POLI 142K Lecture 7: Structural and Institutional
Document Summary
Stable balances create self-enforcing peace (costs of war > costs of peace) Rising powers trigger preemptive war (by declining powers) The problem of hegemony: hegemonic powers are objective threats. First deduction: in anarchy, the balance of power is a balance of conflict. Anarchy can be stable (if there is a balance of power that is stable) But war can always occur, particularly from major power conflict. Second premise: hypothesis of the unitary actor (states must act and choose like rational individuals or face selection out of system) Second deduction: rational self-interest, rational self-help: rational distrust. Self-interest: state survival and relative power rule out altruism. Self-help: most preferred strategy; alliances secondary and contingent (on necessity) Distrust: in anarchy, distrust is a rational strategy. 2 players, 4 > 3 > 2 > 1. Applications: structural anarchy, rational war choice, security dilemma, survival threat. Core conception: rational cooperation is always preferred to war. Institutions (rule-based organizations) best explain conflict, cooperation and war.
