PHIL 100W Lecture Notes - Multiple Realizability, Chinese Room, Solipsism
28 Nov 2012
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I m not trying to deal with the solipsist. Type-identity theorist claims that mental properties are reducible to physical properties. Believing that sfu is in canada just is being in brain state (say) 137. Dr mc is the prof of this class or. They believe that mental states are multiply realizable. An appropriately programmed computer would have mental states. Searle thinks that a computer will not pass the turing test, and, If a computer did pass the tt, we would not be required to say that it has mental states, and, Even if we were, this would not help to explain how we have mental states. Strong ai, says searle, is just wrong that mind is to brain as software is to hardware . Since many of us here can read and write some form of chinese, let s change the example. Searle in the chinese (wingding) room does not understand chinese (wingding)
