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POL101Y1 Study Guide - Quiz Guide: Stanley A. Mcchrystal


Department
Political Science
Course Code
POL101Y1
Professor
Jeffrey Kopstein
Study Guide
Quiz

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POL 101 Democracy, War &
Peace
November 22nd
The Geography of Chinese Power
oChina is both a land & sea power; virtual reach extends from Central Asia to main shipping
lanes of Pacific Ocean
oChina will stand @ hub of geopolitics even if the countrys path toward global power isnt
linear
oThanks to central control, regime can (e.g. enlist labour of millions) – relentlessly dynamic in
ways that democracies (due to temporizing) cant be
— concept of efficiency over democracy
oEmpires rarely come about by design; grow organically
oChina today is consolidating its land borders & beginning to turn outward
oChinas actions abroad are propelled by its need to secure energy, metals & strategic minerals
to support rising living standards
—built advantageous power relationships both in contiguous territories & in far-flung locales
rich in resources required to fuel its growth
—activities abroad has to do with a core national interest – economic survival – can be
defined as an uber-realist power
oBeijing cares little about type of regime with which it is engaged; requires stability not
[Western] virtue {different priorities}
oChance of war between China & US remote – challenge posed is primarily geographic [debt,
trade, global warming]
oChina = rising continental power; shifting balance of power by securing its economic needs
oImperial properties of Beijing ethnic nationalist tensions (complicates relationships with
adjacent states)
oChinas hunger for natural resources also means Beijing will take substantial risks to secure
them – resource acquisition is the principal goal of Chinas foreign policy everywhere
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oGeography could drive China & Russia apart (current alliance purely tactical) would be
advantageous for US
oChina has adopted a divide-&-conquer strategy – develop profitable relationships with
southern neighbours
oViewed as antagonist – as USs power in SE Asia passes prime & Chinas rises, states in
region increasingly cooperating with one another to mitigate Beijing’s divide-&-conquer
strategy
oBeijing prefer to see far more modern, authoritarian state develop in N Korea – create a
buffer between China & vibrant, middle-class democracy of S Korea – reunification of Korea
would also benefit China
oEasy to conceive of a Korean future within a Greater China & lessened US group presence in
NE Asia
oFavourable sitch. on land, free to work @ building a great navy
—already have disputes over parts of energy-rich ocean beds in East China Sea & South
China Sea, with Japan, Philippines & Vietnam over islands
oSuch disputes allow Beijing to stoke nationalism @ home (but sitch grim for naval
strategists)
oStill an insecure sea power, thinks about ocean territorily
oAlso improving mine-warfare capability, developing an offensive strategy to strike icon of US
power (aircraft carrier)
oMost important to advent of a Great China is future of Taiwan (only fusing of Taiwan with
Chinese mainland would mark real emergence of a multipolar military order in E Asia)
oBeijing is preparing to envelop Taiwan not just militarily but economically & socially too
oA more democratic China could be an even more dynamic great power than a repressive
China would be, in an economic & military sense
— increasing integration appears likely; will be pivotal for future of great-power politics in
region
— “Beijing aims to create a ‘disposition of power so favourable’ that ‘it will not actually
have to use force to secure its interests.’”
oRather than fight US outright, Chinese seek to influence US behaviour precisely so as to
avoid a confrontation
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— motives can change, better to track capabilities
— multipolarity will increasingly define power relationships in Asia
Arms race going on in Asia
oStrengthening the US air & sea presence in Oceania would be a compromise approach
between resisting a Greater China @ all cost & assenting to a future in which the Chinese
navy policed the 1st island chain
oUS-China tensions in years ahead will be exacerbated (although still more stable than
between US & Soviet Union)
oThe US (hegemon of Western Hemisphere) will try to prevent China from becoming the
hegemon of much of the Eastern Hemisphere
American Aims: Realism Still Prevails Over Community Idealism Green
Concept of anEast Asia Community”
[Leaders & senior officials] chose own national capabilities, alliances with US or global
institutions (e.g. UN) to rely on to prevent/respond to armed attacks, terrorism, pandemics,
etc.
Continuing gap between quantity & quality of Asias multilateral institutions & uncertainty
about future balance of power within the region
APEC – ensure regional economic integration would remain trans-Pacific & thus
complement prevailing security architecture of US alliances {efforts to generate an explicit
security agenda have usually met resistance}
EAS (East Asia Summit – begun competing with APEC – reminder of how significant great
power rivalry remains in Asia
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – regions broadest forum for security dialogue
ASEAN – also proving less cohesive as a regional stabilizer than hoped for – ASEAN states
are splintering (Beijing can often count on proxies within to rep its interests; member states
cant count on unified voice on security challenges from outside SE Asia)
Six-Party talks – 1st high-level security forum in NE Asia – prospects are dim for meaningful
negotiations
Deep vein of realism just beneath surface idealism that characterizes most discussions of
regional community building
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