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Dominic Martin

PART A HUMAN SOUL Aquinas 1. Soul is the actuality of the body (principle of life) because the first thing through which the body lives is the soul 2. Soul is subsistent (exists on its own and operates in the matter that it exists) 3. Human soul can’t be corrupted because it’s subsistent that is wholly form • Corruption means the form being separated but form cannot separate from itself; thus soul is incorruptible • Although sensory soul is corruptible, with the intellective, it is incorruptible 4. Humans are natural things of composite of body and soul • Hylomorphism (soul to body = form to matter) • Definition of natural thing: form and matter as one (against dualist) • Sensing isn’t operation of soul alone; it’s one of the operations of human being; thus, human isn’t a soul alone but composite of soul and body 5. Intellective soul is the form of the human body • One is not human through one soul and animal through another but through one and same soul one is both 6. Parts of soul: vegetative, sensitive and intellective • Memory is part of sensitive soul and is a habit of possible intellect • Intellectual memory (math) is part of intellective soul Siger 1. There is only one intellective soul • Intellective soul is separated from body but isn’t multiplied with multiplication of our bodies • Understanding the intellect unites to the one who knows and not to the one who doesn’t know because knowledge derives from phantasm (of the knower); thus, one knows while another remains ignorant o we already know the same things; we just got to recognize it • After saying this, he holds the opposite because of his faith 2. Criticism from Aquinas • Human beings are individual thinkers with as many intellective souls as there are human beings • If there is single intellect, then all of us would be just one common thinker and we perceive all things in the same way (everything objective) Olivi 1. Intellective soul is not the form of human being, not body (unlike Aquinas) • Intellective soul isn’t directly connected to the body but rather through sentient soul as an intermediary because the body itself is incapable to receive an intellective soul o The body is still completely different from intellectual form and therefore inconceivable how these two could form a unit of composition • Intellective and sentient soul are rooted in the same substance (closely connected but not united as one) and intellective part is related to body through sensitive part Ockham 1. Intellective soul is form of body but not only one form but one form of many (humans can have more than one substantial form) • Sensations are from sentient soul and not intellective soul; so there are two distinct souls INTELLECT AND COGNITION Aquinas 1. Thinking is a non-bodily activity because it would impede cognition of other things (i.e. sick man’s tongue) • Mind operates on its own without body • Intellect is different from any sensory power (subsistent) 2. Intellectual cognition starts from the senses… • External senses get affected by material object to form images (phantasms) and phantasms are the basis for intellectual cognition • Agent intellect (processor) has to provide the possible intellect (receiver) the ‘intelligible species’ derived from phantasm 3. Cognition follows the principle of cognition in the knower • Form can be considered under two aspects: with relation to the being it has in the knower (causes the knower to actually know), or in the reference it has to the thing it represents (limits cognition to some definite knowable object) o Knowing a thing conforms to the state of the knower, which receives the form in its own way (nothing prevents us from knowing material things through forms which exist immaterially in our minds) • There is a likeness between items in our mind and material things outside the mind o This is supposed to explain why my acts of perception and understanding are about this or that thing o Bodily representations can exist in the mind and through these the mind is made like bodily things 4. Intellect is passive with respect to the object (intelligible) to receive forms abstracted from sensible things • Sensible species (images) > Phantasm (Sensitive memory/imagination/storage of a singular) > Abstraction > Possible intellect (intellective memory/understanding) • Agent intellect isn’t the power to think but is the gap between sensory realm and thinking realm so that the sensory can affect the intellect species whereas possible intellect actually thinks • Intelligible species (intellect) is there because all intellectual cognition requires input from senses and how this input gets into the intellect (bridges the gap between material and immaterial). It activates the intellect and determines it to a certain object 5. Cognition is a division of labour • Intellect doesn’t cognize singular things (abstraction) but is responsible for the universal • Senses are responsible for the particulars 6. Aquinas’s answer to objections • Cognition can’t come from the above because it misconstrues the relationship between senses and intellect • Cognition can’t come from inside because this means that souls were created before bodies and later united but this wouldn’t be natural (would be an accidental accretion to soul) Olivi 1. Parsimony • We don’t need species because sensory input provided by imagining (phantasm) together with agent intellect is enough 2. Veil of perception: intelligible species/universal concept is misleading because they don’t give us direct knowledge (species in the mind create a veil between us and the world) • There’s no species informing the power’s core is necessary to produce an act; if we can’t have intellectual cognition of x without intelligible species of x, then our cognition is rather of the species and not of the real object (assumption of species is a veil between cognizer and world) o Solution: universals are from phantasm and are features of reality. From a singular, we can find a common nature/concept of other singulars. Aquinas and Scotus don’t conceive species as object of cognition Scotus (same as Aquinas) 1. Necessity of intelligible species is a twofold • Understanding the universal as universal • Postulating intelligible species because of the presence of the object in the intellect, which it has because of nobility of the potency and its own nature o Saying that there is no species in intellect is to jeopardize autonomy of the intellect 2. Understanding is a movement to the soul • First impression occurs in intellect through presence of species it has received • Second is from object as it shines forth in the species o Knowledge is a habit, because it is generated from acts o Species is a habit o Species are items that ‘reduce’ intellect from essential potency (learning) to accidental potency (exercise) Ockham 1. Everything is singular • Thing that isn’t a common sign is a singular • There are no genuinely universal things anywhere 2. We can have intellectual cognition of singulars 3. There’s a distinction between two kinds of cognition • Intuitive cognition (proper cognition of singular; naturally caused by one thing; by casuality) • Abstractive cognition (not a cognition proper to singular but a common cognition) KNOWLEDGE Aquinas 1. All humans naturally desire to know/understand • Each thing has its proper operation and our proper operation is to understand 2. All humans desire knowledge • Our natural desire is actually a natural desire for knowledge and for scientific
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