PHL100Y1 Lecture Notes - Strategic Dominance, Natural Person, Proxy Voting
Document Summary
There is an incentive to not cooperate in the last game for each, which leads the opponent to not cooperate in the next-to-last game, and so on. Nothing is gained by considering a finite number of known (or likely) repetitions: (b) infinitely many repeated iterations tat strategy-but it is unrealistic, (c) indefinitely many repeated iterations. There are cooperative solutions-for instance, adopting a tit-for- If we see it as being a variation of (a) in which the determinate number of iterations is not known, then we can treat each iteration as having some probability of its being the last, 1, 1: here there is no dominant strategy: Each prefers to do what the other does, although one such symmetrical outcome is payoff-dominant . Key worry in overcoming a prisoner"s dilemma, or even in ensuring cooperation in an assurance game: hobbes"s argues as follows (14. 5, it is irrational for anyone to do something that, as far as can be foreseen,
