Robert Jervis- Cooperation under the Security Dilemma

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Political Science
POLI 244
Jason Scott Ferrell

Robert Jervis: Cooperation under the Security Dilemma Anarchy vs. the Security Dilemma  Anarchy encourages behaviour that leaves all concerned worse off than they could be. o “Stag Hunt”: if they cooperate to eat the stag, they all eat well; if one prefers a rabbit and goes off to find it, they all lose out.  1) cooperate and trap the stag (cooperation and disarmament), 2) chase rabbit while everyones at their post (maintain high levels of arms while others are disarmed), 3) all chase rabbits (arms competition/high risk of war), 4) stay at post while another chases rabbit (being disarmed while others are armed) o International case – problems not mentioned in Stag Hunt  1) incentives to defect must add potent fear even if the other state supports the status quo, it can eventually become dissatisfied later.  2)For protection of own posessions, states seek to control resources or land outside their own territory/their borders - quest for security.  3)Found in Security Dilemma: a lot of the ways a state tries to increase its security, decreases the security of others/threatens them. Making Cooperation More Likely  Stag Hunt vs Prisoner’s Dilemma: PD – there’s no solution that is in the best interests of all the participants.  Costs of Being Exploited (CD) o The easier it is to destroy a state, the more reason for it to join a larger/more secure unit or be especially suspicious of others  If the costs of CD are lower (if people are well fed or states are resilient) they’re able to take a more relaxed view with threats. [Obviously now higher CD means more guard]  States that can afford to be cheated in a bargain or cant be destroyed by a surprise attack can more easily trust others and don’t need to act at the first sign of menace.  It is easier for status-quo states to act on their common interests if they are hard to conquer (tolerable CD means low level of arms/passive foreign policy they can adopt securely are less likely to threaten others)  Cost of CD: loss of sovereignty – the lower it is, the less the impat of the security dilemma Offense, Defense and the Security Dilemma  An increase in one state’s security decrease the security of others  Need to be aware if a) defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensives ones and b) whether the defense or the offense has the advantage o B) Offense/Defense Balance  “offense has the advantage”: easier to destroy the othr’s army and take its territory than to defend one’s own.  If states can’t conquer each other, then the lack of sovereignty no longer forces states to devote their primary att
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