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CAS PO 141 Study Guide - Midterm Guide: Mancur Olson, Punctuated Equilibrium, Public GoodPremium

7 pages135 viewsSpring 2016

Department
Political Science
Course Code
CAS PO 141
Professor
Kate Krimmel
Study Guide
Midterm

This preview shows pages 1-2. to view the full 7 pages of the document.
Casual&Stories&(Stone&1989)
Intended
Unintended
Unguided
!"#$%&'#%()#%*+"
,##'-"&.%()#%*+"
Purposeful
/&."&.'0&%()#%*+"
Willfully&or&knowingly&causing&harm.&
Ex.&Conspiracy,&doing&things&on&purpose&
Ex.&Oppression
Action&taken&by&a&group&of&individuals&for&a&common&goal
a.
What&is&collective& action
A.
Not&all&agree&on&same&goal
i.
Group&must&decide&on&goals
a.
All&agree&on&goal,&we&all&have&to&decide&how&to&coordinate&our&
efforts&with&other&people's&efforts.&
i.
Ex.&Small&music&groups&dont&need&a&conductor,&because&they&can&
communicate&amoungst&eachother&since&its&so&few&of&them
Coordination&problems
b.
Idea&that&individuals,&what&is&individually&rational&becomes&
collectively& rational.&
i.
a)
Collectively&rational:&remain&silent,&collective&jail&time:&2&yearii.
But&it&is&irrational&because&both&will&want&to&talk.&Only&ok&if&both&are&
confident&that&the&other&wont&speak.&
Prisoner's&dilemmas
c.
Ex.&Street&lamps,&available&to&everyone.&a)
No&street&lighting,&etc.&b)
Problem:&Public&good&not&provided1)
Affects&large&groups2)
Ex.&Those&who&vote.&
Getting&a&sticker&or&balloon&after&you&vote&since&
voting&is&seen&as&a&burden
Benefit&given&to&only&those&who&participate.&a)
Selective&incentives3)
Free&Rider&Problem&(Mancur&Olson)A.
Ex.&Herdsmen&raise&cattle,&too&many&&people&
raising&cattle,&then&the&pasture&gets&destroyed&
because&a&lot&of&animals&are&feeding&off&of&it.
i)
Can&make&regulations,&limit&number&of&cattleii)
Public&good&exists,&but&problem&is&that&it&will&be&
exploited
a)
Problem:&Exploitation&of&a&public&good&1)
Tragedy&of&the&commonsB.
Types&of&Prisoners'&Dilemma
Barriers&to&collective& action
B.
Collective& Action&Problems
Punctuated&equilibrium:&Baumgartner&and&Jones
How&advising&
Policy&subsystem&and&policy&monopoly
Difference&between&the&two
Incrementalism:
Serial&processing&vs.&parallel&processing
Humans&vs.&governments&(organizations,&companies,&etc.)
Policy&subsystems:&small&group&of&specialized&people&who&are&not&
representatives&of&the&general&public
Policy&monopoly-dominated&by&one&player
Control&problem&definition&(also&policy&subsystem)
3$"&45$6)-0)'++*"+)7".)801"-)9208):0('#6)+*;+6+."8+)<=>?).0)8%#20@:0('.'#%()
'&+.'.*.'0&+)<!/?A
Some&type&of&change&in&the&Policy&image,&outside&of&subsystem.&1.
Social&movements&(in&contesting&the&policy&image)2.
Note:&Event&that&moves&an&issue&from&PS&to&mI&can&be&
large&(like&focusing&events&in&Kingdon's&world)&or&small&
(minor&events&can&add&up&over&time)
Issues&get&redefined,&new&actors&feel&qualified&to&use&their&power.&Etc.&3.
Reasons:
Subsystem&politics&=&politics&of&equilibrium&(in&stasis,&no&major&changes)
-
Macro-politics&=&politics&of&punctuation&(jumps&in&changes)
-
In&sum:
In&order&to&engage&in&parallel&processing&government&make&policy&subsystems
Disproportionate3Information3processing helps&to&explain&why&we&see&patterns&
of&punctuated&equilibria&in&policy&making
I.
Difference&is&that&uncertainty&is&that&you're&not&sure&what&it&
means.
1)
Uncertaintyi.
Cant&be&totally&sure&signal&has&changed.1)
Ambiguityii.
Signal:&some&detectable&change&in&what&is&happening&'out&there"1.
Information3Processing:&collecting,&assembling,&interpreting,&and&prioritizing&
signals&from&the&environment.&
II.
Conscious&of&unconscious.&1.
Culture.&i.
People&are&more&likely&to&accept&info&that&is&consistent&to&what&they&
used&to&think&before
Why&may&people&interpret&signals&in&an&incorrect&way?2.
Sources&of&biasIII.
What&do&you&do&with&ideas&are&contradictory,&and&which&ones&to&believe&
over&others.&
1.
Index3construction3problem:&information&from&multiple&sources&and&about&
diverse&issues&must&be&combines&and&weighted&in&making&a&policy&choice.&
IV.
Disproportionate&Information&Processing&(Baumgartner&and&Jones)
Government&is&inundated&with&information&all& the&time,&and&how&to&manage&it.&
(challeneges)&they&always&affect&policy&change&and&it&is&why&we&dont&see&change&as&
much,&It&is&prioritizing&signals&from&the&environment.&(ex.&Change&in&unemployment&
rate,&school&shootings,&change&in&test&scores,&etc).&
B'+:20:02.'0&%.") /&9028%.'0&)=20#"++'&7)<C)%&-)D?
Big&news,&big&response.&(100&jobs&lost,&no&one&is&really& mad.&1million&jobs&
lost,&everyone&is&v&mad)
Strength&of&response&would&match&strength&of&signal&
-
No&1:1&correspondence&between&strength&of&signal&and&strength&of&&
response&(change&tends&to&be&"feats&of&family"
leads&to&patterns&in&punctuated&equilibrium
What&is&disproportionate&information&processing?&
-
What&would&proportionate&information&processing&look&like,&theoretically?&
Cant&pay&attention&to&everything&that&is&going&on&at&the&same&
time
1)
We&can&only&tend&to&a&specific&number&of&things2)
Causes&emotional&response3)
Selective&attentioni.
Incorporating&info&will&prob&create&trade&off.&And&humans&are&
not&good&at&trade&offs&
1)
Difficulty&with&trade&offsii.
Do&not&update&response&to&new&learned&information1)
Learningiii.
Human&factorsA.
Still&hard&to&make&change&happen&where&there&is&an&institution&
with&checks&and&balances
1)
A&small&number&of&senators&can&essentially&block&a&policy&2)
Checks&and&balancesi.
Suck&costs,&organizational&structure&may&make&movement&away&
from&status&quo&hard
ii.
"if&and&whenissues&have&won&the&attnetion&of&the&primary&policy&
making,&institutions&(ex.&Congress),&&errors&have&oftn&accumulated,&
and&punctuations&…"&
iii.
Institutional&FactorsB.
Why&does&disproportionate&information&processing&occur?
B'+:20:02.'0&%.") /&9028%.'0&)=20#"++'&7
Again,&you&cannot&focus&on&everything&at&the&same&timeA.
People&are&not&always&paying&attention&to&signal&&&&&->&&&&&get&"behind&curve"&&&&->&&&&&
react&with&"alarmed&discovery"&to&a&fact&that&has&been&around&for&a&while
1.
Who&work&really&hard&to&keep&info&away&from&government,&etc.A.
Policy&entrepreneurs&2.
No&focusing&events&or&too&many&focusing&events,&thus&policy&makers&
respond&in&a&specific&way.&
A.
Agenda&crowding3.
Messiness&of&policy&press4.
Why&doesnt&change&just&occur&when&signals&exceed& some&threshold?
Path&Dependence
Polya&urn&example.&First&draw&is&random,&but&is&powerful&&(early&
draw&=&powerful).&You&cannot&tell&early&on&in&the&game&which&color&
will&dominate.
Unpredictability1.
As&process&progresses,&it&becomes&harder&to&change&pathsi.
Inflexibility2.
Accidental&events&early&in&a&sequence&do&not&cancel&out.&They&
feedback&into&future&choices.&Also,&&small&events&will&be&
remembered.
i.
Nonergodicity3.
All&reach&consensus,&but&it&is&an&inefficient&outcome.&In&the&long&run,&
it&generates&more&chaos,&it&is&not&utility&maximizing.
i.
Potential&path&inefficiency4.
It&is&not&just&what&happens,&but&when&it&happens.&Same&outcome&
from&different&actions&if&you&put&it&in&the&same&order.
i.
Critical&role&of&sequencing5.
Characteristics&of&increasing&returns&processes
Pierson:&path&dependent&process&characterized&by&increasing&returns
First&draw1.
Initial&"critical&juncture"I.
When&positive&feedback&(re)enforces&the&path.&i.
Period&of&reproductionII.
Possible&to&have&an&end&of&path,&lock&in&is&not&absolutely&guaranteed&
forever.&Early&stage&of&sequence&are&more&open&and&the&later&ones&more&
closed.&
i.
Change&possible!&Just&harder&later&on.&ii.
End&of&pathIII.
The&Three&Stages&of&Path&Dependence
Multiple&equilibriua
Path&Dependence&in&Political&Life:&4&Potential&Effects
Kingdon
Agrees&with&Lindbloom
Rational&model
-
Incrementalism
-
Critiuques&of&other&models
Three&mostly&independent&streams&(prob,&policy,&politics)&come&togheter&at&critical&
moments&(when&a&"policy&window'&opens&)
Coverage&of&big&events
Media&coverage
GDP,&test&scores,&etc.&so&measure&degree&of&problem&and&see&if&
there&has&been&any&change.
Indicators
Promote&something,&for&instance,&education.&Or&gas&
prices.&Gas&prices&were&too&high,&also&health&care&cost&
were&rising&a&lot.&As&well&as&social&security
Easier
Seems&like&it&is&too&expensive&(long&term&health&care)&
Harder
Make&it&easier&for&a&problem&to&be&on&the&agenda,&or&harder.
Cost&affects&a&problem
What&brings&attention&to&problems
Something&else&gets&attention&so&it&is&competingi.
Government&solved&the&problem&or&people&think&it&solved&the&problem&or&
that&it&is&too&hard&to&solve&and&the&government&failed&to&solve&the&problem
ii.
Realization&of&cost,&the&costs&have&become&alarmingiii.
Why&do&problems&fade?
Problem&Stream
No&new&ideas,&simply&nuances&in&old&ideas.
§
Policy&of&primeval&soup
Policy&primeval&soup
Policy&stream
Notes&-Feb&23&(Review)
Tuesday,& February& 23,&2016
11:08&AM
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Casual&Stories&(Stone&1989)
Intended Unintended
Unguided !"#$%&'#%()#%*+" ,##'-"&.%()#%*+"
Purposeful /&."&.'0&%()#%*+"
Willfully&or&knowingly&causing&harm.&
Ex.&Conspiracy,&doing&things&on&purpose&
Ex.&Oppression
/&%-1"2."&.)#%*+",&
unintended&
consequences&of&willed&
human&action.&
Consequences&are&
predictable&but&
unforeseen
Action&taken&by&a&group&of&individuals&for&a&common&goala.
What&is&collective& actionA.
Not&all&agree&on&same&goali.
Group&must&decide&on&goalsa.
All&agree&on&goal,&we&all&have&to&decide&how&to&coordinate&our&
efforts&with&other&people's&efforts.&
i.
Ex.&Small&music&groups&dont&need&a&conductor,&because&they&can&
communicate&amoungst&eachother&since&its&so&few&of&them
Coordination&problemsb.
Idea&that&individuals,&what&is&individually&rational&becomes&
collectively& rational.&
i.
a)
Collectively&rational:&remain&silent,&collective&jail&time:&2&year
ii.
But&it&is&irrational&because&both&will&want&to&talk.&Only&ok&if&both&are&
confident&that&the&other&wont&speak.&
Prisoner's&dilemmasc.
Ex.&Street&lamps,&available&to&everyone.&
a)
No&street&lighting,&etc.&
b)
Problem:&Public&good&not&provided
1)
Affects&large&groups
2)
Ex.&Those&who&vote.&
Getting&a&sticker&or&balloon&after&you&vote&since&
voting&is&seen&as&a&burden
Benefit&given&to&only&those&who&participate.&
a)
Selective&incentives
3)
Free&Rider&Problem&(Mancur&Olson)
A.
Ex.&Herdsmen&raise&cattle,&too&many&&people&
raising&cattle,&then&the&pasture&gets&destroyed&
because&a&lot&of&animals&are&feeding&off&of&it.
i)
Can&make&regulations,&limit&number&of&cattle
ii)
Public&good&exists,&but&problem&is&that&it&will&be&
exploited
a)
Problem:&Exploitation&of&a&public&good&
1)
Tragedy&of&the&commons
B.
Types&of&Prisoners'&Dilemma
Barriers&to&collective& actionB.
Collective& Action&Problems
Punctuated&equilibrium:&Baumgartner&and&Jones
How&advising&
Policy&subsystem&and&policy&monopoly
Difference&between&the&two
Incrementalism:
Serial&processing&vs.&parallel&processing
Humans&vs.&governments&(organizations,&companies,&etc.)
Policy&subsystems:&small&group&of&specialized&people&who&are&not&
representatives&of&the&general&public
Policy&monopoly-dominated&by&one&player
Control&problem&definition&(also&policy&subsystem)
3$"&45$6)-0)'++*"+)7".)801"-)9208):0('#6)+*;+6+."8+)<=>?).0)8%#20@:0('.'#%()
'&+.'.*.'0&+)<!/?A
Some&type&of&change&in&the&Policy&image,&outside&of&subsystem.&1.
Social&movements&(in&contesting&the&policy&image)2.
Note:&Event&that&moves&an&issue&from&PS&to&mI&can&be&
large&(like&focusing&events&in&Kingdon's&world)&or&small&
(minor&events&can&add&up&over&time)
Issues&get&redefined,&new&actors&feel&qualified&to&use&their&power.&Etc.&3.
Reasons:
Subsystem&politics&=&politics&of&equilibrium&(in&stasis,&no&major&changes)
-
Macro-politics&=&politics&of&punctuation&(jumps&in&changes)
-
In&sum:
In&order&to&engage&in&parallel&processing&government&make&policy&subsystems
Disproportionate3Information3processing helps&to&explain&why&we&see&patterns&
of&punctuated&equilibria&in&policy&making
I.
Difference&is&that&uncertainty&is&that&you're&not&sure&what&it&
means.
1)
Uncertaintyi.
Cant&be&totally&sure&signal&has&changed.1)
Ambiguityii.
Signal:&some&detectable&change&in&what&is&happening&'out&there"1.
Information3Processing:&collecting,&assembling,&interpreting,&and&prioritizing&
signals&from&the&environment.&
II.
Conscious&of&unconscious.&1.
Culture.&i.
People&are&more&likely&to&accept&info&that&is&consistent&to&what&they&
used&to&think&before
Why&may&people&interpret&signals&in&an&incorrect&way?2.
Sources&of&biasIII.
What&do&you&do&with&ideas&are&contradictory,&and&which&ones&to&believe&
over&others.&
1.
Index3construction3problem:&information&from&multiple&sources&and&about&
diverse&issues&must&be&combines&and&weighted&in&making&a&policy&choice.&
IV.
Disproportionate&Information&Processing&(Baumgartner&and&Jones)
Government&is&inundated&with&information&all& the&time,&and&how&to&manage&it.&
(challeneges)&they&always&affect&policy&change&and&it&is&why&we&dont&see&change&as&
much,&It&is&prioritizing&signals&from&the&environment.&(ex.&Change&in&unemployment&
rate,&school&shootings,&change&in&test&scores,&etc).&
B'+:20:02.'0&%.") /&9028%.'0&)=20#"++'&7)<C)%&-)D?
Big&news,&big&response.&(100&jobs&lost,&no&one&is&really& mad.&1million&jobs&
lost,&everyone&is&v&mad)
Strength&of&response&would&match&strength&of&signal&
-
No&1:1&correspondence&between&strength&of&signal&and&strength&of&&
response&(change&tends&to&be&"feats&of&family"
leads&to&patterns&in&punctuated&equilibrium
What&is&disproportionate&information&processing?&
-
What&would&proportionate&information&processing&look&like,&theoretically?&
Cant&pay&attention&to&everything&that&is&going&on&at&the&same&
time
1)
We&can&only&tend&to&a&specific&number&of&things2)
Causes&emotional&response3)
Selective&attentioni.
Incorporating&info&will&prob&create&trade&off.&And&humans&are&
not&good&at&trade&offs&
1)
Difficulty&with&trade&offsii.
Do&not&update&response&to&new&learned&information1)
Learningiii.
Human&factorsA.
Still&hard&to&make&change&happen&where&there&is&an&institution&
with&checks&and&balances
1)
A&small&number&of&senators&can&essentially&block&a&policy&2)
Checks&and&balancesi.
Suck&costs,&organizational&structure&may&make&movement&away&
from&status&quo&hard
ii.
"if&and&whenissues&have&won&the&attnetion&of&the&primary&policy&
making,&institutions&(ex.&Congress),&&errors&have&oftn&accumulated,&
and&punctuations&…"&
iii.
Institutional&FactorsB.
Why&does&disproportionate&information&processing&occur?
B'+:20:02.'0&%.") /&9028%.'0&)=20#"++'&7
Again,&you&cannot&focus&on&everything&at&the&same&timeA.
People&are&not&always&paying&attention&to&signal&&&&&->&&&&&get&"behind&curve"&&&&->&&&&&
react&with&"alarmed&discovery"&to&a&fact&that&has&been&around&for&a&while
1.
Who&work&really&hard&to&keep&info&away&from&government,&etc.A.
Policy&entrepreneurs&2.
No&focusing&events&or&too&many&focusing&events,&thus&policy&makers&
respond&in&a&specific&way.&
A.
Agenda&crowding3.
Messiness&of&policy&press4.
Why&doesnt&change&just&occur&when&signals&exceed& some&threshold?
Path&Dependence
Polya&urn&example.&First&draw&is&random,&but&is&powerful&&(early&
draw&=&powerful).&You&cannot&tell&early&on&in&the&game&which&color&
will&dominate.
Unpredictability1.
As&process&progresses,&it&becomes&harder&to&change&pathsi.
Inflexibility2.
Accidental&events&early&in&a&sequence&do&not&cancel&out.&They&
feedback&into&future&choices.&Also,&&small&events&will&be&
remembered.
i.
Nonergodicity3.
All&reach&consensus,&but&it&is&an&inefficient&outcome.&In&the&long&run,&
it&generates&more&chaos,&it&is&not&utility&maximizing.
i.
Potential&path&inefficiency4.
It&is&not&just&what&happens,&but&when&it&happens.&Same&outcome&
from&different&actions&if&you&put&it&in&the&same&order.
i.
Critical&role&of&sequencing5.
Characteristics&of&increasing&returns&processes
Pierson:&path&dependent&process&characterized&by&increasing&returns
First&draw1.
Initial&"critical&juncture"I.
When&positive&feedback&(re)enforces&the&path.&i.
Period&of&reproductionII.
Possible&to&have&an&end&of&path,&lock&in&is&not&absolutely&guaranteed&
forever.&Early&stage&of&sequence&are&more&open&and&the&later&ones&more&
closed.&
i.
Change&possible!&Just&harder&later&on.&ii.
End&of&pathIII.
The&Three&Stages&of&Path&Dependence
Multiple&equilibriua
Path&Dependence&in&Political&Life:&4&Potential&Effects
Kingdon
Agrees&with&Lindbloom
Rational&model
-
Incrementalism
-
Critiuques&of&other&models
Three&mostly&independent&streams&(prob,&policy,&politics)&come&togheter&at&critical&
moments&(when&a&"policy&window'&opens&)
Coverage&of&big&events
Media&coverage
GDP,&test&scores,&etc.&so&measure&degree&of&problem&and&see&if&
there&has&been&any&change.
Indicators
Promote&something,&for&instance,&education.&Or&gas&
prices.&Gas&prices&were&too&high,&also&health&care&cost&
were&rising&a&lot.&As&well&as&social&security
Easier
Seems&like&it&is&too&expensive&(long&term&health&care)&
Harder
Make&it&easier&for&a&problem&to&be&on&the&agenda,&or&harder.
Cost&affects&a&problem
What&brings&attention&to&problems
Something&else&gets&attention&so&it&is&competingi.
Government&solved&the&problem&or&people&think&it&solved&the&problem&or&
that&it&is&too&hard&to&solve&and&the&government&failed&to&solve&the&problem
ii.
Realization&of&cost,&the&costs&have&become&alarmingiii.
Why&do&problems&fade?
Problem&Stream
No&new&ideas,&simply&nuances&in&old&ideas.
§
Policy&of&primeval&soup
Policy&primeval&soup
Policy&stream
Notes&-Feb&23&(Review)
Tuesday,& February& 23,&2016 11:08&AM
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