HIS344 Study Guide.docx

34 Pages
Unlock Document

University of Toronto St. George
Vasilis Dimitriadis

HIS344 Study Guide The “First” Cold War/Truman Doctrine - Historiography about the Cold War, collapse of Grand Alliance o Traditional view  Came from the West, the US  Dominated until the mid-1960s  Era of McCarthyism  Soviets did not “provide” evidence against this view  Cause of the Cold War was nothing but Soviet activity, the Soviet Union  Guilt falls on the Soviets, Communism and Stalin  Communism by its nature wanted to expand  Soviet Union aimed to overthrow the free world o Revisionist  Mid 1970s – US and Soviet relations thawed out -> challenged the traditional interpretations  Cold War emerged because of the US being in a superior position -> its desire to ensure markets for their its economy o Post-Revisionist  1989-90: unprecedented opportunity because all of the Soviet archives were opened to the public  Both sides committed blunders, tried to gain the upper hand in Cold War  Archives proved that it wasn’t just Soviet ideology but also genuine Soviet concerns triggered international conflicts  Both sides pursued their national interests  US had misinterpreted Soviet actions  Many post-revisionist still put more blame on the Soviets o Soviet  Every single point blames the US  Looks over the Soviets’ own mistakes - Beginnings of the Cold War o By Potsdam Conference in 1945, it became clear to the major states that national interests were more important than cooperation  Truman: “I’m tired of babying the Soviets”  Truman did not have a working relationship with Stalin  Soviets felt they had a free-hand over the countries in the East - The communization of Eastern Europe during the first three years after the end of WWII precipitated a fundamental reassessment of US foreign policy towards the USSR o Truman administration began to interpret it as the first stage of a Russian campaign to acquire control of the entire continent of Europe - Developments that lead to the Truman Doctrine o Feb. 1946: Stalin’s Speech to the Supreme Soviet  Announced that the world was now divided into two hostile camps – capitalist and communist – that were destined to come to blows o Kennan’s “Long Telegram”  In his telegram, Kennan laid out the course of future US foreign policy 1  Argued that the USSR, due to its nature, will always feel insecure, have the need to establish spheres of influence  Given political and ideological nature of the USSR, it is not possible for any Western states to cooperate with them  Communism is committed to the destruction of capitalism  Only way to deal with Soviets is through confrontation and containment globally -> Soviets not allowed to achieve a single victory o Winston Churchill – “Iron Curtain” Speech  Warned that an Iron Curtain had descended across Europe behind which evil communism was spreading and trying to expand  Called for Anglo-American alliance against the USSR to counter what he viewed as the country’s expansionist policy o Food Crisis in Germany  Lucius Clay warned that if economic situation is not alleviated it would lead to a communist controlled Germany  Fears that capitalist economic collapse in Europe would lead to a Soviet takeover o Iran and Turkey 1946  Stalin made demands to both countries in order to increase the Soviet sphere of influence  Britain and US intervene and protest against the demands – threaten military action  Stalin backs down in both cases but shows he is willing to push the envelope o Greek Civil War  Percentages Agreement - Greece considered within the British sphere of interest  British defeat Greek Communists -> Stalin did not give aid to the Communists  Early 1946 – return to civil war in Greece  Truman administration saw the Greek insurgency as an instance of Soviet meddling that had already been witnessed in Iran and Turkey  Feb. 1947: Britain announces that dire economic conditions at home would oblige it totherminate all financial assistance to Greece and Turkey - Truman Doctrine – March 12 , 1947 o Was an unconditional pledge of American assistance to countries anywhere in the world that were threatened either by external aggression from the USSR or an indigenous Communist insurgency backed by Moscow o Communism would be opposed pro-actively o US will stand up wherever it is necessary to promote Western democratic values o First active step of the Cold War - After the Truman Doctrine o George Kennan’s Article in Foreign Affairs  USSR would probe the weak spots all along its periphery to expand its power and national security  Moscow would pursue these expansionist goals by annexation or satellite states  The US alone was capable of imposing limits on Soviet expansion  US must do so discreetly and indirectly by promoting the prosperity, stability and security of those countries in danger 2  These military robust and economically viable states along its periphery would oblige the USSR to accept its geographical limits  This doctrine of “containment” was rooted in the assumption that a major objective of Soviet foreign policy was the achievement of hegemony over non- communist Europe o 1947: Marshall Plan  Restoration of Western Europe’s economic viability was seen as the key to the success of ‘containment’  US promised financial assistance and economic aid to Europe  Financial assistance would be distributed on a multi-lateral basis: individual European countries would have to cooperate, integrate their markets and create a supranational institution (would later develop into the EU)  Opened up market possibilities for American businesses  Offer was extended to all European countries also those of Eastern Europe  Many Eastern European states expressed interest to participate in the Marshall Plan -> instigated a real Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe – Stalinization o Increasing Militarization of the Cold War  Clashes over the future of Germany  March 1946: Kennan argues that unified idea of Germany must be dropped  Jan. 1947: Bi-Zonia o British and US zones merged o Greater effort to rejuvenate the Germany economy  London Conference Feb-June 1948  Western proposal to merge their zones and include West Germany into the EER  Creation of single currency – Deutsche Mark  Berlin Blockade  Berlin is closed off from the West  Americans decide to supply West Berlin through an airlift  Blockade is lifted in May 1949  Declaration of NATO – April 1949  Goal was to resist any Soviet aggression in Western Europe  Attack against any member state would be considered an attack on the entire NATO  Created a military block  Purpose of NATO was a political statement by the US, that US would side with Western Europe  Raised the stakes of military confrontation o April 1950: NSC-68  Laid the foundation of US foreign policy for the next 4 decades  There could be ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the USSR  Containment policy was no longer sufficient – communism had to be destroyed  Proposed a number of measures:  Developing the hydrogen bomb to preserve America’s nuclear advantage 3  Increase in US conventional forces  Expansion of American defense industries  300% budget increase in the defense budget o NATO’s “Forward Looking Strategy” (Sept. 1950)  Would see an immediate military response to a Soviet attack o 1950-1953: The Korean War  Turned the Cold War into a Hot War  Truman Doctrine prompted the US to intervene – turn to the UN o West Germany integrated into NATO in 1955 o Creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 o The Schumann Plan – created the ECSC – further integration in Western Europe o Berlin Crisis of 1958 and 1961 The Thaw Peaceful Coexistence? - 1953 o Eisenhower Presidency  Truman was disillusioned by the criticism against him, that he was soft on communism -> however he had made a contentious effort  Eisenhower wins the election by a landslide – population was convinced he would do much better against communism  Meant a new course in US foreign policy  With the death of Stalin, it meant a new start and a new opportunity o Death of Stalin o Historiography  After 8 years of challenging each other, there was a moment where the tension could have been  Traditionalists  See no change in the new Soviet government after Stalin’s death  Actually Soviets changed the means with which it employed expansionism – instead use good-will, diplomacy to undermine the West  Revisionists  New leadership of the Soviets was parting with the old policies  Genuine Willingness in their approach to work with the West  Traditionalists always turn a blind eye to their own, the Americans’, aggression - American perspective o US still dominated in military terms, wanted o Americans had to create a powerful and viable army o Army had to be increased to 3 million o However, Eisenhower was also interested in:  limiting government  A balanced budget  Maintain the standard of living in the US o Maintainence of the conventional army east a large part of the budget o The “New Look” 4  Create a overwhelming military power  But also save the budget, maintain the standard of living o Nuclear arsenal of the US was increased  Getting rid of the conventional weapons o This is where the theory of massive retaliation comes up o US Concerns  Eisenhower was alarmed by the cost of massive retaliation – did not want the US to go broke  Military industrial complex – Eisenhower recognized that policies are driven by domestic interests, by the interests of the leaders of the military - Soviet perspective o Stalin was succeeded by a collective leadership – “The New Presidium”  Comprised Chief of Secret Service Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev  Khruschchev was a newcomer, emerged as the leader after years of infighting o Beria was quickly discredited for supporting Stalin, arrested and executed o Khrushchev’s foreign policy:  Denounced Stalin’s foreign policy  Found it too stubborn, rigid and risky  Claimed that it had been erroneous, based on half-truths  Molotov claimed that Krushchev was naïve - o Krushchev visits Yugoslavia  Showed his willingness to openly acknowledge a mistake made by Stalin’s leadership - This approach prompted the US to rethink their own approach The Thaw - “Chance for Peace” – April 1953 o Eisenhower offered the Soviets a negotiated settlement on all issues - “Atoms for Peace” – Dec. 1953 o Eisenhower agreed to share fissionable material with the world o To create an international organization from which member states could use these materials - Winston Churchill recognized the fact that the development of nuclear weapons changed the dynamics of international politics o That peaceful coexistence was much more beneficial o Churchill supported a meeting of all the 4 Powers – “Conference on the Highest Level” – May 11, 1955 - British develop the “Eden Plan” o PM Eden proposed a solution to the German question:  To allow a free election in both German states and allow the Germans to make up their mind without any interference - Eventually the Soviets realized that all these offers were genuine - Americans wanted the Soviets to demonstrate their willingness - Soviets dissolved the Cominform – April 1955 o Clear cut demonstration by the Soviet Union that it was no longer willing to undermine Western governments o Showed a desire to loosen the grip on the states of Eastern Europe 5 - May Day Parade 1955 o Khrushchev publicly announces that it is possible for peaceful coexistence of the two camps o Offers an olive branch to the Western world - The Bering Strait incident – June 1955 o Soviets release American pilots shot down over the Bering Straits without any conditions o Garnered support in the US - Soviets agree to evacuate all forces from Austria – Oct. 1955 o Austria must remain strictly neutral – cannot join one of the two camps - Soviets give back a military fortress back to Finland - Soviet willingness even survived after West Germany was incorporated into NATO in 1955 - Soviet Union creates the Warsaw Pact - Only after these developments that a great summit in Geneva was agreed upon Geneva Conference – July 1955 - Propositions: o Disarmament o Nuclear/military inspections  Common and reciprocal inspections o “Open Skies”  Would allow each side to inspect the others facilities via planes  Use of spy planes - Eisenhower wanted to meet with General Zhukov, leader of the Soviet army o Khrushchev agreed o Zhukov admitted several mistakes of Soviet foreign policy of the Stalin years; it did not have all the information, had  Admitted that foreign policy had not reflect realities - Krushchev did not agree to inspection of their own military capabilities – didn’t want the US to find out how incapable and unprepared the Soviet Union war - Nothing came out of the Geneva summit yet everything changed o Political climate had changed - Dec 1955 – foreign minister meet o Dullles, US foreign minister, wanted to negotiate from a position of strength o No solution to disarmament until the German solution was solved o Soviets wanted to negotiate disarmament first 1955 was a breakthrough in international relations – changed the relationship between the Soviets and US 6 Nuclear Arms Race - After WWII, there was a move from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons o Goal was to speed up conflicts o Development of the atomic bomb o Hydrogen bomb – 1000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb o States had these weapons but did not know how to use them; did not know how effective they were - Considerations for Hot War o US thought of nuclear weapons as an extension of conventional weapons; realized that even if they used all of their nuclear weapons they would still not be able to defeat the Soviets o Soviets only though defensively – military was tasked with defending the homeland - American Nuclear Deterrence o Sufficient forces were need to strik back at the country of origin with the available nuclear weapons o Any aggressor would be fully aware of the consequences of an attack o Feb 1946 – study said that best defence for the Americans was to try and avert wars  No state would consider attack if US has superiority o Gen. Curtis Lemay  Rejected deterrence  Argued that American military plans allow for pre-emptive strikes o US Inter-service rivalry prevented coming up with one coherent and integrated strategy - Stalin and Soviet Nuclear Policy o Soviets did not develop a coherent nuclear strategy – Stalin was obsessed with atomic weapons - Berlin Blockade and Korean War prompted the Americans to develop a coherent nuclear strategy o Strategy had to be incorporated into their military, political and diplomatic plans The Nuclear Strategies - Options: o Limited Nuclear War  Pros: ensured limited victory; not escalation in global conflict, smaller costs  Cons: could not achieve clear cut victory o Full-Scale Nuclear War  Pros: destroyed opponent completely  Cons: destruction of an entire society - US Strategy o Agreed to ‘deterrence’ and ‘retaliation’  Rested on the assumption that the USSR knew that any aggression would be met by American nuclear forces  Envisioned the USSR on holding back from engaging the US  It would never be sufficient – Soviets could challenge the Americans over and over in limited actions o After the Russians had tested the atomic bomb in 1949, Truman authorized the development of the hydrogen in 1950 o In 1953, the Soviets matched the US by testing their own hydrogen bomb 7 o Eisenhower’s “New Look”  Create an overwhelming military power  Nuclear arsenal of the US increased – more cost-effective than maintaining conventional forces o Massive Retaliation (1954)  Does not require conventional forces to defend the Western border – was a lot cheaper  Allowed US military forces to retaliate against any perceived Soviet aggression  Threat alone that Soviet aggression would be met with massive retaliation would force the Soviets to back down  Eisenhower believed this to be the most effective way by expanding nuclear forces and express a willingness to use them  Eisenhower envisioned nuclear weapons as a key stone to the strategy of deterrence  Shortcomings:  Definition of aggression  Could have tempted the Soviets to carry out a first strike o Flexible Response (1961)  Allowed the Americans to retaliate but always dependent on the scale of the aggression - Soviet Strategy o Only after Stalin’s death did the military high command develop a coherent strategy o Within 6 years, the Red army had been modernized, brought up to the level of its Western counterparts  Development of nuclear weapons  Continental missiles on submarines o Soviets developed a strategy based around pre-emptive strikes o Khrushchev seemed willing to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons to wage and win a nuclear war o Khrushchev initiated sharp cuts in conventional Soviet forces and diverted resources to his country’s nuclear program o Furthered the development of a delivery system that could carry nuclear weapons from Soviet bases to their intended targets in the US The Arms Race - SAC – Strategic Air Command – centralized command for the use of nuclear weapons o Containment reinforced by a political and military strike o Developed three different types of bombers: B-52 - “The Bomber Gap” o The mid-1950s, Soviets developed a long-range bomber “Bison” but did not produce sufficient numbers o US overestimated Soviet capabilities and fuelled concerns about national security – believed that the Soviets had a huge advantage – however the Soviets had tricked them - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) o Soviets  launched the first ICBM in 1957  Nov. 1957: Launch of Sputnik – diplomatic and scientific victory for the USSR 8  Showed that the Soviets had a missile that could launch a satellite into space  Meant that if the Soviets had such a missile, it could also reach the US  Huge damage to American prestige  Meant that the USSR had acquired a delivery system capable of exposing American territory to nuclear attack against which there was no defense  Spectacular breakthrough in nuclear delivery systems o Americans  Americans rapidly tested “Atlas” ICBMs  Americans began producing the Atlas in great numbers  By the end of the Eisenhower administration, it had begun to deploy a formidable ICBM system and expand both the quantity and quality of its already superior long-range bomber force - The “Missile Gap” o The long-range missiles that the Soviets had tested in 1957 proved to be expensive and unwieldy o By 1960, the USSR only possessed 4 ICBMs capable of reaching targets in the US  Focus shifted to production of intermediate range and medium range BMs targeted at Western Europe and American bases along the periphery of the USSR o Khrushchev launched a second campaign of deception over-exaggerating the capabilities and quantity of Soviet ICBMs o Prompted controversy over a perceived “missile gap” in the US o In reality, the US enjoyed the overwhelming advantage in missile capable of attacking the other’s homeland - However, the incontestable reality remained that the US had lost the immunity from nuclear attack that it had enjoyed since the advent of the atomic age - US revealed that the it possessed such a decisive superiority in ICBMs that its second-strike capability was more than sufficient to deter a Soviet nuclear attack o This exposure caused a serious loss of credibility and prestige in Moscow Moves towards Parity and Détente - Cuban Missile Crisis highlighted the problems of massive retaliation o Almost led to a nuclear showdown o Forced both to pull back from the brink o Both sides begin to reach out for cooperation - After the Missile Crisis, the Soviets channelled all their resources into their military, into the missile program in order to achieve parity – believed that they could only deal with the US from a position of strength - Aug. 1963: Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty - July. 1968: Non-Proliferation Treaty o Nuclear technology would not be sold to other states - The agreements in the 1960s restricting the testing, development and deployment of nuclear weapons constituted an unprecedented instance of international cooperation in the interests of global security 9 o However did not limit the expansion of nuclear warheads o Soviets were not interest in strategic arms limitations as long as they were still inferior to the US - Soviets begin a massive campaign of nuclear modernization aimed at bridging the gap in ICBMS and SLBMs - By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet arsenal of ICBMs had expanded to 1,050 compared to 1,054 for the US o Had surpassed the US in SLBM forces and closing the gap in long range bombers o This increase occurred in a time when the Americans had diverted resources away from the nuclear program - By 1967, US came to regard the emerging condition of nuclear parity as a positive force of stability - Two superpowers had attained the condition of “mutually assured destruction” – it guaranteed the safety of the world o Neither side would ever contemplate a first strike - MAD provided the modicum of security for both parties that was required for genuine progress in arms control negotiations to be achieved - Lead to the SALT I negotiations - led to a rapprochement between the US and USSR in the era of ‘détente’ The Cuban Missile Crisis - Brought the two sides to the brink of nuclear Armageddon Historiography - The Hawks (Traditionalists) o Blame the Soviet Union; that they wanted to challenge the US no matter the cost o US could not allow the USSR to establish a bridgehead in Latin America, even if it meant war - The Doves (Revisionists) o Constant humiliating of the US against the USSR o Resulted in the Soviets balancing the power by placing missiles on Cuba o All result of US foreign policy - The Owls (Post-Revisionists) o Documents had been released o Crisis occurred because of mistakes and misconceptions by both sides o USSR underestimated US resolve but the move was a result of US foreign policy Prelude - 1959: Castro became the new Cuban leader – at first tried to reassure the US of his friendship - Castro launched a sweeping program of socioeconomic reform o Transfer of land ownership o Nationalized all foreign, financial, industrial and commercial enterprises including US- owned companies o In response, US imposed an embargo on all exports to Cuba except medical supplies and foodstuffs and eventually severed diplomatic relations - Castro increasingly turned to the Soviet Union for support 10 o After La Coubre incident in March 1960:  Ship explodes in port of Havana, Castro blames CIA  US decides that Castro must be removed o Moscow granted loans and trade - Cuba’s growing economic links with the Communist bloc were complemented by an expanding military relationship between Moscow and Havana o Soviet weapons, technicians and military advisors arrived on the island - March 1960 – NSC Meeting about intervention in Cuba o Pros:  CIA stated that there 10,000 Americans in Cuba  US Navy was concerned over Guantanamo Bay o Cons:  US had no replacement for Castro  Didn’t consult the Latin American Organization of States – rather US should garner support in Latin America to renounce Cuba and communism o Eisenhower decides against intervention however allowed the CIA to build a plan of gradual approach  Allow CIA to form a unified internal opposition in Cuba  Discredit the Castro regime domestically and internationally  Authorized training for clandestine training for Cuban exiles - Khrushchev openly supported the Castro regime, warned the US not to touch Cuba – nuclear retaliation - Kennedy demanded that something must be done to remove Castro from power - April 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion o CIA set up an army of Cuban exiles o However, popular support was on Castro’s side o Invasion was an utter failure  Landings were poorly executed  CIA had hoped on an internal uprising however invading force was isolated  Kennedy did not provide US air support, which might have saved the invasion - June 1961: Vienna Summit o Khrushchev wanted to show to world that he was still capable of dominating IR o Kennedy was weakened by the Bay of Pigs o Khrushchev wanted:  Cuba to be safe o Summit did not go well:  Soviets failed to realize that the Americans would not allow Castro to survive; they would still try to undermine the Castro regime - August 1961 – the “missile gap” is revealed o Forced Khrushchev to back down over Berlin o Shows that US had at least a 17:1 advantage - Kennedy authorizes numerous plans to overthrow the Castro regime; some even targeted Castro personally - Khrushchev had stayed out of Cuba because he had hoped to make a deal in Vienna and because it challenged the US in Latin America - In late 1961, Khrushchev reappraised his stance: 11 o The defense of the Cuban revolution had become a preeminent goal of Soviet foreign policy. It was the Communists’ only showcase in the West. o Khrushchev saw Cuba as way of alleviating the USSR’s inferior ICBM and SLBM forces by placing MRBMS and IRBMS on Cuba within range of US targets o US had placed strategic missiles in Europe – wanted the US to face the same prospects The Crisis - April 1961 – Operation Anadyr o Placed 48 medium range and 24 short range missiles in Cuba o Secret operation, wanted to present Kennedy with a fait accompli o Installed an air defense system o Also shipped over 40,000 soldiers - Successful deployment of the Soviet missiles could have brought Khrushchev important advantages: o It would have greatly enhanced Moscow’s credibility as the protector of countries threatened by the US o Since the MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba could reach targets almost anywhere in the US, they would function as substitute ‘strategic’ missiles and compensate for the Soviets’ inferiority  Khrushchev would be able to extract concessions from the US - US intelligence receives indications of merchant ships carrying suspicious materials to Cuba - Oct. 15, 1962: Kennedy authorizes U2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba o Brought unmistaken evident of Soviet missiles sites under construction in Cuba - Oct. 16: Kennedy convenes the EXCOMM o Decided that only acceptable outcome was removal of all missile launchers from Cuba o Three options  Air strikes  Ruled out because of casualties and they could not guarantee the destruction of all missiles  Invasion  Ruled out because it would lead to direct confrontation between US and USSR soldiers  Diplomacy  Ruled out because time intensive and the delay would allow the Soviets to complete the sites - Oct 18: Decision made in favour of a ‘quarantine’ in EXCOMM o Blockade but through different means - Oct 20: Kennedy informs the Europeans of his decision – they support him - Oct 22: Kennedy raises to US alert system to DEFCON 2, the highest alert level short of war - Oct 22: Kennedy delivers nationally televised speech o Announces the imposition of a naval ‘quarantine’ of Cuba to prevent the arrival of Soviet ships o Warned that any missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would trigger American nuclear retaliation against the USSR o Demanded the prompt dismantling of the missile launched - Oct 24: Naval quarantine begins o US warships surround Cuba o In the evening, four Soviet ships decided not to run the blockade and reversed course 12 o Khrushchev was unwilling to risk nuclear war over Cuba - Oct 26: strushchev issues two letters to Kennedy o 1 letter: came privately and personally through RFK  USSR would pull back their missiles if the US pledged to never invade Cuba o 2 letter: public letter, broadcast to the entire world  Khrushchev demanded that there would be no invasion of Cuba and that the US pull out its missiles in Turkey o EXCOMM responds to the first letter - Oct 27: Kennedy pledged not invade Cuba in exchange for the removal of all missiles o Privately, Kennedy also agreed to pulling out US missiles from Turkey The Consequences - In both states, there is an entire change in their foreign policy o The US Response  US acknowledged the fact that they no longer negotiated from a position of strength – the USSR must be dealt with as an equal  Kennedy decided to reach out to the USSR by proposing some sort of cooperation with the Soviets o The Soviet Response  Moscow saw the missile crisis as a huge defeat  USSR decided upon a two-pronged approach:  Resumption of the quest for “peaceful coexistence” o Avoid challenges to the US  Transformation of the USSR into a global power o Ditched the effort to increase standard of living o From 1962, the sole purpose of the USSR was to build missiles o Channelled all its resources into the military – aimed at reaching parity with the US o Could only deal with the US from a position of strength - After the crisis, both high commands realized how many mistakes and blunders were committed o Both sides agreed to establish a ‘hot line’, a direct communications line between Moscow and Washington to avoid an accidental nuclear war o June 1963: Moscow-Washington Hot Line established  Bypassed all the intermediaries, and allowed the two leaders to talk to one another immediately - 1964: Khrushchev was peacefully removed from power because he failed to live up to his promises - The guarantee of safety for Cuba allowed the Cuban revolution and Castro to survive - Closed the chapter of the First Cold War, thereafter both sides make efforts to tone down the constant friction and aggressive rhetoric 13 The Emergence of China - The end of the Chinese Civil War China turned communist – great concern to the US - Chang Kai-Shek had followed US foreign policy – was given membership and veto power on the UN Security Council - US thought they had ‘lost’ China o However, in truth, it was a domestic development - US and Soviets had cooperated over Far East Asian issues - Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (14 August 1945) o Stalin made a deal with the Nationalists o Soviet navy was given two warm-water ports o In return, Soviet army was asked to remain in Manchuria to prevent a communist takeover - Stalin was suspicious of independent communist forces -> explains lukewarm support for the Chinese communists - 1947 – Mao also tried to establish a link with the US – wanted economic aid o US refused this because of their support for British and French claims in Asia o State Department was paranoid about everything communist o US failed to see the difference between Mao and Stalin - Mao terminated consultations with the US - 1949: Mao – “We must lean to one side” o Mao now looked to Stalin for cooperation o Signalled that he accepted Soviet leadership in the international Communist movement - Oct. 1949: Mao declares the Peoples Republic of China - After the Communist victory in China, Stalin apologized to Mao and Chinese for his mistaken policy o Offered economic and military aid – however not too much – Stalin was still suspicious of Communist leaders who rose to power without him - Feb. 14, 1950: Treaty of Friendship and Alliance o Mao travelled to the Soviet Union o Stalin pledged economic, military and technological aid - The Korean War o During the course of the war, Gen. MacArthur wanted to militarily defeat communism -> invaded North Korea and wanted to push back its army to the borders of China  State Department warned that the army must not come close to Chinese borders o Chinese felt threatened – cross the North Korean border th o Pushed the US forces back down to the 38 parallel – peace agreement in 1953 o The United States, confronted by what it viewed as a calculated bid by a monolithic Communist bloc to expand into the power vacuum of an Asia recently liberated from Japanese domination, hastened to reengage its power in the region by extending military protection and economic assistance to many of its non-Communist states  First beneficiary was South Korea  Followed by treaties with the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand o The war also led the US to provide military aid and offer protection to the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan against the threat of invasion from the mainland 14 The Sino-Soviet Split - Khrushchev o Continued the pattern started by Stalin – military and economic aid – however he gave it wholeheartedly – trusted Mao more than Stalin ever did o Agreed to share nuclear technology with China o Offered Soviet aid to industrialize China o Khrushchev visited Beijing in 1954 and 1958 - The Seeds of Discord o Profound cultural difference between the Soviets and China o Political differences  Mao had declared the Western states ‘paper tigers’ – offered his unconditional support to the Soviet – that China and the Soviets should pool resources together against the West  Khrushchev argued that it was impossible to engage the US with conventional warfare o Chinese government began to express dissatisfaction with the cavalier treatment it was receiving from its Soviet supporters  Disappointment over the amount of economic aid, Mao lost all confidence in the USSR as China’s foreign economic benefactor o Mao was more willing than Khrushchev to accept the risk of nuclear war and endure its terrible consequences in pursuit of a Communist victory against the “imperialist” powers in the West - Death of Stalin 1953 sto Khrushchev had a different foreign policy approach - 1 Offshore Island Crisis 1954-55 o Nationalist forces under Chang Kai-Shek had been forced out of the Chinese mainland onto Taiwan  Chang also controlled many islands close to China – this was a problem for Mao o Americans promoted a ‘two-China policy’ – recognized Taiwan and the islands  Dec. 1955 – alliance with Taiwan o Soviet Union fully supported Mao o Sept. 1954 – Mao unleashed a military barrage on two of these islands – Khrushchev offered military aid, a ‘nuclear umbrella’ - Khrushchev changed his view – now argued for ‘peaceful coexistence’ and denounciation of Stalin - Mao never supported the denunciation of Stalin o Mao had accepted the Stalinist view of bi-polar world - Nov. 1957 – Mao visits the Soviet Union o Mao questioned the necessity of the denunciation of Stalin, of ‘peaceful coexistence’ o Argued that Khrushchev did not understand foreign relations - 1958 - Mao began to chart his own course – introduced the Great Leap Forward o Followed Stalinist policies of the 1930s o Industrialization of China – change from agricultural to industrial  18-30 million o Mao tried to undermine Khrushchev  By breaking away from the Soviet Union  Decided to challenge Khrushchev understanding of international relations; that communism could peacefully coexist with the US 15 - Aug. 1958 – Khrushchev made his 2 visit to China o Mao wanted Soviet nuclear technology in return for the Soviets to have a base in mainland Chin o Visit was short - Aug. 1958 - 2 Offshore Island Crisis o Mao launched a second attack on the islands o Americans threatened Mao with a nuclear strike o Soviet Union still decided to support China on ideological grounds o Mao argued that the islands were important in controlling the Soviet Union and the US  Challenging Taiwain forces the US to show their hand, come to the aid of Taiwan  Forced the Soviet Union to stand behind China - Khrushchev felt betrayed by Mao - Oct. 1959 – Khrushchev visits Beijing to confront Mao o Mao was embarrassed because Khrushchev came from Washington o Khrushchev was condescending – confronted Mao directly – that his policy was ruinous to Communism – that peaceful coexistence was more benecial o Khrushchev wanted the Chinese leadership to get rid of their old leadership pursuing bad policy and to accept reality – that Communism and capitalism were entrenched o Khrushchev also pleaded for the release of captured American pilots during the Korean - irritated o Soviet Union supported India in the Sino-Indian border incidents  India had given safe haven to the Dalai Lama - Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated dramatically – from then on The Split - April 1960 – Mao published an article extolled the virtues of Leninism, subtly criticizing Khrushchev’s foreign policy - June 1960 – International Communist conference called in Romania o Chinese delegation openly criticized the USSR - July 1960 – Khrushchev terminates all Soviet aid to China - 1962 – Cuban Missile Crisis – proved to Mao that the USSR was pursuing a mistaken foreign policy, blamed Khrushchev for discrediting Soviet communism - June 1962 – Sino-Indian War o USSR support India – supplied weapons - Mao claimed the leadership of the true communist ideology and interpretation - 1964 – the ideological Sino-Soviet split was complete China was still no match to the USSR and the US. It was still a tri-polar world. USSR had to now deal with the West and China Khrushchev argued it was easier to come to terms with the capitalist states than with Chinese communists China turns to the West - China wanted to become leader of the Non-Aligned World – that they could be a third power- didn’t materialize o China could not offer the same economic and military aid as the US and USSR o By the early 1960s, non-aligned world was not interested in China – condemned it for not signing the NPT 16 - China became isolated by the West and East, and the neutral world - China sought to find salvation by themselves - The Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s resulted in a tremendous tragedy - May 1966: Cultural Revolution o Struggle against the remaining bourgeoisie elements in China o Mao eliminated his political opponents – unleashed wave of terror o Devastated Chinese foreign policy – now seen as the pariah of the East and West – ostracized and isolated - 1969: Sino-Soviet border clashes o Tensions between China and USSR had been growing o Armed clash between the USSR and China - Johnson still saw China as a communist puppet of the USSR – never tried to utilize the Sino- Soviet Split o However his decision to seek a negotiated settlement in Vietnam calmed Chinese fears about the expansion of American power on the mainland of Asia - Nixon and Kissinger recognized the potential with the split o Sensed that Beijing might be willing to settle its differences with the US in order to concentrate on dealing with the Soviet threat from the North o State department announced relaxation of travel restrictions to China  In 1971, removed all remaining travel restrictions - Ping-Pong Diplomacy o 1971: American ping pong players invited to China o Kissinger and Zhou Enlai negotiated o In 1971, US also stood aside when the UN voted to admit the PRC and banish the Nationalists and transfer its seat on the UNSC to the Communists - 1972: Nixon visits China, meets with Mao o Agreed on 5 points:  US recognized One-China policy (gave up commitments to Taiwan)  Agreed on no independence movement in Taiwan – would never become a separate Chinese state however US reaffirmed its mutual defence treaty in return for guarantee against an invasion from the mainland  Both governments condemned the quest for hegemony in East Asia and pledged to oppose any other nation’s efforts to that end – a warning to the USSR  To limit American presence in Asia, specifically Vietnam - By playing the “Chinese card”, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to induce the USSR to adopt a more cooperative attitude toward strategic arms control and political détente in Europe - Economic considerations played an important role in the Sino-American rapprochement as well o Prospect of sale to this previously inaccessible market proved particularly attractive to the US exporters o The Chinese government relished the opportunity to develop commercial relations with the US to replace the trade links with the USSR that had been severed in the 1960s - All of the old assumptions about great power relations in the Far East had been brought into question 17 The Détente Prelude - Aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis led to both sides moving towards a foreign p
More Less

Related notes for HIS344Y1

Log In


Don't have an account?

Join OneClass

Access over 10 million pages of study
documents for 1.3 million courses.

Sign up

Join to view


By registering, I agree to the Terms and Privacy Policies
Already have an account?
Just a few more details

So we can recommend you notes for your school.

Reset Password

Please enter below the email address you registered with and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Add your courses

Get notes from the top students in your class.