FAH102H1 Lecture : FAH102 Week 12.docx

For which system below would quantum effects be leastnoticeable?

-The collision of two N₂ molecules in a gas, whichchanges the rotational energy of both

-Polarization of the electron density of ethanol resulting inexcitation of vibrational motions

-An electron-sized particle moving in a 1 m³ box asthe temperature decreases by 10 degrees

-A hydrogen atom being struck by a UV photon

We have dealt with two different ensembles, canonical andmicrocanonical. Which of the following statements is inaccurateregarding these ensembles?

-The canonical ensemble is always considered as a subset of alarger reservoir, which acts as the surroundings.

-The microcanonical ensemble is defined to have constant energy,volume, and composition.

-The microcanonical ensemble is a smaller subset of microstatesof the canonical ensemble.

-The canonical ensemble is generally more useful than themicrocanonical for chemical processes.

Which statement below is most correct regarding the partitionfunction of an ensemble?

-For a given temperature, the high-energy contributions to thepartition function are more heavily weighted.

-Once a partition function is defined in a specific ensemble, itis valid in all other ensembles.

-It tells us the numerical order of the energy levels for agiven system.

-It provides a measure of the energy levels available to asystem at a given temperature.

Consider a cup-carrier from your favorite take-out restaurant.The carrier can hold four cups, and you have to place two cups (onelarge, one small) into the carrier, with no preference forposition. How many microstates can you form with two cups in thefour spaces?

-12

-8

-16

-6

Boltzmann's definition of the entropy was a breakthrough inunderstanding statistical thermodynamics. What is the bestdefinition of Boltzmann's entropy?

-The Boltzmann entropy is a count of the total distinctmicrostates in a system.

-The Boltzmann entropy is a measure of the randomness of anensemble.

-The Boltzmann entropy is a count of the accessible energylevels at a given temperature.

-The Boltzmann entropy is a measure of the useful work availablein an ensemble.

Our canonical ensemble was defined such that the temperature,volume, and number of particles were each held constant. In termsof the Legendre transform, which thermodynamic potential isfundamental in the canonical ensemble?

-The Helmholtz energy

-The internal energy

-The Gibbs energy

-The enthalpy

The equipartition principle can be used to estimate the constantvolume heat capacities of gases. Under which circumstances wouldthe full equipartition heat capacity most closelyapproximate the measured value of C_V?

-A sample of N₂ gas at 373K

-A sample of propane gas (C₃H₈) at roomtemperature

-A sample of water vapor at 373K

-A sample of Br₂ vapor at room temperature

Which factor below does not contribute to the rotationalpartition function of a molecule?

-The rotational quantum number

-The nuclear and electronic spin states

-The rotational constant(s)

-The temperature of the molecule

We were able to reduce the vibrational partition function froman infinite series to a function of a single exponential, but onlyapproximately. Which approximation below was NOT used?

-We assumed that the vibrational energy can be expressed asv?_e.

-We assumed that the energy levels were close enough to allowintegration instead of summation.

-We assumed that the vibrational motion is purely harmonic.

-We assumed that the separations are relatively small, due tohigh temperature or lower vibrational constant.

The derived partition function for an ideal gas depends on allof the physical parameters listed below except for which one?

-Molecular symmetry

-The temperature of the molecules

-The volume of the sample

-Mass of the molecules

Deriving the translational partition function is more involvedthan deriving the rotational and vibrational partition functions.Which statement below is NOT a reason for this?

-There are so many possible translational energy levels, thatthe integral does not converge to a finite value.

-The integral of translational states for a single particle mustbe taken over a 6-dimensional hypervolume.

-The degeneracy of translational states is not obvious becausethey lie so close in energy.

-Translational degrees of freedom involve interactions betweenall molecules in the sample, whereas rotations and vibrations donot.

The connection between the Equipartition Principle and thetranslational partition functions helped to demonstrate that thetemperature of a system depends on the easily excited degrees offreedom. Why should this be true?

-In systems with easily excited degrees of freedom, a change inthe entropy requires energy changes on the order of thermalenergy.

-In systems with easily excited degrees of freedom, smallincreases in the pressure make excited states more accessible,

increasing the temperature.

-In systems with easily excited degrees of freedom, thepotential energy is no longer dependent on the temperature of thesystem.

-In systems with easily excited degrees of freedom, thermalenergy is sufficient to allow one to treat the energy levels as acontinuum.

The connection between the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution andthe translational partition function allowed us to betterunderstand the distribution of speeds. Which statement below is NOTa consequence of the translational partition function?

-The population of the lowest speeds is very small.

-The pressure of the gas increases as the velocityincreases.

-An increase in the temperature will result in shifting thedistribution to higher energies.

-The population of the highest speeds is very small.

When dealing with quantum energy levels, there are severalimportant factors to consider. Which concept below is NOT importantto quantum energy levels?

-The set of quantum numbers

-Degeneracy

-The deBroglie wavelength

-The ground state

Write a summary of of this article below. You should write at least one paragraph.

ABSTRACT
Feminist theories in sociology reflect the rich diversity of general theoretical
orientations in our discipline; there is no one form of feminist theory. The development
of these theories over the last 25 years has only recently begun to
influence the mainstream theory canon, which has much to learn from their insights.
This chapter demonstrates why feminist versions of the following theory
types should be more fully integrated into mainstream sociological theory:
neo-Marxist, macro-structural, exchange, rational choice, network, status expectations,
symbolic interactionist, ethnomethodological, neo-Freudian, and social
role. Feminist standpoint theory, an epistemological critique of mainstream sociology,
is discussed at the beginning, and the chapter concludes with a brief
account of the newly developing effort to theorize the intersection of race, class,
and gender.
INTRODUCTION
The term “feminist theory” is used to refer to a myriad of kinds of works, produced
by movement activists and scholars in a variety of disciplines; these are
not mutually exclusive and include: (a) normative discussions of how societies
and relationships ought to be structured, their current inequities, and strategies to
achieve equity; (b) critiques of androcentric classical theories, concepts, epistemologies,
and assumptions; (c) epistemological discussions of what constitute
appropriate forms, subject matters, and techniques of theorizing from a feminist
perspective; and (d ) explanatory theories of the relationship between gender and

various social, cultural, economic, psychological, and political structures and
processes. Much of this work is explicitly interdisciplinary in inspiration and
intended audience. To complicate matters further, there is no consensus on the
exact meaning of the word “feminist,” which makes it difficult to distinguish
with precision between theoretical material that pertains to gender (e.g. Parsons
1949, 1955, which no one would label feminist) and gender-related theory that
is specifically “feminist.” Finally, there is little consensus among feminist sociologists
about the basic theoretical questions that require an answer, resulting
in the proliferation of theories at a low level of abstraction that explain specific
phenomena (e.g. pay inequity), in addition to more abstract, general works.
To remain within the limits of one chapter, I confine this review in several
ways, beginning by excluding feminist theory that has not been produced or used
extensively by sociologists. While feminist theory is often defined as “womencentered”
(e.g. Lengermann & Niebrugge 1996:436; Smith 1979, 1987; Alway
1995), I use a definition that focuses more broadly on gender, yet maintains the
normative emphasis implied by all definitions of the term feminist, which thus
enables one to distinguish feminist from other gender-relevant theory.

Some feminists focus on those contemporary theories and texts that ignore
the contributions of feminist theories and the topic of gender and conclude that
feminist contributions remain largely ghettoized within our discipline (e.g.Ward
& Grant 1991, Alway 1995). My view is that, while progress has been made
in integrating feminist concerns and insights into the discipline’s theoretical
discourse, much work remains to be done. This chapter demonstrates the
abundance and variety of feminist theoretical insights that can and already have
to some extent contributed to a more robust theoretical understanding of social
life, one which reflects the centrality of gender in virtually all sociocultural
contexts. It also demonstrates that feminist theories emanate from, critique, and
revise the rich array of theoretical traditions that define our discipline. Space
limitations preclude much discussion of precisely how feminist theories can be
better integrated with mainstream ones. Rather, I focus attention primarily on
reviewing the central insights of feminist theories in order to better inform those
sociologists who may be unfamiliar with much of this body of work about the
rich array of theoretical ideas that are at their disposal.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES
Much of the literature that is labeled “feminist theory” consists of epistemology
and epistemological critiques of “malestream” sociology. Its foundations reflect
several nonfeminist traditions, especially Marx’s and Mannheim’s discussions
of ideology, Foucault’s work on knowledge and power, and phenomenological
and ethnomethodological approaches, the exact mix of influences varying by
author. While this work makes important contributions to these traditions, for
two reasons I believe that it is a misnomer to call thiswork feminist epistemology
(or theory). First, the issues raised are not in any fundamental way different
from those raised by many scholars who haveworked in these traditions but have
not been interested specifically in women or committed to feminism. Feminists
extend their insights in important ways, but this does not constitute a uniquely feminist approach to sociology. Second, many women in sociology, whose
scholarship they and others consider as well within the feminist tradition, do
not agree with this perspective.
Feminist scholars in a number of disciplines critique what they define as
mainstream, “masculinist,” “objectivist,” and “positivist” social science, and
develop a “feminist” alternative called standpoint theory. In sociology, the
two most widely cited are Dorothy Smith (especially 1987, 1990, also 1979,
1989) and Patricia Hill Collins (especially 1990, also 1986, 1989), whose basic
ideas constitute the focus of this section (see also Harding 1986, 1991). Where
Smith focuses on developing a “woman’s standpoint,” Collins’ work is directed
at an Afrocentric feminist standpoint epistemology. The Issue of Essentialism
Feminist standpoint theory, which is highly attuned to reification committed by
mainstream sociologists, cannot avoid reifying the genders. While Smith and
Collins explicitly recognize considerable variation among women (and presumably
men) in their experiences and consciousness, their own logics, and
many times wording, make it clear that they assume that there are overarching,
gender-specific standpoints; they could not otherwise talk about a “masculine”
form of discourse. In addition, Collins explicitly cites such feminist theorists
as Gilligan (1982) and Chodorow (1978, also 1974), who argue that the
genders are fundamentally different in their moral reasoning and capacities
for/commitments to interpersonal relationships.
Positing dichotomous gender differences that are treated as transcultural and
transhistorical is termed “essentialism,” a view that has substantial currency
among feminists in a variety of disciplines but is hotly contested in our own
(e.g. Lorber et al 1981, Coser 1989, Epstein 1988). The empirical evidence for
it is flawed, often based on small, nonrandom, American samples, and typically
finds only modest differences, along with extensive overlap, between the sexes.
Essentialist thinking converts differences of degree into differences of kind. The
presumed but often unstated origin of essential differences includes psychodynamics
rooted in the parental division of labor (Chodorow 1978) and biological
sex (Rossi 1977, 1984). It has become common for feminist scholars to recognize
within-gender categorical differences (e.g. race, class), but this awareness
of difference has often failed to preclude essentialist thinking about basic personality
and value orientations (e.g. the assumption that, regardless of other
differences, women are nurturant and oriented toward personal relationships,
while men are individuating and oriented toward abstract moral principles).
Given that the evidence suggests modest between-sex and considerable withinsex
differences on virtually all individual-level traits, a dichotomous gender
variable is theoretically useless when speaking of individual-level phenomena.
Explanations that begin by categorically attributing different characteristics
to women and men—cognitive, emotional, relational, and/or behavioral—not
only exaggerate differences in the distribution of such traits by gender, they also
implicitly treat these variables as dichotomous rather than continuous.

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France: The country’s first ‘saviour sibling’ is a ‘double-hope baby’
By Annick Chapoy on July 18th, 2011
The birth, in France, of its first baby to be conceived by artificial insemination on top of the selection of an embryo based on its blood, has sent new flames into the hot parliamentary debate over the reform of bioethics law.
The child’s deliberate embryonic selection rested on it not having the gene for beta thalasaemia, and its birth potential to help cure beta-thalasaemia suffered by two older siblings. Theoretically, the use of ‘saviour siblings’ has been allowed since 2006, when the 2004 Bioethics Law and associated decrees was passed. The USA has utilised this for about ten years, but such a birth is rare in Europe – and, depending on the results of a current debate, might become even rarer in France.
Umut-Talha, a name meaning 'our hope' in Turkish, entered life this February in Clamart, south-west of Paris. He weighed 3.65kg and was pronounced ‘very healthy’. His birth resulted from in vitro fertilisation after a double pre-implant genetic diagnosis that enabled doctors to choose an embryo that would not carry the disorder beta-thalasaemia, and whose blood and tissue would be compatible with that of his brother and sister. This type of technique was legalised in France with the Bioethics Law of 2004, but is still the source of great controversy in the public.
It is the first successful birth resulting from this type of pregnancy in the country. The practice is legal in numerous other European countries, including Spain and Belgium where, in 2005, the first two 'medicine babies' in Europe were born. The first birth of this type took place in the USA in 2000.
France’s first so-called ‘saviour sibling’ was born to parents of Turkish origin and he was conceived under circumstances that would have been unthinkable only a generation ago. Umut Talha’s parents had approached the hospital in Clamart just over a year ago. They had a serious problem - their two youngsters were both afflicted with the inherited blood disorder beta thalasaemia, which requires monthly blood transfusions. The parents knew the hospital was one of only three in France that was developing a treatment for their children's illness.
An embryo was screened and genetically selected from an original group of 12 embryos. It was chosen to ensure it did not carry the Beta thalasaemia gene and also due to its compatibility with the sick siblings. Besides selecting an offspring that would be spared from the disorder, the parents hoped their future baby could also become a donor of the right kind of treatment cells.
Born disorder-free, the baby’s cells also proved compatible with his two-year-old sister. Doctors feel confident that she will be cured with the cells from his discarded umbilical cord, and her monthly blood transfusions will be discontinued.
The family have since returned to their home in southern France, but plan to return to Clamart to undergo the same procedure to cure their other child, Umut’s four-year-old brother.
Following his birth, French newspapers spread ‘Medicine baby’ headlines across their pages. However, Professor René Frydman, a fertility pioneer and the ‘medical father’ of the first French test-tube baby in 1982, oversaw Umut’s case, said he preferred the term ‘double-hope baby’.
‘Medicine baby is a media term invented by people who are against this kind of procedure,’ said Prof. Frydman. In English-speaking countries, the terms ‘donor baby’ and ‘saviour sibling’ have been widely used in the media.
Umut certainly presents a double hope for his parents: the hope of having a new, healthy baby, and the hope of curing one of their sick children.
However, other scientists, religious groups and parents beg to differ. The issue of saviour babies has raised complex ethical debates, and renewed fears of a move towards ‘designer babies’, or babies whose traits – e.g. intelligence, eye-colour and height – have been predetermined.
Thus, Umut’s birth has raised questions among medical, political as well as religious circles in France. Christine Boutin, President of the Christian-Democratic party, denounced an ‘instrumentalisation of the human being, conceived in the sole purpose of being used’, while the head of the Bishop’s Conference said he was ‘totally opposed to a procedure by which somebody is being used exclusively to serve somebody else’.
The timing of Umut's birth was also significantly timely - just as the very law that allows for cases such as this to be revised. Observers say that the existing legislation guiding biotechnology in France might be tightened and restrict research in certain fields, including stem cells.
The country’s standing bioethics law allows for cases like Umut’s. In fact, the government has earmarked €800,000 per year for Clamart to practice and develop the procedure.
Nonetheless, Prof. Frydman and colleagues say a lot more needs to be done, complaining of endless hurdles to launch further research and access funds. They regret that France has started a decade after the USA and that the government is still reluctant to give them full backing.