william of champeaux's first theory
second objection to "material essence realism":
if the accidents are all genera too, how do i predicate substance of other ultimate
genera. accidents are supposed to make particulars of a species different. but if each
of the nine is its own genus, how does it manifest as only one instance of its
for these various advening forms to differentiate the species and particulars from the
ultimate ONE of the top genera, these advening forms cannot themselves be genera.
WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX'S SECOND THEORY:
they call things discrete "the same," not ESSENTIALLY, but INDIFFERENTLY.
THE SAME THINGS THEY CALL SINGULAR ACCORDING TO THEIR DISCRETENESS THEY CALL UNIVERSAL
ACCORDING TO THEIR 'INDIFFERENCE' AND THE AGREEMENT OF LIKENESS.
"PERSONAL" DISCRETENESS DOES NOT ARISE FROM THOSE FORMS BUT IS FROM THE VERY DIVERSITY
OF THE ESSENCE, JUST AT THE FORMS THEMSELVES ARE DIVERSE FROM ONE ANOTHER IN
You have a discrete essence. But if I take reference to what you are as a universal,
you are indifferent in your nature as a human.
some people take the universal thing as conisting only in a 'collection' of several
but if the collection determines the species, it is going backwards! if you must
collect the thing first to have the universal, rather than having the universals
determine the particulars.
you can take just the people in this classroom, say we are just this group, and we are
a universal species. any collection can be. the parts that make up joe gurba are a
collection, that makes joe gurba a universal, not a particular.
"THERE WOULD BE NO FEWER UNIVERSALS THAN SINGULARS"
universals are supposed to exist entirely in the things they inhere. socrates is
entirely an animal. browny is entirely an anim