nukes and your enemy doesn’t then you run the risk of the other party continuing to build nukes.
• The key is a strategic response to what other actors will do.
• Game theory (assumes rational actors) it’s a way of thinking of IR taking into account how other
actors will respond to what you do. Assumes actors will always go for whatever will benefit them.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Game theory: Strategic interaction. If both actors cooperate their outcome as a total is 6, 3+3, which
gives them the best net
When do states cooperate:
• Relatively few actors
• Iteration: If you anticipate that you will be interacting with the country over time you have an
incentive to cooperate.
• Information: If you have information on how the other actor will act
• Linkage: If you can tie cooperation to another interaction. By raising the stakes, if an actor doesn’t
comply they will face repercussions in another outcome.
Bargaining:
What can affect bargaining outcomes:
• Power: If you have less to lose if you don’t comply, you have more bargaining power.
• Coercion: If you have the power to impose sanctions etc
• Outside opinions: If you have other options outside the agreement, with another trade partner etc
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Document Summary
The international system: it is anarchic, there is no legal authority higher than states hat can make and enforce binding laws. So the un doesn"t have enough power to bind states to their will, membership is also voluntary. States have interests (ie: their leaders have interests). We assume that states are rational and want to further their wellbeing. Actors adopt strategies based on their interests and what they believe are a best response to others" strategies. Why do actors fail to cooperate: actors might have a unilateral incentive to defect: for example the us and ussr during the cold. Assumes actors will always go for whatever will benefit them. If both actors cooperate their outcome as a total is 6, 3+3, which gives them the best net. By raising the stakes, if an actor doesn"t comply they will face repercussions in another outcome. Institutions: a set of standards of behavior that verify compliance.
