PS 125A Midterm StudyGuide copy.docx

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Department
Political Science
Course Code
POL SCI 125A
Professor
Barry O' Neill

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PS 125A Midterm Reading Study-guide (3rd week readings) PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY From reading guide document: Who signed it and roughly, when? Just what does the treaty ban? Why? Does the treaty ban explosions for peaceful purposes, like making a harbor or a pass through mountains? Why didn’t they ban all tests? Suppose a country is caught testing in the atmosphere, against the agreement – what are the consequences? Is it legal to test just below the surface of the earth, where radioactive debris escapes into the atmosphere (see Article I). Does each side get to make inspections within the other’s territory, or must it stay outside with its monitoring devices? You can skip the details of the negotiation and the proposals for possible inspection provisions. (Some of this info was from the lectures.) This isn’t from either the text or the lectures, but you can think about it. The treaty is open for the signature of all states. Have all countries signed this treaty? Why not let non-states sign it as well – for example some groups that are accused of being terrorist and wanting nuclear weapons could sign it to show their intentions. Why do you think it is restricted to states?  The treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963 and put into force October 10, 1963  The ―Original Parties‖ or signers of the treaty were the USA, UK, and USSR  Preamble o Principal aim to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament o End armaments race and eliminate production/testing of new weapons  Article I o Signers agree to prohibit, prevent, and not carry any nuclear testing in the following places:  Atmosphere, outer space, and under water  Any other environment that causes radioactive debris to be outside territorial limit of the State  Note: while the treaty intends to develop into a total testing ban, it currently does not prohibit underground testing o Also agree to refrain from causing, encouraging, or participating in any way in nuclear testing  Article II o Any member can propose amendments and can be considered for a conference vote with the support of one-third of members o Any proposed amendment must require a majority and all votes of the Original Parties  Article III o Open membership to all States—of which they can join at any time o Treaty is subject to ratification of all States who sign—all accession instruments are designed to Depositary Governments o Treaty becomes enacted upon ratification of Original Parties  Article IV o Treaty is of unlimited duration o Any State has the right to withdraw due to extraordinary events with three months notice  Article V o Authentic copies are available in English and Russian  Additional notes (from lecture) o Coming later COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY From reading guide document A very natural subject for a question would be to compare this treaty with the last one, the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Why do they call it comprehensive? Is there verification? Roughly who has signed it - same as the last one? Here’s an interesting small but telling question: If a state plans to conduct a chemical explosion of over 300 tonnes (Metric tons) what does it have to do and why? This summary seems to say that you can’t withdraw, but you can - just with six months notice.  The treaty opened for signatures on September 24, 1996  Preamble o Two main goals: reduction in arsenals and prevention of nuclear proliferation o Need for systematic and progressive efforts for global arms reduction o Most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively comprehensive treaty o Identifies long term goal of 1963 treaty of ultimately banning all test explosions  Agreements set in Article I o All States agree not to carry out any nuclear test or any nuclear explosion and prohibit/prevent any explosion under its jurisdiction o All States refrain from causing, encouraging, or participate in any testing o  Adoption and Signatures o Negotiations began in January 1994 o Final draft submitted to UN with 127 signatories two yaers later o Adopted on September 10, 1996 and opened for signatures on September 24, 1996  Arrangements until Entry o CTBT Organization was established on November 19, 1996 o Preparatory Commission in charge of starting global verification regime  Composed of all signatories and Provisional Technical Secretariat  Executive Secretary is head of Provisional Technical Secretariat which started in March 1997  Treaty Verification o International Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Centre (IDC) oversee verification o IMS consists of 321 monitoring stations which sends data for processing and analysis to the IDC o All states have the right to request an on-site inspection if these data are not sufficient evidence for verification  Entry into Force o Requires signatures of 44 states in annex 2 for treaty to go into force o If the treaty is not in force three years after opening for first signatures, a conference of those who already ratified must meet to readdress the ratification process  History of Treaty o Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India was first to state nuclear testing needs to be suspended o Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) prohibited all testing and explosions, except underground o Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) limited underground testing to 150 kilotons  Treaty Summary o General Scope  Preamble summary (see above) provides general goals of treaty  Article I lists basic obligations of signatories  Implementing Organization  Article II establishes the CTBT Organization to ensure implementation with three components o Conference of all state parties o Executive Council (52 state parties) as principal decision maker and supervising activities o Technical Secretariat lead by a Director-General will assist in implementation and verification, and supervise operation of IMS and IDC  Article III requires states to take all necessary measures to implement its obligations  Verification and Compliance  Article IV establishes the verification regime (IMS, IDC, consultation, right to on-site inspections, and obligation to conference-building measures)  Verification be based on objective information limited to subject matter of Treaty  International Monitoring System (IMS)  Detects and identifies nuclear explosions  Included a variety of different types of monitoring stations, such as those who detect seismic activities which may be misconstrued as underground testing  International Data Centre (IDC)  Receives information from monitoring sites and sends raw and processed information to all state parties  Consultation and Clarification  States are encouraged to resolve issues amongst themselves or through the Organization before requesting on-site inspections  On-site inspections  Requests can be made for on-site inspections in area where event occurred  Confidence-building measures  Each state will notify Technical Secretariat of any single explosion using 300 tonnes or more of TNT equivalent material  Article V allows the Conference to restrict or suspend a state’s rights and privileges and to recommend to other states collective measures of international law  Issues can be brought to UN by the Conference or Executive Council  Disputes  Article VI describes mechanisms by which disputes can be settled (regarding the Treaty)  Amendment and Review  Article VII allows all states right to propose an amendment—requires majority vote at amendment conference with no negative vote  Article VII calls for a review of treaty effectiveness after 10 years  The issue of permitting underground testing is considered (but not currently allowed)—the treaty recommends this issue be reconsidered and if it receives consensus be implemented immediately  Duration and withdrawal  Article IX states treaty is of unlimited duration but members can withdraw under extraordinary circumstances with six months notice  Other provisions  Articles X, XI, XII, and XIII list annexes, signatures, ratification, and ascension policies  Entry into Force  Article XIV states treaty will enter force 180 days after receiving signatures of the initially listed 44 states  If not entered into force three years after being opened for signatures, a conference can be called to reexamine ratification process  Additional provisions  Article XV – treaty provisions not subject to reservations  Article XVI – Secretary General of UN is Treaty Depository  Article XVI – lists authentic treaty languages  Other relevant facts o The Treaty has yet to enter into force o Nine of the ―annex 2‖ countries have not ratified the treaty  China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and United States have all signed but not ratified  India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed it o Annex 2 countries are those who participated in negotiations before the treaty was finished and had nuclear reactors or research reactors at the time  Note: these notes reflect an outline of the treaty summary, not an outline of the treaty itself. More detailed notes on actual treaty may be added tomorrow after asking professor about the specific testable content  Additional notes (from lecture o Coming later OBAMA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW (FROM NPR) From reading guide document This document (or the part you read, pp. 5-31) would be a source for only the most general questions. It’s an overview, but as a political document it tries to please as many people as possible. You would have to read it closely and know the context to understand whether it’s really in favour of more missile defense or less. It has a few specifics, like the rejection of the idea that the US should never initiate the use of nuclear weapons. (Who does it say might get attacked by US nuclear weapons, even if they didn’t use them against the US?). But even that gets covered over in the section’s summary points. So read it over for its very general ideas and we’ll talk about it in the second part of the class. Does this mean my notes are a waste of time? Maybe the NPR recommendations are some of the “general ideas” that might be tested on?  Most extreme threat today is nuclear terrorism o Terrorist groups are believed to lack resources but the vulnerability to theft or seizure creates a serious risk of them acquiring armaments o Progress toward achieving a ―global lock down‖ has been made  Other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation o North Korea and Iran have violated proliferation agreements o More countries may now have nuclear weapons  Many countries are now more anxious about changes in security environment and desire US reassurance of keeping things secure  NPT remains a cornerstone for non-proliferation  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEC) applies safeguards facilities and materials are being used for peaceful purposes  Russia and China o US and Russia have decreased deployed weapons by 75 percent since end of Cold War o US and China are increasingly interdependent o Asian neighbors remain concerned about China’s current military modernization efforts  New US Security Approach o Focus to dangers of proliferation and terrorism—build broad international support o Prevent emergence of new regional armed states and enhance security architectures o Further arm reductions by US and Russia o Investment to maintain current nuclear stockpile  Current stockpile from Cold War is not suited to combat a terrorist attack o However, this does not make our nuclear deterrent irrelevant o Fundamental change has been seen though in US conventional military capabilities and missile defenses  Modernization in Security o Reduced role and numbers of nuclear weapons  Makes it easier to pursued NPT partners in adopting same measures o Maintain a clear nuclear deterrent o Stockpile Management Program to extend nuclear weapon life o Modernize supporting facilities o Improve transparency and confidence with Russia and China o Reduce salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs  US stance on improving NPT o Reverse nuclear ambitions in Iran and North Korea o Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  I.e. more financial resources and verification authorities to deter safeguard violations o Create actual consequences for noncompliance rather than just improve methods for detecting noncompliance o Impede sensitive nuclear trade by strengthening export and border controls  UNSC Resolution 1540 trust fund exists for countries to pursue this  Obama’s Proliferation Security Initiative—90 countries share intelligence to interdict WMD transfers o Promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy  Global Nuclear Energy Partnership—25 partners and 31 observers to reduce incentives to pursue indigenous fuel cycle facilities  US stance on preventing nuclear terrorism o Pursue UNSC Resolution 1887—secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide o Increase funding National Nuclear Security Administration’s NPT programs o Remove and secure high-priority vulnerable nuclear material according to Global Threat Reduction Initiative o Improve International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation Program—expand cooperation with new countries for increased security at weapon complex sites o Secure and eliminate WMDs o Enhance national and international capabilities to detect smuggled nuclear materials o Strengthen nuclear forensics efforts o Renew US commitment to hold any state fully accountable that supports or enhances terrorist efforts  New efforts to show NPT support o New START limits US and Russian levels below the 2002 Moscow Treaty level o Further pursue negotiations for deeper reductions and usher in agreements with other weapon states like China o Pursue ratification into the CTBT o Seek commencement on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty—halt production of fissile material for nuclear weapon use  Needed to provide cap on growth of existing nuclear arm stockpiles o Eliminate 68 tons of weapon grade plutonium with Russia  Fundamental role of US nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on US, allies, and partners  US has already given up its own chemical and biological weapons in accordance to international treaties  Fundamental post-Cold War changes o USSR and Warsaw Pact are gone, many former members are now in NATO o US, allied, and partner military capabilities now have wider range of effective conventional response options to deter o Major improvements in missile defense and counter-weapons  Because of this, US is now prepared to strengthen ―negative security assurance‖ by not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are part of NPT and in compliance with NPT obligations o States that posses nuclear weapons and not in compliance—US nuclear weapons still play direct role in deterrence o Thus, US is not prepared to adapt a universal policy of nuclear weapons having one sole purpose of deter nuclear attack  Some influences on current US nuclear arms use policy o Commitment to Article VI of NPT to purse disarmament o Reduce role and numbers of nuclear weapons o Strengthen conventional capabilities and role of nuclear weapons in deterring attacks o Consider nuclear weapons only under the most extreme circumstances o Not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states in compliance with NPT  New START—further US and Russian nuclear arms reductions on top of the 75 percent decrease already  NPR conducted research to see how US can minimize potential nuclear instability o Maintaining strategic stability at reduced level is an upcoming challenge for the US o Will replace the last START agreement of 1991 o New START will result in significant limits in deployed warheads (well below the 2,200 allowed under Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) a.k.a. 2002 Moscow Treaty)  Main strategic forces: submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers  NPR concluded US can sustain stable deterrence with fewer deployed warheads with some recommendations o Maintain second-strike capability o Retain force in each of the nuclear triad and make sure are all strong enough to be effective even if one leg fails o Retain margin above minimum nuclear force structure for possible addition of non- nuclear prompt-global strike capabilities  US has approximately 1,200 SDVs(limited to 1,600) although fewer than 900 are deployed with nuclear weapons o Similar cases exist with some B-1B bombers and SSGN submarines (nuclear compatible but not utilized)  Agreement in New START between US and Russia o Limit warheads to 1,500 o Separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and heavy bombers o Combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launches, and heavy bombers o Outcome and implication: US should retain a smaller triad while all three legs retain strategic stability at reasonable cost  Advantages of each triad leg o SSBNs and their SLBMs are most survivable leg  Currently have 14 nuclear-capable SSBNs  US might consider reducing 14 to 12 o Single-warhead ICBMs (as oppose to the former MIRVs) like SLBMs are not vulnerable to air defenses  450 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs in silos  MIRVed ballistic missile—multiple independently targetable reentry vehiles  De-MIRVed means each is reduced to a single warhead  Important to keep due to secure command, high readiness rates, and low operating costs o Bombs can be visibly deployed—signal in crisis to strengthen deterrence  76 B-52H bombers and 18 B-2 bombers  Nuclear capability provides effective hedge against technical challenges of other legs of triad  Important to extended deterrence since they are visibly deployed  Dual-capable bombers not placed on full-time nuclear alert  DoD activity  Research money already allotted to upgrading B-2 stealth bombers  Extend life or replace current weapons  US should retain ability to upload nuclear warheads to launchers in preparation for future problems (warheads should be able to deployed by other SSBNs or heavy bombers)  NPR conclusions o Reduce strategic delivery vehicles by 50 percent from START level (30 percent decrease from 2002 Moscow Treaty) o Maintain nuclear triad o De-MIRV all ICBMs to increase stability o Retain ability to upload some non-deployed nuclear weapons  Alertness report—heavy bombs are off full0time alert, ICBMs remain on alert, and most SSBNs are at sea any given time o NPR recommends keeping it this way  NPR recommends ―open-ocean targeting‖ so any accidental launch results in missile landing in open ocean  Secretary of Defense has initiatives to improve resiliency of NC3 system  NPR recommendations on comm. system o Maintain current alert posture of strategic forces (stated above in alertness report) o Continue ―open-ocean targeting‖ and ask Russia to reconfirm its commitment o New investments in US command and control system o Explore new modes of ICBM
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