IRG 320F Lecture Notes - Lecture 16: United States Agency For International Development, Clean Development Mechanism, Kyoto Protocol

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IRG 320 Apr 7th
Institutional Design:
Why do States comply? (Chayes)
oStates comply because of efficiency, interests, and norms
oExpectations of noncompliance
Ambiguity, variation in capability, time variations
oNote: not strict enforcement mechanisms or clear rules (Varieties of
noncompliance, page 188)
Institutional Design
oAmbiguity, flexibility (chayes and chayes)
oTime variations (chayes and chayes)
oSmall, regional with democratic members (Pevehouse)
oHard coercion (Hafner-Burton)
Climate Change
oAll emitters must be included
oBalanced by desire for economic growth
Agreements
oMontreal Protocol, 1987
Concrete targets, special provisions
oUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992
Versatile framework (Ranalli)
oKyoto protocol, 1995
Cap-and-trade
Joint implementation
Clean Development Mechanism
Institutions and climate change (Ranalli)
oBenefits of international institutions
Strong, versatile framework
Differentiated responsibility
Meaningful commitments
Flexible implementation
oExample: Montreal protocol
Weakness of intentional regimes (Ranalli)
oEffectiveness
oProcedures
oParticipation
Challenges to Institutions (Thernstrom)
oChallenges:
Setting targets
Differentiated responsibilities
oCauses of problems
Futility of equity
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