1. Argument against substance dualism v. Polio is not identical to polio-like symptoms,
a. Objection 1 to Dualism (interaction problem) even though there is a necessary connection
i. If dualism is true, then a physical thing (my between the two.
body) interacts with a nonphysical thing (my vi. By analogy, pain is not identical to pain-like
mind) symptoms, even though there is a necessary
ii. Physical things do not interact with nonphysical connection between the two.
things vii. Don’t confuse the conditions for asserting that someone
iii. Therefore, dualism is false is in pain with the presence/existence of pain.
b. Objection 2 to dualism (the pairing problem) d. Super-spartans argument:
i. If dualism is true, then non-physical minds have i. If pain is necessarily identical to pain behavior,
causal power over physical bodies, and bodies then super-spartans are logically impossible.
have causal power over minds ii. Super-spartans are not logically impossible.
ii. In order for me things to have causal powers over iii. Therefore, pain is not necessarily identical to
another, there must be a causal relation that pain behavior
holds between the two. iv. If pain is not necessarily identical to pain
iii. The only possible relations that might serve as a behavior, then behaviorism is false.
causal relation is a spatial relation v. Therefore, behaviorism is false.
iv. There can be no spatial relation between non- vi. Defense of (premise 4; d): the behaviorist has to
physical minds and physical bodies
say that pain is defined as pain behavior – that
v. Therefore, dualism is false the identity is necessary. If she said the identity is
c. Dualism is incompatible with contemporary science contingent then she would be saying something
i. The claim that mental events can be initiated
without a physical cause violates the law of like this: “Pain didn‘t have to be identical to
pain behavior, but the two just happen to be
conservation of energy: The amount of energy in identical in us.” But then the obvious response
a closed system remains stable; energy cannot be
created or destroyed is that the two clearly are not identical in us. It is
an empirical question whether pain is
2. Putnam‘s argument against behaviorism contingently identical to the behavior associated
a. Putnam‘s critique:
Thesis: even weak versions of behaviorism are hopelessly with it, and just a little bit of investigation (e.g.,
flawed. The form of behaviorism Putnam has in mind via introspection) shows that pain is not the same
as the behavior associated with it. So it seems the
consists of two claims: behaviorist is going to have to make her stand by
i. There are analytic entailments between mental
terms and behavioral terms: Analytic entailment: claiming that those who deny behaviorism are
confused about the meaning of words like ‘pain
an entailment that holds in virtue of the
meanings of the words used. ’ (for then the empirical investigations are
ii. We cannot directly translate between mind talk completely irrelevant). This is why she needs to
and behavioral talk only for superficial reasons, defend the claim that the identity is necessary.
e. More super—spartan worries
e.g. that mind talk tends to be vague.
b. Note: Putnam uses the term ‗materialism‘ in such a way that i. The behaviorist is forced to say that if a super-
he means to exclude behaviorism. So when he uses the term spartan went from not expressing her pain to
‗materialism‘ he has something like identity theory in mind. expressing her pain, she would go from not
It is not uncommon to use the term this way, but it is also having pain to having pain.is this crazy?
common to use the term so that behaviorism is counted as a ii. X-word super-super-spartans scenario is not self-
form of materialism. There is no widely agreed-upon contradictory, so behaviorism is false.
iii. Imagine the super-spartans is enough to show
c. Analogy between polio and pain the problem with behaviorism.
i. Both polio and pain are cluster concepts, meaning 3. Argument for identity theory
that there are a bunch (a cluster) of criteria that a. The mind is the brain; a mental state is a brain state. In
govern the use of the terms ‗polio‘ and ‗pain‘. other words, the mind and the brain are identical.
1. Polio is associated with a bunch of b. Identity distinctions
symptoms i. Strict identity: A and B are actually the same
2. Pain is associated with a bunch of
behaviors E.g. when we say that the Queen of Canada is the
ii. When we discovered that polio is caused by (or is Duke of Normandy we are talking about the same
identical to) a virus we said that all cases where individual – Elizabeth II
not present were not cases of polio. In other words, ii. Exact similarity: A and B are two distinct objects
the presence of polio-like symptoms is not that are indistinguishable
sufficient to establish that polio is present. E.g. when we say that two socks are identical.
c. Identity theorists were claiming strict identity when they
iii. By analogy, we should say that the presence of
pain-like behaviors is not sufficient to establish claimed that the mind is the brain
that pain is present. d. More identity distinctions
iv. If we treated polio like the behaviorist treats i. The mind is the brain
pain, we would have absurd consequences. If we ii. The copula (―is‖) has three meanings
defined polio as a cluster of symptoms, then any 1. ―is‖ of predication
doctor who (back in the day) said, ―I believe polio E.g. ―her hair is red.‖
2. ―is‖ of definition
is caused by a virus‖ would be wrong. For she
would be saying ―I believe this thing, which is E.g. ―a bachelor is an unmarried male.‖