POLI 12 Lecture Notes - Lecture 17: United Fruit Company
Lecture 17:
Challenging the unitary actor assumption
• Previously unitary actor assumption: Assume that leaders preferences are all that matter, costs and
benefit to the state are all that matter.
• But states might not be unitary actors
• There are lots of different actors with different preferences within the state.
How reasonable is it to assume all states have similar preferences? How much do the personalities and
characteristics of leader matter?
• Economics may affect the value of going to war, if theres a territory that has perceived resources
then they may be more likely to wage a war. If a country relies heavily on agriculture, or a resource
that fluctuates heavily. This makes the leaders more prone to diversionary wars. The key is relative
economic factors can affect the incentives of leaders to narrow or widen the bargaining range.
What domestic political situations could increase the likelihood of war?
• Harness a rally effect: Leaders direct the public’s attention towards an external enemy. Like when a
leader is potentially challenged they appeal to nationalism by rallying support against an outsider.
For example the Falkland Islands, there was virtually no benefit to gaining the Falkland Islands.
Both in Argentina and in the UK, the regimes in power were not popular. In Argentina, there were
lots of protests against the junta and in the UK, the economy and Margaret Thatcher’s popularity
were dwindling. So the Argentine junta attempted to harness the rally effect to boost their
popularity of both sides which increased the value of war to both sides and shrank the bargaining
range. Democratic leaders’ fundamental goal is to stay in power. To do so they try to take control of
political environments to gain more supposer during wartime and divert attention from political
and economic problems. But war is costly and they might lose power if they lose.
• Military-Industrial complex: If the military is particularly influential in the state or want to expand
their territory or enhance their budget, or for glory to ascend the military ranks baby propagating
wars. If the leaders are predisposed to catering to military needs. Or for corporate interests. These
both depend on how susceptible the leaders are to military probing.
• Corporate Interests:
Collective Actions:
Policies can bee captured by special interests. Groups that can do so are:
• Military - They can have leverage over governments as leaders need their advice and support.
• Corporations - They may lobby government to fight wars like the United Fruit Company, they
lobbied the US gov to overthrow the Guatemalan government.
• Ethnic Lobbies - Like the Cuban lobby can promise to withhold votes
The point here is that these small groups are concentrated and so more organized and the costs of war
are diffused across populations rather than being limited to one group. Small groups that favor war
can be more effective in starting war than a large diffused unorganized public that is against it. This
shrinks the bargaining range. When you have shared interests, these smaller groups are very effective
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Document Summary
How much do the personalities and characteristics of leader matter: economics may affect the value of going to war, if theres a territory that has perceived resources then they may be more likely to wage a war. If a country relies heavily on agriculture, or a resource that fluctuates heavily. This makes the leaders more prone to diversionary wars. The key is relative economic factors can affect the incentives of leaders to narrow or widen the bargaining range. What domestic political situations could increase the likelihood of war: harness a rally effect: leaders direct the public"s attention towards an external enemy. Like when a leader is potentially challenged they appeal to nationalism by rallying support against an outsider. For example the falkland islands, there was virtually no benefit to gaining the falkland islands. Both in argentina and in the uk, the regimes in power were not popular.
