POLI 244 Lecture Notes - Lecture 4: Preemptive War, Preventive War
8 May 2017
School
Department
Course
Professor
Document Summary
Fought when there is a first strike advantage, where attacking first improves the outcome as opposed to waiting for the other state to start fighting. Could result from weapons, element of surprise, etc. This can lead to both states wanting war if the bargaining ranges do not overlap. The size of the first strike advantage determines the outcomes, a small one improves chances of avoiding war. If there"s an overlap, there may be some deals acceptable to both. In anarchy it"s impossible or very hard to make a credible commitment. If one party were to renounce their first strike advantage and make a credible commitment, this would reduce things to one bargaining range and a much easier time making a deal. One state with more power sees another growing at a faster pace and catching up. Thus, they want to go to war and defeat them to shift the balance of power before they lose their global primacy.
