PS125A Final Powerpoint guide.doc

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Department
Political Science
Course Code
POL SCI 125A
Professor
Barry O' Neill

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Political Science 125A Final Study Guide PowerPoint Outlines LECTURE 8 (PART II) AND 9 • Proliferation o Spread of weapons to new parties, not just states o Are some nations safer by having or not having weapons? o Can a chain reaction be the result if more nations get weapons? o Supply-side and demand-side anti-proliferation measures are both used  Supply – direct efforts towards source, e.g. research and development of fissile material  Demand – more aggressive and direct by providing incentives to not build (implement sanctions, increase boarder patrol, etc.)  Sagan is against and Waltz is in favor  Issues • Accidents, weapons in wrong hands, poor command, stability and instability paradox • History of nuclear proliferation o Initial extreme pessimism at Kennedy Nixon debate in 1960  Indication that 10-25 nations including China would have nuclear capacity by the end of 1964 presidential term – JFK  Fate of world and race is involved in preventing war –JFK o States that have weapons now (in order of size) – KNOW!  US, Russia, China, France, UK, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea  Approximately .1 country per year as oppose to JFK’s 5.3 countries per year o States that had them and gave them up – KNOW!  South Africa, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan o States that ended serious programs – KNOW!  Libya, Iraq, Argentina, Brazil, Sweden o 1963 memo from McNamara to JFK  China (high motivation), Israel (mod to high), Sweden (evaluating), Germany (Moderate), India (depends on China), Japan (low), Canada (very low) o A time of bomb proliferation  1945 US, 1949 USSR, 1952 Britain, 1960 France, 1964 China, 1970s Israel (never tested), 1974 India, 1980s South Africa (game them up soon, 1998 Pakistan, 2006 North Korea o The slowdown, why?  Taboo extends beyond use, but to possession as well?  Civilian v. military power concerns?  1968 NPT?  Today, notions of prestige or insurance in describing ambitions of rogue states o Baruch Plan 1946 – Truman administration  First attempt at international control or limitation  Control of atomic energy, both peaceful and military  Single states building bombs illegal, and also acquiring materials related and planning  Inspections allowed  US transfer of weapons to international control  “Swift and sure” punishment for violations that could not be vetoed by UNSC  Russia scrapped it o US weapons and NATO allies  NATO formed as defense pact in 1949 with European countries joining in the 1950s and 1960s  “Two-key system” for nuclear control: US and host country must both agree to use • Weapons shared between countries  Symbolic agreement that was an effort to stop West Germany from going nuclear – KNOW THIS WAS THE GOAL TO TWO-KEY SYSTEM! o Kennedy established Arms Control Disarmament Agency to handle negotiations  Saw non-proliferation treaty as a threat to goal of Multilateral Force—NATO ships armed with ICBMs o MLF: two-key system but could become complete transfer of weapons from US to Europe  “United States of Europe”  Soviets objected, so did France and UK  Problem: how was this idea consistent with negotiating a NPT?  After MLF dropped in 1966, NPT began more seriously o NPT negotiations  1958 –against spread and no supplying other states with weapons (SU aye, US nay)  1959 – refrain from handing control of weapons to states not possessing them, subject to inspection (SU abstain, US aye)  1960 – same as 1959, with no inspection (SU aye, US abstain)  1961 – refrain from relinquishing control to states not possessing them and non nuclear states undertake not to accept (SU aye, US aye) o Final text includes “undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever…”  US and allies figured this allowed a US of Europe group as long as there was a united policy—it never happened though o Interests at NPT conference  A comprehensive test ban, no weapons material production, freeze on delivery systems, ban usage, assurances from weapon states would be ultimate goal  Result was Article VI – vague assurance to pursue negotiations with interest of full disarmament  Basic message in final product: we won’t transfer and you won’t acquire, we’ll help you get peaceful technology, but you’ll be inspected for materials and we’ll keep negotiation disarmament in good faith o Membership details  Signed in 1968—nuclear powers at the time were China, Russia, France, US, and UK (same as permanent members of UNSC)  Cuba joined in 2002, North Korea withdrew in 2003  Non parties today: India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan – KNOW!  No NPT members built weapon, although some violated with secret programs that were ended o Why did these talks take 20 years? – KNOW!  Soviet concerns of nuclear West Germany clashed with NATO concerns of Soviet attack and preparing with armament  US needed to see MLF wouldn’t work while Soviets started worrying about China  Cuban crisis provided optimism on both sides • “turning point of seriousness” switching bargaining form positional to integrative • Why States Build Weapons? (Sagan) o Security model  Need them to stay alive in international world  Weak states ally themselves with weapon states • But are assurances of defense always credible? • Result: better to have your own weapons  Main ideas: deterrence and security dilemma  Problems • Shouldn’t more countries have the weapons if this is true? • Case studies show reasons to acquire weapons are not entirely consistent with this logic • Theoretical argument – we need more evidence on deliberations and reasons for development to support it o Domestic Politics model  Actors include nuclear energy establishment, military, and politicians  “nuclear weapons are solutions looking for a problem”  India case study • China tested nuclear weapons in 1964 • India never asked for support from US or Russia • Pressure to build came more from scientists than defense officials • Tested in 1974 but was never weaponized • Government popularity in 1974 and 1998 tests—i.e. more than just a move to increase security?  South Africa case study • 6 bombs in the 1980s but were dismantled, why? • Dismantled before Soviet Union fell, so what was the motive? o Fear of African National Congress or extremists taking control of the bomb (domestic concern) o Norms model  Social norm – follow something because you think you ought to  Identity norm – things define you and your perception from others  Esteem norm – people generally think you possess a valued trait (compliments prestige)  Prestige – people generally think that people generally think you possess this valued trait, giving you power  Cases • France built, but not the rest of Europe • China and UK built after others • Sadam thought nuclear weapons were a “powerful lever and symbol of prestige”  Historic examples of prestige • The Vasa boat (1622) • Mons Meg, Scottish bombard • Sao Paulo, Brazil’s aircraft carrier • Prestige o Complimented by esteem: i.e. people think you possess a valued trait o By achieving this perception, you are given power with them o Evidence involving prestige  Israel built its own supersonic fighter  Swedish launched Vasa  Scotland possess Mons Meg  Soviet Union launched first earth satellite  US first to land on the moon  England possesses colonies o Evidence involving esteem but NOT prestige – KNOW!  Increasing literacy rate  Decreasing corruption in civil system o In order to achieve prestige:  Symbolize power  Must be visible and this visibility should be easily visible  Clear distinction of possession from non-possession (something identifiable)  Nuclear weapons meet this criteria, including the second point if the weapons are tested • Delinking nuclear weapons and prestige o Need to increase prestige bearer developmental events o Possibly add permanent UNSC members who are not weapon states? o Don’t make nuclear acquisition as a symbol of independence o Don’t make possession a symbol of power • Nuclear energy reactors o Reactors to generate electricity (controlled) o Power plants for ships and submarines (controlled) o Nuclear weapons (uncontrolled)  Materials include uranium (natural or enriched) and plutonium  U238-half life 4.5 billion years (makes up 99.3% natural uranium)  U235-half life 700 million years (makes up 00.7% natural uranium)  Enriched if 20% or more is U235 (more radioactive)  Weapons grade if 80% or more U235  Gas centrifuge used to enrich uranium • Nuclear energy process o Mine or import uranium ore o Possibly enrich it o Construct fuel rods o Allow controlled fission to generate heat and run turbine to generate electricity o Remove used rods with depleted uranium (left over U235 with some plutonium by product) and divert to weapons o Reprocess uranium and deal with waste • Review of NPT o Article I  Not transfer any recipient whatsoever any nuclear weapons or explosive devices or control over weapons directly or indirectly  Provide no assistance, encouragement to any non-weapon state to manufacture or somehow acquire nuclear devices o Article II  All non weapon states undertakes not to receive transfer from anyone of weapons o Article III  Non weapon states undertakes all safeguards enacted by IAEA in order to verify fulfillment of obligations in the interest of discouraging nuclear energy use going from peaceful to weapon developments  All signers vow not to provide source or fissionable material, equipment or material designed for processing of fissionable material to non weapon state for peaceful purposes unless source or material is approved in safeguards of agreement  Non weapon states conclude agreement with IAEA o Article V  All signers undertake measures to ensure that under observation and procedures, benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non weapon states on a nondiscriminatory basis o Article VI  Pursue negotiations in good faith measures relating to cessation of arms and pursue disarmament with the intention that full disarmament is ultimate goal o Article VII  Treaty does not limit any members to make their own regional treaties o Article VIII  Treaty open to amendments and require majority approval including unanimous support from weapon states o Article IX  Open to all states to sign o Article X  All states have the right to withdraw if extraordinary events have jeopardized supreme interest of country  Notice given to all parties and UNSC three months in advance  25 years after entry into force (1995) conference be convened to decide whether treaty should be kept indefinitely or for a renewal of some fixed amount of time • Now a standing agreement with no termination date • Stability/instability paradox – KNOW! o Mutual nuclear weapons at the second step of escalation would let states be more confident to take first step (easier to start some conflict because they have weapons and assume confrontation won’t get too out of hand)  Step 1 (peace -> conventional conflict)  Step 2 (conventional conflict -> nuclear conflict) o A state might support terrorist activities against an adversary, launching conventional war  Would argue that nuclear taboo and non-proliferation can cause convention war and possibly result in nuclear war LECTURE 10 • UNSC o 15 members, 10 who rotate o Can pass resolutions on threats to peace and use force to implement them o E.g. Korea, Kuwait peacekeeping o UN Charter 1945 – RELEVANT TO UNSC RES. 1929 IRAN ARTICLE  Article 41 – decide on measures not involving use of armed force— may call upon members of UN to apply such measures; include complete or partial interrupt of economic relations, and other means of communication such as severance of diplomatic relations – KNOW!  Article 42 – If measures in article 41 seem inadequate, may take action by armed forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security including demonstrations, blockade, and other operations of UN forces • Boling Water Reactor (pressure vessel) o Water is heated directly by core, turns to steam, then drives turbines o Disadvantage is that cooling must continue after shutdown o Pressurized water can be heated and heat transferred to unpressured water o Less radioactivity around turbine o E.g. Diablo Canyon Nuclear reactor is a PWR (pressurized water reactor) • NPT Review (again) o Article I: “Each nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices”  Demand or supply side anti-proliferation measure?  Questions to consider: • Can US send trident SLBMs with warheads to Britain? No • Can US and UK have a shared control system? Yes • Can Pakistan give nuclear information to Al Qaeda? No o Article II: “Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons…”  Can Al Qaeda accept information? No o Article III: “Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA…for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”  Can safeguard agency learn and share secrets? Yes  States also cannot provide source or special fissionable material nor equipment or material designed or prepared for processing to any non nuclear state for peaceful purposes, UNLESS the source or special material shall be subject to safeguards required – KNOW THEY CANNOT DO IT, EVEN FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, UNLESS AGREEMENT SAYS OTHERWISE o The IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency  Founded in 1957, headquartered in Vienna  For NPT, it analyzes samples, checks inventories, makes sure uranium is not over enriched, and plutonium not used for weapons  Also non NPT duties including reactor safety checks o Article X  “Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty and to the UNSC three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests” • Do you have to give a reason? Yes, at least something • Do other states get to reject your reasons? No o Additional Protocol – KNOW! RELEVANT TO UNSC 1929  In 1993, allow snap inspections (2 hour notice), remote sensing equipment in plants o Iran has signed the treaty but not ratified; Egypt won’t until Israel does  Does the NPT allow a NWS to use nuclear weapons against a NNWS signator? Yes • NWS have made pledges not to unless attacked – e.g. US • Negative security assurances • Approaches to non-proliferation o Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – 1968 o Missile Technology Control Regime – 1987 – REMEMBER!  34 members, “coordinates export licenses on missile technology relevant to WMDs” so members agree what information sensitive and who not to send it to  A semi-treaty since it is voluntary and has explicit coordination • States are not bound by national or international laws signed in treaty, but have made expectations of each other  Treaty version: 2002 International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation • States promise not to give missile technology to others and to make annual declarations of their own missile activities o Proliferation Security Initiative –2003 – REMEMBER!  Bush response to 2002 North Korean freighter delivery to Libya  Allies can search planes and ships and seize illegal equipment  Justified vaguely by UNSC resolutions on stopping WMDs  Bush saw it as an alternative to arms control treaties, since nations retain sovereignty over commitments  Six nations have signed bilateral treaties with US for mutual shipboarding o Cooperative Threat Reduction Program – 1991  1991- Nunn-Lugar amendment to aid non-proliferation of former soviet states  Deactivated missiles, dismantle weapons, enhance security, etc.  Agreed on 1992, but Ukraine and Kazakhstan wanted compensation and security assurances • Bush offered to buy 500 tons of uranium from dismantled bombs to convert for plants  Big success according to the word of Broneil • Iran and mistrust of US o 1953, premier overthrown by US/UK sponsored coup  Replaced by Shah Reza Pahlavi  Infamous reputation for executions, secret police, etc. o 1954, Atoms for Peace, US/UK have Shah install nuclear energy reactors o 1979, Shaw overthrown o 1980s-90s, US pressures countries and IAEA to block Iranian reactor development o US and other countries fight over whether or not Iran is enriching its uranium  Meanwhile US supports Israel without saying anything about Israeli enrichment • US and mistrust of Iran o History of secrecy about activity towards IAEA o Undemocratic regime that supports Hezbollah and Al Qaeda o Ahmadinejad’s anti-western rhetoric o Interest in nuclear energy given oil supply  Interest in enriching uranium in house rather than elsewhere LECUTRE 11 • Nuclear accident mechanisms o Core “going supercritical”, i.e. acting like a bomb o Cooling failure after shutdown i.e. hard to avoid—can stop chain reaction but there will still be some radiation from byproducts (requires cooling) • Examples of accidents o Three-Mile Island  Coolant escapes in 1979  No breach in containment vessel, but radioactive water released (although no increase in cancer in area)  Cleanup lasted 4 years and cost 1 billion o Chernobyl, Ukraine 1986  Test to see how plant would respond to electrical failure, power surge occurred and reactor went supercritical  No containment vessel and radioactive spread with 5% of core release  Dozens of immediate radiation deaths and spread of cancer risk o Fukushima 2011  Reactors shutdown automatically after tsunami but their cooling systems also failed  Resulted in hydrogen explosions • Review: Iran’s mistrust of US and US’s mistrust of Iran (see end of lecture 10) • Adversaries’ options o Preventive attack on nuclear facilities o Strong sanctions until enrichment stopped o Smaller negotiations? o Problem: well established mistrust between US and Iran • Negotiations with Iran o 2002 – group discloses Uranium enrichment and heavy water; not reported to IAEA o 2003 – France, Germany, and UK (EU3) negotiate with Iran who agreed to sign additional protocol and follow it and suspend enrichment temporarily o 2003 – IAEA reports Iran non-compliant for not reporting importation of uranium from China, although no evidence for actual weapons program (note Iran is in NPT and allowed to enrich) o 2005 – EU3 ask Iran again to suspend enrichment, offering benefits and supply of materials  Ahmdinejad is elected and Iran announces it will restart enrichment o 2006 – IAEA reports Iran to UNSC and Iran explains most of its enriched uranium is from Russia o 2006 – Ahmandinejad announces enrichment success “our dear country has joined a club of nations” o 2006 – UNSC demands Iran suspend all enrichment o 2006-2010 – UN imposes sanctions invoking Chapter VII o 2008-2010 – IAEA inspectors continue to inspect showing Iran not following additional protocol, but no proof of weapon plans o 2009 – Iran plans to open Bushehr plant to tourism; announces to IAEA a second enrichment plan near Qom o 2010 – Akmadinejad said no further negotiations needed; people want Iran to ship uranium elsewhere for refinement • Secret facilities? o Natanz and Arak reactors are safeguarded – flag raised if IAEA inspectors rejected o Maybe they have a reactor somewhere else?  Hence, goal is to dissuade Iran from diverting materials and increasing IAEA access • “Unresolved issues” o Mining activity in Gchine mine between 1999-2000 o Why HEU particles present on university equipment? o What’s this document about making uranium hemispheres, almost identical to Pakistan’s? • Problem of an impartial factfinder o Tell the truth about country activities if war might be the result?  Slant the truth for sake of peace? o How IAEA can be unbiased as possible:  Focus on reporting observed facts without drawing conclusions  Look for object information  But must draw conclusions to a certain extent in making valued judgments  Decisions are usually unanimous o Report on Iran in 2009  “The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has cooperated with the Agency in improving safeguards measures at FEP and in providing the Agency with access to the IR-40 reactor for purposes of design information verification. Iran has not, however, implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on early provision of design information”  “Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by UNSC”  “Contrary to the requests of the Board of Governors and the UNSC, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperation with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern”  “It is critical for Iran to implement the Additional Protocol and clarify the outstanding issues in order for the Agency to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran” • Neutral way of putting it, unlike the US national intelligence estimate in 2007 • Current efforts o Obama and Clinton insist on no enrichment; Obama is strong on sanctions and asking for support from China and Russia o Is noncompliance with a safeguards agreement the same as violating the NPT? – no – KNOW! o Israel has announced it will strike Iranian facilities if program is not stopped diplomatically • Examples of sanctions o UN against South Africa for apartheid (successful) o 2006 UN against North Korea o US sanctions against Cuba (failure) o UN sanctions against Iraq (failure) o US and Japan against India (failure) o 116 cases from 1914-1990 sanctions succeeded 34% of time o Risa Brooks on sanctions – KNOW!  Types include embargos of exports, imports, foreign aid, cultural exchanges, foreign direct investment  Indirect effects that are attractive to parties in target country (like smugglers)  Work better in democracies because they affect the people in power  Not as effective in authoritarian groups—thus need for smart sanctions that are targeted at those with influence o Free-rider problem of getting everyone on board  Benefits of being only country that can deal with sanctioned country  E.g. North Korea wants talks with US , but US wants six party talks that include China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea LECTURE 12 • Review of sanctions (see end of lecture 11) • North Korea o Similar to Iran for US in that its an ongoing conflict fueled by mistrust o Difference: North Korea has had two bombs explode, 2006 and 2009 o North Korea is more culturally isolated from the world o History  1945 – Korea freed from Japan and partitioned  1950 – Premier invades South Korea with Stalin’s approval and US considers but refrains from using nuclear weapons  1953 – cease fire with new demilitarized zone; no real peace made between north and south  1950-60s, interest in nuclear weapons but no help from Soviets since they feared North Korea sharing with China  1962 – Kim shocked by Cuban Missile Crisis  1970s-present – South Korea democratizes while North Korea does not; constant tension  1980s – US sports reactor construction and worried about interest in nuclear weapons  1980s-present – North Korea develops and tests various missiles • US withdraws tactical weapons from South Korea and leaves troops there  1990s – North Korea seeks non-aggression pact for some reason (fear of South Korea and Japan?) – but fails because US wanted 6 party talk instead of a
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