[INTD 200] - Final Exam Guide - Everything you need to know! (43 pages long)

• School: McGill University
• Department: International Development
• Course: INTD 200
• Professor: Kazue Takamura

Document Summary

Simon*hix*and*michael*marsh*: debate*about*the*democratic*accountability*of*the*eu, authors*note*that*european*parliament*elections*are*mid?term*contests*in* the*battle*to*win*national*government*office,*and*the*understanding*is*that* the*voters*therefore*use*these*elections*to*punish*governing*parties*in*that* voting*for*the*eu*parliament*often*reflects*an*urge*to*send*a*signal*of* disapproval*to*the*national*government, a*key*element*of*the*presumed*deficit*is*that*elections*are*not*evaluations*of* the*eu"s*performance*per*se*but*typically*reflect*voters"*judgments*about* national*political*issues, the*second*order*model*offers*three*broad*predictions*about*aggregate?level* outcomes*of*ep*elections:*turnout*is*lower*than*in*national*elections,*smaller* parties*perform*better,*and*parties*in*national*government*are*punished, over*the*past*30*years,*the*second?order*election*model*has*remained*the* dominant*framework*for*analysing*ep*elections,*and*numerous*empirical* studies*have*provided*evidence*in*support*of*the*model, hix*and*marsh*employ*aggregate?level*data*from*the*past*six*european* In*support*of*the*second?order*approach,*they*demonstrate*30*that*large* parties*tend*to*lose*votes*in*ep*elections*regardless*of*their*left?right* placement*or*their*position*on*european*integration: yet,*they*also*find*some*electoral*gains*for*anti?eu*parties*and*parties*that* emphasize*the*european*issue, accordingly,*the*eu*may*suffer*from*a*democracy*deficit*because*voters*do* not*evaluate*europe?related*issues*but*mainly*use*the*eu?level*to*reward*or* penalize*national*governments. *this*is*consistent*with*the*observation*that* large*parties,*who*are*likely*to*be*included*in*national*governments,*tend*to* lose*votes*in*european*elections*when*compared*to*the*last*national* elections: second,*smaller*parties*tend*to*increase*their*vote*share*from*the*last* national*election*to*subsequent*eu*elections, finally,*this*defection*from*larger*to*smaller*parties*is*especially*pronounced* during*the*middle*of*parliamentary*cycles. Europe*matters*: another*view*that*hix*and*marsh*talk*about*is*that*europe*still*matters, evidence*proves*that*falling*turnout*seems*to*go*hand?in*hand*with* declining*support*for*european*integration, a*green*tide*across*europe*in*1989*elections,*as*voters*demanded*the* tackling*of*environmental*issues*on*the*european*level, anti?european*movements*emerging*in*european*elections*in*countries* like*denmark,*france,*uk*and*sweden, existing*parties*on*the*extreme*right*and*left*with*anti?european*policies,* furthermore,*seem*to*do*better*in*european*elections*than*in*national* elections, citizens*who*support*european*integration*are*more*likely*to*vote*in* Empirical*evidence: overwhelming*evidence*fro*the*second?order*national*contests*side*in*the* five*sets*of*eu*elections*up*to*1999*that*large*parties*did*worse*and*small* parties*did*better*relative*to*their*performance*in*the*national*election, dispute*however,*regarding*governing*parties*losing*and*opposition*parties* gaining, effect*of*the*timing*of*eu*election*in*the*national*electoral*cycle*shows*that* those*cast*their*ballot*for*a*different*party*usually*switch*away*from*their* government*and*the*number*of*defactors*increasing*as*the*between*domestic* and*eu*election*grows*(kousser), marsh*finds*that*second*order*effect*is*larger*in*states*where*government* alternation*is*thenorm*, kousser*finds*govt. *al*find*evidence*in*britain*that*national*electoral*concerns,*such*as* the*popularity*of*the*governing*party*play*a*greater*role*in*shaping*voting* behaviour*in*eu*elections*than*in*local*elections: evidence*supporting*europe*matters*is*less*in*volume*and*highly* unstructured, carrubba*and*timpone*find*that*voters*who*are*most*concerned*about* environmental*issues*and*who*feel*that*the*european*parliament*is*an* important*institution*are*most*likely*to*switch*their*vote*to*a*green*party*in*a* European*parliament*relate*primarily*to*regulation*of*the*single*market,* such*as*environmental*or*social*standards: differences*in*the*national*party*policies*on*eu*integration*are*largely* explained*by*different*party*families"*preferences*on*socioeconomic* issues, no*gap*between*european*policies*of*national*parties*and*the*preferences* on*european*issues*of*their*supporters. *if*citizens*vote*in*a*european* election*because*of*their*preference*about*socioeconomic*policy*outputs* of*the*eu,*they*are*likely*to*vote*for*the*same*parties: adding*the*policy*preferences*of*parties*to*the*standard*government* status,*size,*and*timing*variables*of*the*secondorder*theory,*minimizes* observational*equivalence*problems*inherent*when*using*aggregate?level* data*to*investigate*why*voters*switch*parties*in*european*elections. *at*the*time*of**eu*election*and*hence*the*value*takes*1*if*a*party*is*in* govt*and*0*if*the*party*is*in*opposition: size*captures*the*effect*of*the*size*of*the*party*and*is*measured*in*terms*of* the*vote?share*a*party*received*in*the*national*election*immediately*prior*to* the*eu*election, research*has*found*that*the*relationship*between*vote?share*in*the*previous* national*election*and*vote?share*in*the*subsequent*european*election*is* cubic:*specifically,*small*parties*gain*votes,*medium?sized*parties*remain* stable,*and*large*parties*lose*votes*(marsh*1998). *we*also* interact*the*government*and*size*variables,*to*isolate*the*effect*of*european* elections*on*large*opposition*parties: government*early,2is*another*variable*that*captures*the*interaction*between* whether*a*party*is*in*government*at*the*time*of*a*european*election*and*the* timing*of*the*european*election*in*the*national*election*cycle, new2party*is*a*single*dummy*variable*that*captures*the*emergence*of*new* parties*in*european*elections,*which*takes*the*value*1*if*a*party*wins*votes*in* a*european*election*without*winning*any*votes*at*the*preceding*national* election*and*otherwise*takes*the*value*0, four*continuous*measures*of*a*party"s*policy*position*are*considered:*its* absolute*location*on*left?right*dimension;*how*extremist*it*is*on*this* dimension;*its*absolute*location*on*a*pro?/anti?europe*dimension;*and*how* extremist*it*is*on*this*dimension, the*variable*left8right*measures*the*absolute*position*of*a*party*on*the*left? right*scale,*ranging*from*?9. 5*(most*left)*to*+9. 5*(most*right), the*variable*lr2extremism*measures*the*relative*extremism*of*a*party*on*a* 20?point*left?right*scale,*which*is*calculated*by*taking*the*square*of*the*value* of*the*difference*between*the*left?right*position*of*the*party*and*the*center*of* the*scale: the*variable*anti/pro8eu*measures*how*favorable*a*party*is*towards*the*eu,* on*a*20?point*scale*from*?9. 5*(most*anti?eu)*to*+9. 5*(most*proeu);*, the*variable*eu2extremism*measures*the*relative*extremism*of*a*party*on*the* issue*of*europe,*which*is*calculated*by*taking*the*square*of*the*value*of*the* difference*between*the*position*of*the*party*and*the*center*of*the*20?point* anti/pro?eu*scale. Predictive*power*of*the*second*order*national*elections*theory: three*basic*claims:*the*governing*parties*lose,*large*parties*lose*and*timing* matters*are*tested, the*first*three*models*test*these*propositions*on*all*six*european*elections*in* the*old*15*states*and*the*last*three*test*the*propositions*in*the*2004*elections* in*the*new*10*states, old*15*states,*governing*parties*certainly*lose*but*models*2*and*3*reveal*that* large*governing*parties*lose*more*than*the*small*parties*in*govt, second,*the*results*on*the*variables*that*capture*the*cubic*effect*of*party*size* reveal*that*larger*parties*lose*votes,*while*small*parties*gain*votes*and* medium?sized*parties*remain*stable,*regardless*of*whether*these*parties*are* in*government*or*opposition, third,*we*find*a*relationship*between*the*timing*of*a*european*election*in*a* national*electoral*cycle*and*the*extent*of*government*losses. *the*effect*of*adding*party*policy*positions: effect*of*adding*party*policy*positions*to*the*basic*second?order*national* elections*model,*with*the*aim*of*assessing*whether*voters*switch*votes*from* large*and*governing*parties*for*domestic*or*european?based*policy*concerns, adding*party*family,*european*policy*positions,*and*left?right*positions*to*the* mix*does*not*change*the*main*results*of*the*second?order*elections*model*as* it*applies*in*the*old*15*member*states*, large*governing*parties*lose*votes*in*european*elections*(if*the*election*is* not*held*immediately*after*a*national*election),*regardless*of*their*party* family,*whether*they*are*pro?european*or*anti?european,*or*whether*they* are*on*the*left,*the*right*or*at*the*extremes, big*parties*tend*to*lose*regardless*of*their*policy*stances,*a*finding*that* supports*the*second*order*explanation*over*the*europematters*explanation,* with*voters*following*their*hearts*rather*than*heads, there*is*some*evidence*that*a*party"s*position*on*the*eu*matters. If*voters*chose*to*vote*for*a*different*party*in*eu*election*due*to*competences* of*the*eu*parliament,*such*an*act*may*be*a*positive*expression*of*their*views* on*eu*integration*rather*than*protest*against*the*eu: main*conclusion*is*that*party*size*matters*as*the*second*order*model* predicts, small*parties*gain*and*large*parties*lose,*particularly*large*government* parties*once*an*initial*honeymoon*is*over, when*size*and*government*status*are*held*constant,*anti?eu*parties*do*much* better*than*average.