PHIL 415 Lecture : Frege and Trivial Identities
22 Dec 2012
School
Department
Course
Professor
Document Summary
In sense and reference, frege argues that identity is a relation between the signs of objects. This is because if a = b is only about the objects, then that means it has no new information than a = a, which as a tautology is a trivial identity. However, a = b is not a trivial identity. Hence, a = b is not simply about the objects. Thus, in saying cicero = tully it must be that it"s something about the names which makes it different from tully = tully. The latter, as we"ve said, is trivial, and expresses no real knowledge, whereas the former can be used to express something important. Again, one always know the truth of a = a. However, we do not necessarily know that a = b. Frege"s answer: all naming expressions have what he calls a sense as well as a reference.
