POLS2133 Final: WK 5 - Realist and Constructivist Approaches to IOs
(WK 5) REALIST AND CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHEST TO IOs
Realist Approach to International Organisations (Dongwook)
Realism versus Neoliberal Institutionalism
Neoliberal institutionalism: IOs tame power politics
Realism: Power politics fuel IOs
Recognition of the yawning gap between neoliberal theory and reality has recently
led to an exciting round of theoretical innovations and refinements. Often using the
EU as a reference point, contributors to this body of work draw upon economic
theories of hierarchy, organization, and firm structure, none of which take the
institutional requirements for cooperation to be as easily satisfied as earlier IR
scholars envisaged
Much of the controversy between neoliberals and realists have centred around
the issue of enforcement, with neoliberals proposing (and realists disputing) –
various solutions to the problem
Neoliberals and realists disagree about the degree to which constraints of anarchy, an
interest in relative versus about absolute gains, and fears of cheating will scuttle IO
arrangements or hobble their effectiveness
Both agree that IOs help states further their interests where they are allowed to work
Susan Strange – at the forefront among realists in claiming hat information is power,
has emphatically stated that IOs are simply the agents of states, whilst NLI tends to
treat information in a highly technocratic way, failing to see how information is
power
NLI assumes that IOs have no goals independent of states
Both realists and NLI would argue the power we attribute to IOs is epiphenomenal
of state power and state preferences and constraints are responsible for understanding
IO dysfunctional behaviour IOs are not to blame for bad outcomes, states are
1. What Is Realism?
-Realism (aka structural realism or neorealism) is a power-based explanation
of how world politics works.
Basic assumptions: state centrality; bounded rationality; the anarchic
international system (note that neoliberal institutionalism used to be
called a modified structural realism).
Primacy of great power politics: the international distribution of
material capabilities (aka the balance of power) is realism’s key
explanatory factor.
2. Key Concepts: Absolute vs. Relative Gains
-Absolute gains (neoliberal institutionalism): whether the pie is increasing
and each state is getting at least some slices of it
Absolute gains are synonymous with common (or mutual) interests.
-Relative gains (realism): how the pie is divided among states and whether
one state gains more or less than another
-Realism emphasises that states seek to maximise their relative power
positions (i.e. relative gains) vis-à-vis other states.
Neoliberal institutionalism ignores relative-gains concerns: note that
since the absolute vs. relative gains debate began in 1995, Robert O.
Keohane has never explicitly theorised the role of relative-gains
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
concerns in IO creation and operation.
-The world envisioned by many realists is one in which these kind of relative-
gains concerns are both serious and pervasive, and in which, as a result,
security-conscious states encounter few opportunities for mutually beneficial
deal-making
3. Debunking Straw Man Arguments about Realist Theory of IOs
-Straw man 1: Realism asserts that IOs do not matter, period.
Never. If states are rational (as per realism), why would they commit
resources to create IOs that do not matter at all? This would be a
logical contradiction.
-Straw man 2: Realism asserts that relative-gains concerns make IOs not
matter.
No. Unlike some older versions of realism (e.g. John J.
Mearsheimer’s), our course’s version of realism (i.e. “neorealist
institutionalism”) explicitly incorporates relative-gains concerns into
theorising IO creation and operation, and takes IOs seriously:
Stephen D. Krasner, Joseph M. Grieco, and Lloyd Gruber (2005,
Week 5).
Realism: How Are IOs Created?
Great powers’ relative-gains concerns and asymmetrical power are the inherent
enabling conditions for creating and designing IOs.
-Neoliberal institutionalism (as well as the older versions of realism) is wrong
to say that interstate cooperation (including IO creation) is possible if and
when states’ relative-gains concerns are not severe.
The First-Order Problem of Multiple Equilibria in IO Creation
The fundamental issue to decide is not whether or not to create an IO, but on whose
terms to do so in the first place.
-“perhaps reaching agreement is difficult because states encounter too many,
not too few, opportunities for collective gain” (Gruber 2005, 112).
-Recall neoliberal institutionalism’s claim that states create IOs because they
can benefit from functional efficiency gains provided by IOs. Realism argues
that although this functionalist incentive is not unimportant, it is at best the
second-order problem of IO creation (Gruber 2005, 112).
The Primary Role of Great Powers in IO Creation
All states do not matter equally in IO-designing process: the preferences of great
powers are distinctive and carry greater weight than those of small states (Gruber
2005, 102-103).
-Great powers already have more power resources in their hands, and have a
power-preservation incentive (i.e. maximisation of relative gains in the long
term).
Great powers exercise “go-it-alone power” (Gruber 2005, 126).
-Great powers, who are the winners under the future IO, induce small states to
accept their most preferred cooperative equilibrium (i.e. their IO-design version)
because small states know that great powers can simply “go it alone” (i.e.
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
proceed without them).
-Here, great powers do not use coercion and intimidation. Instead, they
unilaterally alter the choice set for small states by disrupting the pre-IO-creation
status quo and presenting small states with their first-choice IO design as a fait
accompli. Under this new situation, small states are better off joining the new IO
than being left out, although small states become the losers under that IO and
would be much better off if this unequal IO had never been created.
Great powers may use bargaining power in addition to go-it-alone power.
-Unlike go-it-alone power, bargaining power involves provision of side
payments.
-Great powers use bargaining power when they need small states’ joining but
want to prevent small states from sabotaging the new IO’s operation in the
future.
As a result, many IOs are created disproportionately on great powers’ terms.
-E.g. The Permanent (or Big) Five’s veto power at the UN Security Council;
the International Monetary Fund’s weighted voting system; the World Trade
Organization’s market-fundamentalist mandate; and the International Criminal
Court’s mandate and operational rules per U.S. standards
Example
-Why did small states accept the Big Five’s veto power at the UNSC (i.e. “the
Yalta formula”) when negotiating and drafting the Charter of the UN at the San
Francisco Conference in 1945?
Realism: How Do IOs Work?
The working (or outcome) of IOs disproportionately reflects great power interests and
the balance of power.
-Although realism accepts that IOs fulfill beneficial functions as per neoliberal
institutionalism (Week 2), great power politics will likely make such IO
functions biased in favour of some states but at the sacrifice of others.
The Role of Great Power Politics in IO Operation
Many IOs, designed disproportionately by great powers, work as a skewed—not level
—playing field that tends to bias the interstate cooperation outcomes in favour of
great powers and their allies.
-By design, many IO’s mandate and decision-making process are structurally
predisposed to favour great powers’ pursuit of their relative gains.
Great powers exercise bargaining power (e.g. contributions to IO budget) to promote
or curb IO activities in line with their national interests.
-E.g. From 2016 to 2017, the U.S. contributed 22% (US $1.2 billion) of the
UN’s regular budget, and over 28% (US $5 billion) of UN peacekeeping budget:
the U.S. alone paid more than 176 and 185 other UN member states combined,
respectively.
Great powers maintain patron-client relationships with small states, and frequently
interfere with IO operation. This can bias IO-mediated cooperation outcomes in their
and their allies’ favour: double standards in IO operation.
-E.g. Contrary to neoliberal institutionalism, Randall W. Stone (2004) found
that the IMF has been far from consistent and rigorous in enforcing its program
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
(wk 5) realist and constructivist approachest to ios. Recognition of the yawning gap between neoliberal theory and reality has recently led to an exciting round of theoretical innovations and refinements. Much of the controversy between neoliberals and realists have centred around the issue of enforcement, with neoliberals proposing (and realists disputing) various solutions to the problem. Neoliberals and realists disagree about the degree to which constraints of anarchy, an interest in relative versus about absolute gains, and fears of cheating will scuttle io arrangements or hobble their effectiveness. Both agree that ios help states further their interests where they are allowed to work. Nli assumes that ios have no goals independent of states. Both realists and nli would argue the power we attribute to ios is epiphenomenal of state power and state preferences and constraints are responsible for understanding. Realism (aka structural realism or neorealism) is a power-based explanation of how world politics works.
