Universal - whatever is said of or apt to be said of many things...
now we must find out what a thing is.
of actual things, some are universal, some are particular.
aristotle just declared that there are two things.
universal is that which by its nature is predicated.
PREDICATE - dicere, to say. pre dicere, the speak about.
the wall is white.
what is the predicate
wall is the subject
is is the copula (brings together, ie copulate)
so does the predicate really exist apart from the subject.
but the wall does not need white to be a wall, but white needs a thing to be white in.
subject is a particular instantatiation of white
in the sentence MATT IS HUMAN
we have aristotle saying some are universals and some are particulars.
*imo "human" is just a classification
here we have MATT as particular and HUMAN as universal
SPECIES & GENUS
species is human
ie socrates plato and tim all share some criteria, so they are all fitted into a
that species itself will also be contrasted with other species which are similar in
other ways but not the same, so they fit into a respective genus.
animal is the genus that contains the species human, donkey, horse etc
substance - the essential aspect of the thing
accidents - the various things that can be said about the substance but should they be
lost the substance would not cease to be what it is.
according to aristotle the species and genera are actual: so human is actual. animal
but species and genera are SECONDARY SUBSTANCE
PRIMARY SUBSTANCE - that which exists primarily and most of all
SECONDARY SUBSTANCE - species and genera
by primary substance, aristotle does not mean the elements, not the reduced
constitutive principles, but rather what makes a substance indepenent. he does not
mean iron or something, that's just a material cause.
PRIMARY SUBSTANCE IS IN SOME SENSE INDEPENDENT. so the wall is independent, white is
dependent. THOSE THINGS WHICH CAN BE PREDICATED OF ANOTHER THING ARE SAID TO BE SECONDARY
MATT IS HUMAN.
MATT IS PRIMARY
HUMAN IS SECONDARY. human is said of anothing thing.
so for aristotle, white inheres in a wall. but wall does not inhere in anything.
*the problem here is that aristotle and plato propose the exact same question. even
though their answers are different, they both assume a false: that the relations of
our own human classifications are somehow metaphysical and actual outside the mind.
they mistake human classification for real existing metaphysical essences. but there
is only the instance as it is observed (and within those limitations an