FINAL EXAM REVIEW TERMS
1) Aristocracy has been a term mentioned by Plato. Plato defines this term when he talks
about the analogy between the city and the soul.
- Plato suggests that in both he city and the soul, one must obey and one must rule.
-Plato asks who should rule the city or the kallopolis. Plato‘s answers: ‗The best‘ [aristoi]
must rule (III.412c). Thus, the government of the kallipolis is literally an ‗aristocracy‘ –
that is, the rule [kratos] of the aristoi. More specifically, the ‗best of the guardians‘ (or
‗complete guardians‘) – those who ‗seem most of all to believe that they must eagerly
pursue what is advantageous to the city
-Plato thinks aristocracy is not only rule of the best, but specifically rule of the
philosopher-kings, because he thinks philosophy (philosophia = love of wisdom) is the
key qualification to be the best ruler. (unlike in democracy, where citizens merely satisfy
-If only ‗the best‘ should rule, it implies that others should not.
- Plato says democracy is unfair, because people that are good and are ruled by dumb
people. This idea regardless of your skill, plato thnks we will not make the best decision
because we pursue their personal desire.
--Democracy can never be a proper form of rule for the kallipolis because rule of the
demos is necessarily not of ‗the best‘
3) Christianitas: this term has been mentioned by Aquinas in medieval political thought
- The only institution that brought some semblance of unity was the Church. A new kind
of political entity began to emerge that was generally called Christianitas, or
Christendom, which treated the Church not simply as a religious institution, but also as a
political institution with its own universal jurisdiction. Of course, the Church existed
since the early Roman Principate – but with the collapse of the Roman Empire, the
Church continued to exist and picked up the pieces of the Empire.
-The Church viewed itself as the successor to the Roman Empire and even believed itself
to have inherited the right to rule over the world as the Empire did – which is why it was
called Roman and Catholic [=‗universal‘]. But this was complicated because secular
kings believed themselves also to have the right to rule over conquered territories – thus,
there was a brewing conflict over who had the best right to govern
4) Church as a politea: Marsilius of Padua defines the church as part of the state
-On the one hand, the church is a religious body, ministered by a priesthood supposedly
separated from the affairs of the world. On the other hand, the Church, as a political and
legal institution, is deeply involved in earthly matters and has a tremendous stake in
-Popes (as political leaders, not just religious leaders) begin to view the Church not
simply as a religious body, but as a kind of state of its own, with a universally-inclusive
jurisdiction -All Christians are included in the Church and, thus, fall under the Church‘s jurisdiction,
under the ruler ship of the Pope. Pope is increasingly starting to view himself not simply
as the chief priest of the Church, but also as a temporal ruler, like a king.
- And because he is the vicar (or representative) of Christ on earth, he is not just any king,
but he is – like Christ -- king of kings.
5) Commonwealth (Bodin) – or ‘state’: Bodin mentions commonwealth in book 1
chapter 1.A commonwealth is a lawful government of many families, and of that which
unto them in common belongeth, with a puissant sovereignty.‘
-The necessity of a ‗puissant sovereignty‘ to hold a commonwealth together. Without
such a supreme power, there can be no commonwealth.
-‗Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth.
--Bodin is able to separate the ‗commonwealth‘ from the ruling sovereign – meaning that,
not everything the prince wills or says is necessarily what the ‗commonwealth‘ or ‗state‘
wills or says.
6) Consent: *
7) Divine Law: it is the law that is created or legislated by God, as a lawmaker. So, an
example would be the kind of law that one might find in a Scriptural text like the Ten
-Bodin makes an important use of divine law, when he says in Book 1, Chapter 8 of the
Six books on the Commonwealth, that even though the sovereign is above all human law,
the sovereign authority is still nevertheless subject to divine law, so there are some
important usages of the term in the texts.
8) Eternal Law: this term has been mentioned by Aquinas.
-based in divine reason, concerns eternal bliss [beatitudo], created by God as ruler of the
whole universe. p. 48: ‗the rational plan of divine wisdom considered as directing all
actions and movements.‘
-This is significant because Aquinas has 3 different types of laws, and eternal law is one
of the three laws
9) Fortuna: This term has been mentioned by Machiavelli. A prince acquires his power
through virtue or fortuna (luck)
-Fortune is unreliable, it is contrary to reason but after this powerful and reliable the
fortune wants to be conquered by virtue. Machiavelli: fortune favours the bold,
particularly young man
-Machiavelli introduces the idea of fortune to describe the precarious condition that all
humans find themselves in. No one can fully control their circumstances, but we are
partially under the control of the arbitrariness of fortune
-The policy of a virtuous prince (meaning a prince of ability, skill, strength) should be to
take those preparatory steps necessary to limit the potentially harmful consequences of
fortune. What this means is that the prince must limit, as much as possible, his
dependence on fortune for securing his position. Instead, he must learn to rely on his own
virtu (abilities), so that when misfortune or bad luck strikes, the prince will be prepared to minimize the harm. You can never fully get rid of fortune, but at least you can try.
10) Glory: this term has been mentioned by Cicero in On Duties.
- Cicero thinks honorable men ought to seek and cultivate. And when writers composed
the handbooks for princely conduct in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, they usually
had Cicero‘s teaching in mind – that princes should be loved, be liberal (= generous),
avoid military glory, and seek justice
-Cicero says people that are greedy want glory that you should beware the desire for
-Also, Machiavelli has mentioned this word when he explained virtue, he valued glory
11) God: this term has been mentioned by classical philosophers and more
- in the beginning of the term, we learn that Socrates was condemned to death by the
Athenians for allegedly ‗corrupting the youth of Athens‘ and ‗impiety‘ against the gods
through his teachings
-One of the contemporary philosophers that use the term God is Aquinas in his book City
of Gods. This is important because it is one of the main themes of political theory in the
-Kingship was regarded the most favored form of government in the Middle Ages
because it imitated the divine form of the rule of God. But kings could not simply govern
arbitrarily and without any limits. They had to govern by consent and according to law.
-Also this term was mentioned by Marsillius. He mentions that there is conflict between
the state and Christ
-The doctrine of the two swords: God governs the whole world with two powers or
―swords‖ – the temporal sword and the spiritual sword.
-The Church, by its priesthood, is said to exercise exclusively one of those
―swords‖ – the spiritual sword, variously called ―the power of the keys,‖ priestly power,
papal power, ecclesiastical power. These are ordinarily thought to mean the power of
administering sacraments instituted by Christ.
-this theory is presented by Marsillius and in chapter 18.
-Empire was thought to be a creation of the Church, in the service and defense of the
Church, and the Emperor was thought to be dependent on the Pope
-The goal of the Papacy in Unam Sanctam is the assertion of Papal supremacy
(hierocratic theory) and universal jurisdiction over the whole world. Bull presents a
dangerous position for the French Crown, and, potentially, for all secular rulers.
-the pope is the rightful judge and ruler of the entire world and that, at their true
valuation, emperors and kings are no more than the sword-bearers of the Church
-a universal jurisdiction – the Church claims jurisdiction over all Christians by exercising
the spiritual sword; the Empire claims jurisdiction because the Emperor is dominus mundi
[lord of all the world].
13) Human Law:
-This is mentioned by Aquinas -based on human reason, concerns the good of civil peace (p. 22, ‗the most important
social good‘; cp. Augustine, summum bonum), created by the temporal ruler p. 53:
‗discipline through fear of punishment...to bring about peace and virtue among men.‘ To
qualify as law, human law must be ‘derived from’ or ‘agree with’ natural law.
Mutable quality of human law—pragmatic reasons for legal change (p. 56), but concerns
about effects (p. 57: ‗human law should never be changed unless the common welfare is
compensated in some way‘). Roman law as a prime example of ‗human law‘ (p. 54
-Relation between human law and natural law: Natural law as the yardstick to measure
the ‗justness‘ or ‗rightness‘ of human law. If human law does not agree with natural law,
it is not law. So human law and natural law don‘t coexist side by side – but natural law is
superior and prior to human law.
14: Inferior magistrate (or popular magistrate)
-calvin talks about the purpose of human government why should we listen to humans
when we should listen to god power? He asks the question you are a magistrate becomes
a tyrant contrary exercise rule of god, is there any recourse in the magistry. His answers
is popular magistrate.
-tribune is like popular magistrate in the Christian polis. (this is the first comparison)
-Ephors (second comparison): 2 kings and had all the executive powers. Sometimes the
kings would do things out of line and thent he ephors would restrain them.
-popular magistrate function is board of directors to keep the magistrate in line and that is
the basic analysis. Calvin provides detail. Popular magistrate cant do anything on their
own, so it is a collective decision they have to agree with others.
-the idea of justice was the major disussion in Book 1
-Socrates really does (I.331c-336a) is criticize some possible definitions. He doesn‘t tell
us what justice is; he merely tells us what justice is not – characteristic of the elenctic
-‗Speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred
-‘ Simonides‘ definition: ‗it is just to give to each what is owed to him.
-‘ Justice as a ‗craft‘ [Gr. techne] of treating friends well and treating enemies badly
-Plato‘s claim is that justice is a type of good in category (c) We should value justice
because it is intrinsically valuable;But also because justice is attached to certain desirable
rewards and consequences.
16) Aquines- Types of Law
(1)Eternal law: based in divine reason, concerns eternal bliss [beatitudo], created by God
as ruler of the whole universe. p. 48: ‗the rational plan of divine wisdom considered as
directing all actions and movements.‘
(2)Natural Law: the law through which humans ‗participate‘ in God‘s eternal law. p. 46:
‗participation in the eternal law by rational creatures‘ Epistemic access to the content of
natural law is unique to man, but not necessary since all animals ‗participate‘ merely by
following natural inclination.
Single standard of truth and right for every human in general, as a first principle, since humans are in theory capable of acting in accordance with reason.
Human Law: based on human reason, concerns the good of civil peace (p. 22, ‗the most
important social good‘; cp. Augustine, summum bonum), created by the temporal ruler p.
53: ‗discipline through fear of punishment...to bring about peace and virtue among men.‘
-To qualify as law, human law must be ‘derived from’ or ‘agree with’ natural law.
Mutable quality of human law—pragmatic reasons for legal change (p. 56), but concerns
about effects (p. 57: ‗human law should never be changed unless the common welfare is
compensated in some way‘). Roman law as a prime example of ‗human law‘ (p. 54)
17) Aquinas Law- 3 Requirements of Law
1st requirement: Must be based in reason p. 44: ‗Law [lex] is a rule or measure of
action by which one is led to action or restrained from acting...The rule and measure of
action is the reason.‘
Aquinas‘ answer to the Roman lex regia: ‗In order for an act of will...to have the
character of law, it must be guided by some reason. This is how we should understand
the saying that ‗the will of the prince has the force of law.‘ [Dig. 1.4.1] Criticism of the
absolutist reading of Roman law: Law is not arbitrary will, but only rational will
p. 48: if something is contrary to law, it is not law but ‗a perversion of law.‘
2nd requirement: Must concern the common happiness [felicitatem communem] – cp.
‗eudaimonia‘ p. 44: ‗Law must concern itself in particular with the happiness of the
3rd requirement: Must be authorized and enforced by the proper lawmaking authority p.
45: ‗Prince in a state‘ and ‗any father of a family [paterfamilias]...in his household.‘ It
can even be a whole people.
18)Law (review Aristotle’s analysis) *not sure if this is right*:
Aristotle‘s key doctrine is that political life is natural, not artificial.
Pol. 1.2: ‘Every state (polis) exists by nature’ If you can live without a state, then
you must be ‗either subhuman or superhuman.‘
For this reason, Aristotle makes the very famous claim that,
Pol. 1.2: ‘Man is by nature a political animal (zoon politikon).’
But what is the key distinctive human power that separates humans from other
‗gregarious animals‘ (like bees or ants or birds)? The power of speech (logos): Pol. 1.2:
‘Speech...serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful, and so also
just and what is unjust.’
Enables humans to have deliberative judgment (prohairesis)
Pol. 1.2: ‘The state has a natural priority over the household and over any
individual among us. For the whole must be prior to the part...It is clear then that
the state is both natural and prior to the individual.’ 20) Law (Bodin)
-Bodin‘s answer: p. 38: ‗Law is nothing but the command of a sovereign making use of
-Law should not be defined in terms of what the law should be, but in terms of what the
law actually is and how it is enforced. So, against Aristotle-Cicero-Aquinas, an unjust
law is still valid law for Bodin. The morality of law is an entirely different matter from
the validity of law.
-Sovereign must be exempt from human law because one cannot command or bind
himself (based on Roman-law principle on forming of obligations, Dig. 126.96.36.199 – self-
binding is impossible).
-Law is not a contract (p. 15) – even though contractual obligations are nevertheless
binding. No law is perpetual (pp. 29-30); it can always be changed by the sovereign. -
Legislative power is now becoming identified with sovereignty. ‗Lawmaking‘ not simply
‗lawfinding‘ – new philosophy of law
21) Law (Marsillius)
-Law is defined in the classical manner as the doctrine of right [juris-prudentia] follows
broadly Aristotelian outlines. But Marsilius insists (1.10.5): ‗Not all true cognitions of
matters of civil justice and benefit are laws unless a coercive command has been given
concerning their observance.‘ So it‘s not enough that a rule be intrinsically reasonable or
beneficial to the common good.
- There must be some commanding lawmaking will in order for there to be law.
Otherwise, we can only have suggestions or advice or reasons or wishes for action. But
-This marks one of the first times that a voluntarist theory of law [from voluntas = will]
has been articulated, suggesting that what makes law ‗law‘ is the fact that someone wills
it, and not because it is intrinsically rational (like in Aristotle or Aquinas).
-Law and states are the product of human will. It is the human will that creates law and
creates the state.
22) Law (in Cicero – lex vs. jus; Stoic conception):
-To have a res publica (best constitution), you need some system of rule of law. Lex and
Jus in Roman legal thought
-‗Law‘ – translates two different words in Latin source texts: Lex and Jus.
(1)Lex has a narrower meaning in classical Rome, statutes formally passed and
promulgated by the Populus (e.g., the Lex Valeria). Traditional etymology: lex derived
from ligere (to bind
(2)Jus is more difficult. Sometimes translated as ―right‖ (thus, jus naturale is ―natural
right‖), so ―injury‖ [in-juria] is, literally, something ―without right.‖ But ―right‖ in the
sense of an objective norm or standard (as when we say that, (a) ―it is right that one
should keep one‘s promises‖ but not (b) ―you have a right to free speech‖). 23) Mixed Constitution:
-Polybius‘ analysis inHistorie sVI: The genius of Rome was in its mixed constitution.
-No one element of the Roman constitution could dominate or fully control the
-But the Rome‘s mixed constitution did not take shape by design. No one
‗designed‘ the Roman constitution (like Sparta, which had a lawgiver). Rather, it
emerged gradually from its constant internal struggling.
-Bodin thinks it is, which is why there can never be a ‗mixed constitution.‘
-Bodin‘s criticism of the mixed constitution Book II, Ch. 1 (pp. 103-4): Imagine a state
where the people have some rights of sovereignty, the aristocratic nobility have another
set of rights, and the prince has yet another set of rights.
This is the classical model of the mixed constitution (remember Aristotle, Polybius,
Cicero, Aquinas, etc).
-But Bodin denies that such a mixed state even exists. P. 105, ‗Mixture...is not a state, but
rather the corruption of a state.‘
-The classical philosophers and historians – Plato, Aristotle, Polybius – were all wrong to
assume the existence of the mixed form of state (p. 95). There is no such thing, if
sovereignty is absolute and indivisible.
24) Middle Constitution
-Plato‘s ‗rule-of-the-best‘ (philosopher-kingship) was one of these five forms – the
political constitution of virtue. In his book he is trying to explain which constitution is the
- Plato uses middle constitution when he talks about timocracy. The shift of aristocracy to
-He says that the shift from aristocracy to timocracy has a result that‘s in the middle, it
both has good and bad features
-The good features are from aristocracy: rulers are respected, fighters not laborers,
communal life, and physical training
-The bad features are from Oligrachy: won‘t appoint wise leaders, incline towards
‗spiritedness‘ (thumos), war-like, love of money-making
25) Military virtue, arms
26) Mode of government (modus gubernandi):
Bodin distinguishes between:
(1) the form of the sovereign state, which is only one of three possibilities [difficult to
translate – in Latin, B. uses status reipublicae, but it can in English be ‗estate of the
commonwealth] (2) the mode of governing or administering the sovereignty which can
take on many different
possibilities [in Latin, B. writes modus gubernandi]
Wiki=Yellow Lecture Slides=Green
Monarchy/Kingship (lecture slides)
(Aquinas)Kingship was regarded the most favored form of government in the Middle
Ages because it imitated the divine form of the rule of God. But kings could not simply
govern arbitrarily and without any limits. They had to govern by consent and according
to law. The king is thought to be like the ‗head,‘ whereas the kingdom or the community
is thought to be like a ‗body.‘ If the head governs poorly, it can remove the head and
replace with another. Even in the Church, theologians argued that if the Pope governs
poorly or illegally, the Church Council (representing the body of the Church) can depose
the Pope and appoint a new one, because the pope is said to be maior singuli, minor
Notice that sovereignty, for Bodin, does not have to be in monarchical form. Personally,
monarchy, for reasons he gives elsewhere, but insofar as legal science is concerned
‗popular sovereignty‘ is just as valid and legitimate as ‗royal sovereignty.‘
Cicero even suggests an interesting possibility (De Rep. III.45-6): A monarchy and an
aristocracy can be a respublica, as long as it favors public interests
Natural law (Cicero) (wiki)
Cicero wrote in his De Legibus that both justice and law derive their origin from God.
For Cicero, natural law obliges us to contribute to the general good of the larger society.
The purpose of positive laws is to provide for "the safety of citizens, the preservation of
states, and the tranquility and happiness of human life." In this view, "wicked and unjust
statutes" are "anything but 'laws,'" because "in the very definition of the term 'law' there
inheres the idea and principle of choosing what is just and true." Law, for Cicero, "ought
to be a reformer of vice and an incentive to virtue." Cicero expressed the view that "the
virtues which we ought to cultivate, always tend to our own happiness, and that the best
means of promoting them consists in living with men in that perfect union and charity
which are cemented by mutual benefits."
Natural law (Aquinas) (lecture slides and wiki)
Natural law: the law through which humans ‗participate‘ in God‘s eternal law. p. 46:
‗participation in the eternal law by rational creatures‘ Epistemic access to the content of natural law is unique to man, but not necessary since all animals ‗participate‘ merely by
following natural inclination. Single standard of truth and right for every human in
general, as a first principle, since humans are in theory capable of acting in accordance
Human law: based on human reason, concerns the good of civil peace (p. 22, ‗the most
important social good‘; cp. Augustine, summum bonum), created by the temporal ruler p.
53: ‗discipline through fear of punishment…to bring about peace and virtue among men.‘
To qualify as law, human law must be ‘derived from’ or ‘agree with’ natural law.
Aquinas restored Natural Law to its independent state, asserting natural law as the
rational creature's participation in the eternal law. Yet, since human reason could not
fully comprehend the Eternal law, it needed to be supplemented by revealed Divine law.
(See also Biblical law in Christianity.) Meanwhile, Aquinas taught that all human or
positive laws were to be judged by their conformity to the natural law. An unjust law is
not a law, in the full sense of the word. It retains merely the 'appearance' of law insofar as
it is duly constituted and enforced in the same way a just law is, but is itself a 'perversion
of law.' At this point, the natural law was not only used to pass judgment on the
moral worth of various laws, but also to determine what the law said in the first place.
This principle laid the seed for possible societal tension with reference to tyrants.
New Prince Machiavelli (lecture slide)
And among ‗new principalities,‘ they are either: ‗completely new…or joined‘ to an
existing state (this is called a ‗mixed principality‘ in Ch. 3 – don‘t confuse with ‗mixed
constitution‘ – not the same thing) Finally, he specifies how a ‗new prince‘ acquired his
state: ‗either with the arms of others or with one‘s own…either through luck [fortuna] or
favor or else through ability [in Italian, virtu] In The Prince, Machiavelli is not
addressing all political rulers, or even all princes. Rather, the audience he has in mind is
of a rather narrow scope, and that is only ―new prince‖ (il principe nuovo), as he
describes here – the person who, by fortune or by his own merits, has come into
possession and control of a state but
does not yet have much experience in the art of politics.
, cities or provinces that are accustomed to being ruled by a prince are easy to take over
once the ruling family has been destroyed. People in such states are accustomed to
obedience and do not know how to live in freedom without having someone to rule over
them. Therefore, the new prince can win the province and hold onto it more easily.
Obedience/Disobedience Reformation (Lecture 11)
Luther was actually quite conservative politically and sharply disagreed with radicals
who took Luther‘s ideas to the extreme to say that they no longer need to obey any secular rulers because of their sole obedience to God.'The first duty of subjects towards
their rulers, is to entertain the most honourable views of their office, recognizing it as a
delegated jurisdiction from God, and on that account receiving and reverencing them as
the ministers and ambassadors of God.'
Calvin restates the general idea that magistrates are authorized by God as a direct
delegation, so obedience is owed to them just as much as it is owed to God. But he then
introduces an important qualification in this general duty:
'I speak not of the men as if the mask of dignity could cloak folly, or cowardice, or
cruelty, or wicked and flagitious manners, and thus acquire for vice the praise of virtue;
but i say that the station [or rank] itself is deserving of honour and reverence, and that
those who rule should, in respect of their office, be held by us in esteem and veneration.'
This is a potentially confusing and troubling line of thought, because Calvin is confusing
again where we should direct our duty of obedience. Do we owe our obedience to (1) the
actual person who happens to be ruling now; or (2) to the office or the 'dignity' that the
ruler happens to occupy? Here, it sounds like Calvin means to say our obedience is to be
directed to (2), but not necessarily to (1). But doesn't that mean we can withhold our duty
of obedience to (1) - especially when the person who is now in position of power is ruling
badly (or tyrannically, immorally, or in an 'ungodly' way, etc.)
Calvin's general political idea, is that when the community is gathered together in an
official capacity, they collectively exercise a power that is greater than the magistrate in
charge. So, it seems that there are limits to the obedience owed to a ruler, and that there is
a pathway to lawful resistance. It is through these 'popular magistrates' or inferior
magistrates, when acting collectively, that they may contest the rule of the supreme
Whenever a magistrate acts contrary to God, he loses the office or 'dignity' that we are
bound to obey - he is no longer a magistrate, but just another regular person, whom we
are in no way bound to obey or show any special obedience. Despite disavowing
resistance and trying to defend the duty of people to obey their rulers, Calvin actually
gives us a recipe for resistance.
Office vs. the person occupying the office Reformation
Obedience is due not to the person who occupies the office, but to the office itself,
whoever happens to occupy the office of the magistrate
I think you can just mention resisitance theory here since that ^^ is all that I could find on
the topic Pars principans (‗the ruling part‘) Marsilius
In every state, there must be a distinct ‗ruling part‘ [pars principans] to settle disputes
arising among members and keep the peace (1.4.4). Cp. Aquinas on the perpetual need
for a ruler. The ruling part is said to be ‗well-tempered‘ (1.8.2) if it (a) ‗governs for the
common benefit‘ (Aristotelian), but also (b) ‗in accordance with the will of the subjects‘
Peace (or tranquility)
I searched tranquility in all of his lecture notes and nothing came up so....
Plenitude of power (plenitude potestatis) Marsilius
Pope is thought to be supreme over all rulers on earth, by exercising what Canonists (i.e.,
Church lawyers) called ―plenitude of power‖ [plenitudo potestatis – compare, Roman-
law plena potestas]
In the High Middle Ages, power-seeking popes began to interpret the two-swords
doctrine in a way that
favored widening the scope of Church powers in political affairs. This new conception of
generally labeled ―plenitude of power‖ [plenitudo potestatis].
The Church‘s ‗perverted desire for rulership, which they say is owed to them because of
the plenitude of power given to them…by Christ.‘ Pope‘s assertion of superior
jurisdiction over all kings and princes and even (1.19.11) over the Rex Romanorum.
Usurping temporal power; illegally claiming powers belonging to temporal rulers.
Marsilius argues that the Church is not a jurisdictional body with coercive power like a
state; priestly power is essentially different from temporal power. Plenitude of power is
contrary to Christ‘s teachings.
Key constitutional doctrines emerge in C.13-C.14 in part because of the perceived threat
of encroaching Church powers. Constitutional theories (especially in Marsilius) took the
shape they did in order to limit and control the excesses of the pope‘s ‗plenitude of
power,‘ not secular power.
‗Principalities,‘ meaning those states governed with a princely ruler. Among
principalities, Machiavelli tells us there are several different kinds: ‗either hereditary…or
they are new‘ And among ‗new principalities,‘ they are either: ‗completely new…or
joined‘ to an existing state (this is called a ‗mixed principality‘ in Ch. 3 –don‘t confuse
with ‗mixed constitution‘ – not the same thing) (sparknotes)
It is much easier to maintain control over a new principality if the people share the same
language and customs as the prince‘s own country. If this is the case, the prince has to do
only two things: destroy the family of the former prince, and maintain the principality‘s
laws and taxes. People will live quietly and peacefully so long as their old ways of life
Machiavelli notes that it is easier to govern a hereditary state than a new principality for
two main reasons. First, those under the rule of such states are familiar with the prince‘s
family and are therefore accustomed to their rule. The natural prince only has to keep past
institutions intact, while adapting these institutions to current events. Second, the natural
disposition of subjects in a hereditary state is to love the ruling family, unless the prince
commits some horrible act against his people. Even if a strong outsider succeeds in
conquering a prince‘s hereditary state, any setback the outsider encounters will allow the
prince to reconquer the state.
A localized territory or region ruled by a prince (or princess), from which the term is
derived. A prince may rule more than one principality. All principalities can be grouped
under the general category of ―state.‖ A principality is ruled autocratically and is
therefore distinguished from a republic, the only other type of state. For the most part, the
advice found in The Prince is geared toward principalities, although the book does
reference republics in some cases.
Reason of state Cicero
The separation of morality and politics- But observe that the arguments provided by
Machiavelli are not straightforwardly moral arguments. They are of a different kind. His
considerations are about stability or well-being of the sta