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Final

# PS 171C Final review session.docx

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Department
Political Science
Course
POL SCI 171C
Professor
Tim Groseclose
Semester
Spring

Description
PS 171C Week 10 Tuesday  Explain how positive or negative externalities exist in the prisoners’ dilemma game o If I defect => negative externality for my opponent o If my opponent cooperates => positive externality for me  How many equilibria are there in this game? Are any Pareto inefficient? o One – defect, defect o NE is not Pareto efficient. Pareto efficient outcome would be mutual cooperation  One aspect of a coordination game is that there are multiple equilibria. Is society’s choice of the arrange of the arrangement of letters on a typewriter a coordination game? o Yes, keyboard manufacturers design QWERTY keyboards. o All users then learn how to type the QWERTY system  In a stag hunt game two hunters stand on either side of a path, waiting for a stag to approach. Nearby are some rabbits. Each hunter decides whether to abandon the stag hunt and kill a rabbit or help his or her fellow hunter kill a stag. If both hunters choose option 2, they kill the stag and split it between them. This is the most preferred outcome of both hunters. The second most favored outcome of a hunter is if he chooses 1 and takes home a rabbit. The least preferred outcome of a hunter is if he chooses 2 but his partner chooses 1. In this case he takes nothing home. What is the equilibrium or equilibria to this game? o Two equilibria: (rabbit, rabbit) and (stag, stag)  In what ways is a pay-raise vote in a legislature like a prisoners’ dilemma? o A legislator voting against the pay-raise is a negative externality for me o A legislator voting for the pay-raise is a positive externality for me o Incentive to defect if there is a voting coalition in favor  In what ways is a pay-raise vote like a stag hunt? o There are multiple equilibria o Some everyone prefer others  Suppose a legislature of 101 members is voting on a pay raise. What is the equilibrium or equilibria to the game? o One equilibrium: 51 yeas and 50 nays o Other: everyone votes nay  Describe any coordination problems in this game? o Which 51 voters support it?  In 1991 how did the Senate solve these coordination problems? o 51 to 48 vote so it didn’t seem pivotal. But how do you pick the 51 voters? o People not up for reelection got a free pass for the pay raise o Robert Byrd solved coordination problem o Breakfast the day of the vote to confirm votes  Did any senators not act rationally in the 1991 Senate pay raise vote? o One of the planned nay-voting senators voted yea  Left Turn - Tim Groseclose  Second Midterm Review o List six ways in which the cartoon “I’m Just a Bill” is wrong or incomplete  Bill can’t die in committee  Can be discharged  Extracted by Rules Committee  Rider tactic  Suspension of the rules calendar  Usually bill needs a rule from the Rules Committee  Might pass the Senate first  Might need a conference committee o In the actual House, how many legislators must sign a discharge petition before the bill receives a mandatory consideration on the floor?  218 o True or false? When the Rules Committee writes a “rule” for a bill, this is more of a suggestion than an order. In 1-4 sentences explain why or why not.  Must be voted on by the floor It can be ame
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