Philosophy 2073F/G Lecture Notes - Traumatic Brain Injury, More Life, Permadeath
13 Nov 2012
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Argues against the idea that death cannot be considered to be bad for the person who dies. Thinks we actually can consider death to be bad for the dead. Two main arguments: life is good, and we can regard a loss of possibilities as an evil. Preliminary work: two important things that nagel (and also silverstein, though not explixitly) is not concerned with: Whether or not we are/can be immortal, or whether or not we can survive death. Whether or not a person"s death can be bad for someone who is not them: life (that is, merely being alive) is emphatically positive . If death is bad, it can"t be because of any positive qualities (it has none) Why nagel doesn"t care about surviving death: In cases of resurrection/life after death, this condition is not satisfied another: what we are concerned with is whether the sort of permanent lack of any experience described by lucretius can be bad.
