Midterm organized terms review.docx

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Political Science
Leslie Johns

PS 20 Midterm Review Interests (Ch. 2)  Power or Security  Economic or Material Welfare  Ideological goals States as actors (Ch. 2)  National interests (e.g. security)  Particularist (personal interests) Interactions (Ch. 2)  Qualities o Purposive o Strategies in hopes of desired outcomes  Cooperation o At least one actor is better off o Coordination  All actors benefit from complying (e.g. traffic laws)  How it can be achieved:  Easier with smaller number of actors (can monitor one another)  When iteration is present  When linkage is present (allows retaliation)  Can be proved by public acts  What exacerbates it:  Lack of public acts (e.g. secret military actions)  Uncertainty due to lack of information  Misperception due to lack information that can lead to unnecessary retaliation o Collaboration  All actors benefit from complying but have an incentive to defect (e.g. PD, SH)  Prone to collective action problems  Due to incentive of a free ride  Bargaining o Distribution of a fixed good (zero-sum) o Exercising power done in three ways:  Coercion  Deciding factor: net ability to impose costs on the other, i.e. the difference between the coercion employed by one side and that employed by the other  Outside options  Makes reversion outcome next best and easier to walk away from bargaining table  Relative attractiveness of each side is what matters  Agenda setting  Transforms available choices to other  Institutions’ effects on cooperation o Third party enforcement  Imposed punishment on actors o Set clear standards of behavior o Verifying compliance  Self reporting and on site inspections o Reduce the costs of joint decision making  Routinized for ease o Resolve disputes  Prior agreements made Bargaining and War (Ch. 3)  Crisis bargaining  Coercive bargaining o Explicit or implicit o Compellence (change SQ) o Deterrence (retain SQ) and extended deterrence (involves allies)  Bargaining range War from Incomplete Information (Ch. 3)  Sources of uncertainty o How each state evaluates its prospects of war o Determine bargains preferred to fighting o If uncertain about opponent’s value of war, then uncertain of how it will cost in a bargain to end conflict  Difficulties in achieving credibility o Following through on threats is costly o Both sides want best deal and have incentive to misrepresent  Solution o Make threats difficult to back down from  Clear public statements o Brinksmanship o Audience costs leads to tying hands which makes threat seem credible War from Commitment Problems (Ch. 3)  Causes of war o Goods that can be perceived as bargaining power  A state is reluctant to render itself more vulnerable o Change in balance of military capabilities  Threat to country that is more powerful in the present  Can lead to preventive war o Situations that create a first-strike advantage  Hostile states fear being attacked first due to advantage creating a less desirable expected outcome  Can lead to preemptive war War from Indivisibility (Ch. 3)  Good cannot be divided without diminishing its value  Incentive to claim something is indivisible (strategic quality) How to make war less likely (Ch. 3)  Raise costs of war o E.g. nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction  Increase transparency o Decreases lack of information  Provide outside enforcement o Sooths commitment problems o Iteration cannot be relied upon alone to keep promises  Divide apparently indivisible goods Factors of war being probable (Ch. 3)  States’ beliefs about the other’s willingness and ability to wage war  How each communicates its resolve, and degree of accidental war  Nature of disputed good – is it a source of future bargaining power? Is it divisible?  Constant or change in distribution of power Interests (Ch. 4)  National (e.g. security)  Narrow/particularistic (held by small groups) Domestic interests and actors (Ch. 4)  Leaders  Groups (bureaucracy/interest groups)  General public Incentives for conflict (Ch. 4)  Rally effect o Leads to short term increase in approval rating  Divisionary incentive  Gambling for resurrection o More common in non-democratic states o Moral hazard Influences on deciding to go to war or not (Ch. 4)  Bureaucratic organizations o Care about resources and influence they wield o “Where you stand depends on where you sit”  Military – usually most influential actor o Does not necessarily equate to militarism though  Interest groups o Economic and ethnic o Not necessarily belligerent recommendations How these influences are effective (Ch. 4)  Military – from coercive force  Interest groups o Superior resources and information access o Have a higher individual stake in not going to war than the cost of intervention for the general publi
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