Notes for second test

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Department
Philosophy
Course
PHIL102
Professor
Professor Shabo
Semester
Fall

Description
Philosophy Test 2 1. Strong ai and weak ai aren’t the name for different kinds of artificial intelligences, Surle argues against strong ai thesis. Stong ai thesis- computers fully understand and have cognitive states like a human- genuinely understanding information. Weak ai thesis- Appropriately programmed machine is a useful tool for understanding the human brain, as it MODELS the brains function. Does not actually think, goes through set steps. Strong ai maintains that a machine understands what it is doing weak ai does not. Behavior of machine can be seen and agreed upon. What counts as actually thinking? Shank may set bar lower for “thinking” than surle. Shanks case for stong ai- shank programmed a computer to “actually think”- His machine, when given inputs in the form of a story, then it can make inferences not specifically mentioned in the story, therefore it can understand the story. Surle is not impressed with this example  responds by using an analogy of “The chinese room experiment” – Enter room and you are given Asian script. Then he is given instructions in English that tell him what to do with the characters in an appropriate sequence. He does so and is told by chinese speakers that he has constructed a story in chinese. Point: If the computer has instructions, just as the man in the chinese room, it can manipulate symbols into coherrant “thoughts” without really understanding. If machine understands the story than the man also understands the chinese story. Surle does not believe that computers can be programmed to actually think- maybe thinking and understanding are explicitly biological process. 2. Qualia- the subjective aspects of mental states To be in a state is associated with a feeling. The robot in the chinese robot experiment does not have qualia- attempts to assemble entire population to function as one big neuron network. The funcionalist thinks that each type of mental state can be identified by an input-output profile. An input can cause the right response, but the qualia is not experienced by a robot, the “feeling” is not there. Individuals can have qualia, but collectives can not. Handout 7. Pain is not just a functional state, functionalism does not give the right account for pain. Functionalist response- maybe qualia is non essential to overall experience. (But how could you feel pain with the feelings associated with it). Pain may be an exception to the functional role. Belief and desire, on the other hand, do not essentially involve qualia. 3. Token
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