INTR2010 Study Guide - Final Guide: American Experience, United States Asiatic Fleet, American Diplomacy
18 Jun 2018
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(WK 3)
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES I – BLACK SHIPS TO MILITARY BASES
A Central Theme and Five Tendencies
Central theme no hegemonic power
Five key tendencies (1) Europe vs. Asia, (2) continental vs. maritime (China vs.
Japan), (3) defining the forward line of defense, (4) self-determination vs. universal
values, and (5) protectionism vs. free trade
1. Europe vs. Asia
-America’s strategy towards Asia derives form global priorities, and for most
of the US’ history, it was Europe rather than Asia that remained the region of
greatest importance to the nation’s elite
2. Continental vs. Maritime (China vs. Japan)
-Alfred Thayer Mahan – posited that security and hegemony depended on
control of the seas
-As a maritime power in the Pacific, it has always been natural for the US to
anchor its engagement of the region on Japan, as the earliest US naval officers
active in the region argued back to Washington
-Yet historically, Asian regional orders has been centered on China and the
continent
-Pursuit of a geographic condominium with continental China risks
undercutting the offshore island bastion offered by Japan, since China would
seek to subvert Japan and the island bastion under its historic hegemony
-Some looked to Japan as the geographic and ideational anchor for
America in Asia, yet others have seen China as a more natural partner for
realizing a favourable balance of power in the Mackinder tradition
3. Defining the forward defense line
-A major question has been where to draw the defense line against potential
hegemonic aspirants in Asia
-In the 1820s, the US drew that line in the Pacific Northwest, and in the
1840s, at Hawaii (even though the US Navy wasn’t in a position to enforce
either defense line at the time)
-By the middle of the 19th century, the US goal was to establish coaling
stations which run laterally across the Pacific to the China coast
-From 1907-19471, the US naval strategists struggled with the problem of the
threat of Japan being able to attack US forces the US defeated Japan in a war
that they drafted which involved a costly island-hopping campaign across the
Central and Southwest Pacific
-Today, the American forward presence in the Western Pacific is again being
challenged by China’s military build-up and coercive claims to territories
within the First Island Chain – and American strategists are debating whether
the US should be risking war over “rocks” in the South China Sea (as one
administration official put it in 2012)
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
-Defining the location of the forward defense line always entails costs and
risks that each president has calculated differently – and at times unadvisedly
4. Self-determination vs. Universal Values
-The promotion of democratic norms has always been a central element in
American foreign policy strategy because o the clear strategic advantages of
maintaining a favourable ideational balance of power in which likeminded
states reinforce American influence, access, and security
-In the long-term, support for democratic norms often conflicts with
immediate demands for commercial access or national defense
-There is an inherent tension in two key principles embodied in the American
Revolution with respect to democracy:
1. Self-determination
2. Universality
-At times, American diplomacy in Asia has been premise don self-
determination, as American diplomats championed their anti-imperialism and
their support for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states
-At other times, American diplomacy has expressed the universalist vision of
Thomas Paine, who foresaw that the American Revolution would bring
“harbingers of a new world order, creating forms of governance and
commerce that would appeal to peoples everywhere and change the course of
human history”
-In the immediacy of great-power competition in Asia, consistency has been
difficult – and inconsistency has confused friends and adversaries alike
5. Protectionism vs. Free Trade
-Since 1784, trade has dominated American strategic thought toward Asia –
but – this creates an inherent tension in American governance
-Americans were initially drawn to Asia not to support universal free trade
but to promote their right to trade in a world otherwise dominated by British
imperial preferences
-By 1960s – Japan had begun to outcompete American textile firms, and
voices of protectionism re-emerged in the US Congress
-The battle lines between protectionism and free trade have been drawn and
redrawn in American domestic politics ever since – from textiles to consumer
electronics, autos and aerospace
-Protectionists have never regained the upper hand, because successive
administrations have repeatedly negotiated new bilateral, regional, and global
trade agreements that simultaneously reinforce hegemonic stability and
Americans’ rights to trade
Foreign policy traditions
Foreign policy eras Continental (1776‐1860s), regional (1860s‐1940s) & global
(1940s‐today)
Societal context Democracy, pluralism, legalism, universalism & exceptionalism
Institutional context Constitution, White House, Congress & bureaucracy
Early contacts
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
A Pacific player Asiatic Fleet (1835) & Black fleet (1853‐54)
Trade & culture Growing trade & missionaries
“Open Door” policy China: privileges to UK, also to US
-The US was interested in an economic ‘Open Door” policy in part in order to
prevent Japan from establishing dominance over the China Market
Colonial power Spanish‐American War
-Between the Spanish-American War and WWI there was a transformation in US
policy the US had become a major exporter of manufactured goods, especially
to Asia and Latin America
-The American experience in Asia had become as much military and economic as
cultural
An emerging Pacific power
Rising power Pacific possessions, naval expansion & growing commerce →
growing tensions with Japan
Wilsonian idealism Washington Conference (1921‐22)
Strategic withdrawal Isolationism, anti‐Immigration & decolonization
Pearl Harbor (1941)
Containment, 1945-72
Roosevelt’s vision Engagement & cooperation
-The Americans’ initial isolationist reaction to Japanese militarism and Nazi
Germany’s expansionism gave way to a new vision authored by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt
-Roosevelt’s vision was a commitment to an integrated world order –
militarily, economically, and culturally
-The US would be more willing to augment its armed forces and to be
involved in different parts of the world in order to maintain a balance of power,
and would cooperate more closely with other powers to police the world order
-Worldwide bodies were established – e.g. the IMF and the World Bank – to
monitor and to ensure a more open international economic system
-Roosevelt’s vision defined a new phase of American relations with the Asia
Pacific after defeating Japan, the US and its allies (including China and other
Asian countries and people resisting Japanese aggression) would re-establish
regional order on the basis of this definition
-During this period:
oJapan would be disarmed and democratized
oKorea would be unified and eventually become independent
oEconomic relationships would be fostered throughout the Asia-
Pacific region
Cold War reality Soviet rivalry; “loss” of China & Korean War; decolonization
San Francisco system Peace Treaty process (1950‐51), Political, military &
economic commitments (e.g. Japan, ROK, Aust., Phil.)
-The San Francisco System – designed and constructed in 1951 – as the
Korean War was raging – in an effort to integrate japan into the “hub and
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
United states i black ships to military bases. Five key tendencies (1) europe vs. asia, (2) continental vs. maritime (china vs. Japan), (3) defining the forward line of defense, (4) self-determination vs. universal values, and (5) protectionism vs. free trade: europe vs. asia. Alfred thayer mahan posited that security and hegemony depended on control of the seas. As a maritime power in the pacific, it has always been natural for the us to anchor its engagement of the region on japan, as the earliest us naval officers active in the region argued back to washington. Yet historically, asian regional orders has been centered on china and the continent. Pursuit of a geographic condominium with continental china risks undercutting the offshore island bastion offered by japan, since china would seek to subvert japan and the island bastion under its historic hegemony. Some looked to japan as the geographic and ideational anchor for.
