PHIL 115 Study Guide - Final Guide: Megagon, Myriagon, Gilbert Ryle
21 Oct 2016
School
Department
Course
Professor
Locke (A realist, empiricist):
• Argues against the doctrine of innate/natural ideas
• Against Descartes he used Ockhams ‘azo: Do ot ultipl etities eod eessit.
o When two theories are given, we should choose the theory that is more simpler
• Says we can adequately explain experience and knowledge without innate (natural) ideas
o We acquire ideas through senses
o Prior to sense experience, the mind is a blank tablet (tabula rasa) like a sheet of white paper with
nothing written on it; Thus, seso epeiee eas that ideas ae itte o the id.
• Ideas of the mind are acquired through sensation and reflection (on our senses)
o We get sensations from the motion of bodies (bodies are real)
o Lokes episteolog assues the eistee of eteal odily reality
o Assumes God is creator of bodies with sense organs that puts us in touch with external reality
Locke’s arguets that reject the existence of innate ideas:
• It would be rude to suppose that ideas, such the idea of colors innate in a creature, were originally
imprinted in the mind
• Ideas are formed when a man thinks, so there cant be ideas without thinking
• Baies dot hae iate ideas, e aot hae ideas he sleepig, ideas are present to the senses
before they are present to reason
• If ideas were innate then we would have them all at once rather than acquiring them over time as we do
Locke on extension, solidity and hardness:
1. We receive the idea of solidity by the sense of touch (essential to body)
o A body resisting the entrance of any other body into the place it occupies
2. This resistance where a body keeps other bodies out of its space is so great that no force can over come it.
(Distinguishes idea of solidity from pure space and hardness)
3. Hardness is a firm cohesion of the parts of matter that is large enough to be perceptible, so that the whole
thig doest easil hage its shape Hadest stoe ist more solid than water)
4. This idea of solidity marks off the extension of body from the extension of space
Primary quality vs. Secondary quality
Primary qualities (representative ideas):
• Resemble qualities that are possessed by the bodies that we sense
• Inseparable from bodies and are what bodies have in themselves, independently of being sensed by
anyone; they are perceiver independent qualities
• Connected to occupation of space, may be experienced through senses (solidity, extension,
figure/shape, motion/rest, number)
Secondary qualities:
• Do not resemble the qualities of the bodies in themselves, although they are caused by the actions of
bodies on our senses; they are perceiver dependent qualities
• Power to produce sensations in us (colors, sounds, taste, smell)
Berkeley’s Counter point to Locke
• Esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived)
• Bekele suppots Lokes olusio that seoda ualities ae peeie depedet of a ojet (Eg.
bucket of water experiment)
• Berkeley concludes that primary qualities are also perceiver dependent (Eg. Perception of shape); thus,
primary qualities do not exist.
• Problems with his conclusion:
o Seems to imply that things cease to exist when they are not perceived by someone
o Seems as if there is a world independent of the subjective experience of any perceiver
• Bekeles solution: The world is a perception in the mind of God
• More error:
o Abstraction is a process of reflection (in Lockes defiitio), but Berkeley objects that it is rather
distortions of original perceptions; reflection is the source of error
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Berkely’s Otology (an empiricist; emphasis on Minds + Ideas and excludes Matter):
o There are no material objects (no matter) but only finite (our minds, which have various perceptions) and
infinite (God who perceives all the perceivable) mental substances
o Finite minds include ideas and knowledge that are directly experienced
o Minds are active (reflections/imagination of ideas) but we cannot actively produce sensations,
therefore these are produced God (stability of reality, popping in and out of existence)
o Mind is known by interference from its effects (ideas/perceptions)
o Ideas are passive ad dot do athig
o Does not assume God but assumes causality
David Hume (atheist; empiricist objection to Berkeley’s Otology):
o The mind contains two kinds of perceptions: impressions and ideas
o The mind is not a place where ideas arrive; we do not experience our mind, but rather a bundle of ideas
o Denies both direct knowledge of our minds ad Gods ifeee to ou ids
o Argues that we are mistaken about our self’; and uestios idetity’ ad saeess’; the idea of an
object that remains unchanged as tie passes
o 2 different mental activities of imagination:
1. 1. Thinking about a sequence of related objects requires almost same amount of effort and feels the
same as the activity in 2
2. Thinking about one uninterrupted and invariable/never-changing object
o Hume says we are getting confused about ideas because they resemble each other very closely; as if they
were ideas of the same thing. Our mental journey across these similar ideas makes it seem as if we were
watching the motion/movie of one single thing (series of still photographs)
With Berkeley we lost matter, with Hume we lose mental substance as well.
Descartes (rationalist) Meditation 1:
• He doubts what can be doubted but this does not prove that beliefs that can be doubted are false
• Whatee eliefs hae oe to e though the seses, hih I ould e fooled/deeied fo
• Experiences in dreams come from somewhere; the components of the dreams must be from reality, (e.g.
the horns and horses are real although he dreams of unicorns)
• The components of how imagination works (color, shape, size..) could be placed together by our
imagination to generate objects of imagination
• If God is supremely good, he ouldt allo me to be deceived or to have made me so I constantly
deceive myself; however, a deceitful God cannot be ruled out
Meditation 2:
• He denies that God put these doubts in his head; usig Okhas azo aguet dot oe opliate
things)
Aristotle says there are nutritive souls (plants), sensitive souls (animals=sensation and movement), and
rational souls (humans)
• “oul is isepaale fo the od ad is diffeet theo tha the ghost i the ahie hih Plato
believed as the pneumatic soul (Pneuma=breath)
o Ghost i the ahie is hat Gilet ‘le ought up
• Descartes rejects any view of soul
• I ode to idetif hat I is, he osides ho e oe to ko of a piee of a just take fo a
honeycomb. He first considers what he knows about the piece of wax (taste, smell, color, and other
senses) and what happens when wax is melted near a fire. All of these sensible qualities change (becomes
flexible, extended). It is impossible to see all the infinite number of shapes the wax could turn into (the
megagon problem).
Meditation 6:
• He cannot doubt God (perfect, exists), that he is a thinking thing, and certain ideas are clear and distinct
while others are confused
• He is a rationalist, father of analytical geometry, invented Cartesian geometry
• He knows that material things (matter) can exist and is possible
• Explains two kinds of active mental activity (Imagination and Pure Intellection):
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
o Chilliagon-1000 sides; Myriagon 10,000 sides; Megagon 1 million sides
o We will have difficulty imagining a chilliagon/myriadgon but not a triangle
o Ideas of the intellect are clear and distinct, whereas the ideas of the imagination are confused
(Imagining a chili,mega,myriagon is vague while through intellect, they are distinct geometric
shapes)
• Pure intellection is independent of sensory experience; it can proceed without sensory experience (we
dot hae to see tiagles to thik aout the
• He cannot think of more possible explanations, so he says we have reasons to believe that body probably
does exist, God exists, and mind, and matter exists.
o Body is the intensional object of mathematical thought.
▪ Whatever is described my geometry must be located in space, and occupies it; thus
bodies are extended.
▪ Bodies are defined spatially; are characterized by extension; divisible, and are the cause
of sensations
• Mind is not defined spatially; does not have an extension; indivisible; it is one thing; a thinking agent.
• Sensation is passive:
o He cannot produce sensations simply by a pure effort of the mind.
o God cannot be the direct cause of sensation because God is not deceptive, as sensations are
• Pineal Gland (specific part of brain which functions as the interface) is involved in sensation, imagination,
memory, and cause of bodily movements
• Treatise of Man: Descartes says the bodies are machines made of earth, which God forms with the
explicit intention of making it as much as possible like us. This provides an explanation of digestion of food,
sleepig, akig…. eteal sese ogas.
Cartesian mind body problem:
• Descartes dedicated his Principles of Philosophy to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia
• Piess Elizaeth of Boheia odes hat the id is; gie that it eists aodig to Desates
even when there is no thinking (unconscious person or fetus), believes in innate ideas
o Elizabeth examines that for one thing to move another, there must be contact between the two;
Desates sas shes akig a atego istake
• Descartes explains the category mistake by comparing it to the way people think about how a oks
weight causes it to move.
o The idea that weight is a property of the rock might be interpreted wrongly and thought to be
something distinct from the rock itself
• Gilbert Ryle explains the category mistake using a pair of gloves, asking how many things he has when
holding a right and left glove (but also a pair of gloves)
o Vie of self as ghost i the ahie
Asels Otologial Aguet:
• God is soethig hih othig geate a e iagied ho eists ad aoe ho sas Thee is o
God is a fool
• Agues that he the fool heas hat Asel is saig something than which nothing greater can be
iagied he understands what he hears and what he understands is in his understanding even if he does
not understand that it is
Gauilos Ojetio:
• Reduction ad absurdum: if one argument is absurd, so is the structurally analogous one
• The lost/perfect island argument:
Anselm says:
▪ God is a being which no greater can be conceived
▪ If one agrees to this, God exists in your understanding
▪ If God only exists in understanding, something greater could be conceived, but it is impossible for
anything else to be greater. Thus, God exists in reality.
Gaunilo says:
▪ The Lost Island is an island which no greater can be conceived
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
Locke (a realist, empiricist): argues against the doctrine of innate/natural ideas, against descartes he used ockham(cid:859)s azo(cid:396): (cid:862)do (cid:374)ot (cid:373)ultipl(cid:455) e(cid:374)tities (cid:271)e(cid:455)o(cid:374)d (cid:374)e(cid:272)essit(cid:455). (cid:863, when two theories are given, we should choose the theory that is more simpler. Ideas of the mind are acquired through sensation and reflection (on our senses: we get sensations from the motion of bodies (bodies are real) Lo(cid:272)ke(cid:859)s episte(cid:373)olog(cid:455) assu(cid:373)es the e(cid:454)iste(cid:374)(cid:272)e of e(cid:454)te(cid:396)(cid:374)al (cid:271)odily reality: assumes god is creator of bodies with sense organs that puts us in touch with external reality. Locke"s argu(cid:373)e(cid:374)ts that reject the existence of innate ideas: It would be rude to suppose that ideas, such the idea of colors innate in a creature, were originally imprinted in the mind. Ideas are formed when a man thinks, so there cant be ideas without thinking: ba(cid:271)ies do(cid:374)(cid:859)t ha(cid:448)e i(cid:374)(cid:374)ate ideas, (cid:449)e (cid:272)a(cid:374)(cid:374)ot ha(cid:448)e ideas (cid:449)he(cid:374) sleepi(cid:374)g, ideas are present to the senses before they are present to reason.
