PHIL 255 Study Guide - Midterm Guide: Colin Mcginn, Qualia, Mental Property
Document Summary
Martian pain (c-fibres) physicalist substance monism; all substance is physical reject view that mental properties are identical to physical properties. Mental properties are always realized by physical properties. Mental kinds are functional kinds disposition to perform certain actions; form certain mental states. Objections: all mental states are multiply realizable. (premise, functionalism is the best explanation for why all mental states are multiply realizable. (premise, so functionalism is true. (from 1 and 2, too liberal: - ned block"s. If premises were true, they would provide us with good reason to accept conclusion. Fred w/ r1 & r2 experience: no amount of physical info re: fred"s brain and optical system tells us what it feels like to have r1 & r2 sight. Objections: phenomenal qualia , line 2 is false = relevant. Logically strong; form if p, then q; 1. new fact upon first seeing a coloured object, then physicalism is false. (premise) Supported by physicalism = all facts are physical facts.