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Chapter 1

POLI 441 Chapter Notes - Chapter 1: Hegemony, Glossary Of French Expressions In English, Protectionism

Political Science
Course Code
POLI 441
Krzysztof Pelc

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Cooperation and International Regimes (p.49-64)
hegemony depends on asymmetrical cooperation (sucessful hegemons support and maintain
US less willing than before to define its interests in terms complementary to those of Europe
deny the premise that int’l eco. policy coordination is valuable by assuming that int’l markets
will automatically yield optimal results
very difficult to organize cooperation in pol. economy
when shared interests are sufficiently important and other key conditions are met,
cooperation can emerge and regimes can be created w/o hegemony
how do patterns of rule-guided policy coordination emerge, maintain themselves, and decay
in world politics?
Harmony, Cooperation, and Discord
cooperation vs. harmony
harmony: a situation in which actors’ policies automatically facilitate the attainment of
others’ goals
i.e. Invisible Hand ensure pursuit of self-interest contributes to all
no one’s actions damage anyone else
apolitical; no communication necessary, no exerting influence
cooperation: requires the actions of separate individuals/organizations being brought
into conformity w/ one another through negotiation (“policy coordination”)
occurs when actors adjust their bhv, to the actual preference of others
intergovernmental cooperation happens when policies actually followed by 1
gov’t are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own
objectives, as the result of a policy coordination
highly political; patterns of bhv. must be altered (neg. and pos. inducements)
think game theory and the like
typically mixed with conflict and reflects partially successful efforts to overcome
a reaction to conflict/potential conflict
distinguishing b/w harmony, cooperation, and discord
1) Do actors’ policies automatically facilitate attainment of others’ goals?
2) Are attempts made by actors to adjust their policies to each others’ objectives?
if not, you get discord
gov’ts hold each others’ policies responsible for hindering the attainment
of their goals
often leads to efforts to induce others to change their policies (when this
fails—> policy conflict results)
example: liberal int’l pol. economy
discord on trade issues may prevail b/c gov’ts do not seek to reduce the
adverse consequences of their policies on others; some seek to increase those
effects (i.e. mercantilist gov’ts manipulating foreign trade and warfare to
damage others’ economies)
gov’t may desire “positional goods”, such as high status
some industries forced to incur adjustment costs as changes in comparative
advantage occur
protectionist costs domestically impose adjustment costs abroad
don’t need bargaining or negotiation necessarily
adaptive (not manipulative) adjustment can occur
one country may shift its policy in direction of another’s preferences w/o regard
for the effect of its action on the other state
non-bargained manipulation can also occur
like when one actors confronts the other with a fait accompli
each gov’t pursues what it perceives as self-interest, but looks for bargains to benefit
all parties (but not necessarily equally)
Marxists say that mutual policy adjustments under hegemonic cooperation cannot resolve the
contradictions in the system b/c they are attributed to capitalism rather than to problems of
coordination among egoistic actors lacking common gov’t
fundamental issue is posed by the contradictions of capitalism rather than the tensions
inherent in a state system
International Regimes and Cooperation
each act of cooperation or discord affects the beliefs, rules, and practices that form the
context for future actions
each act is embedded within a chain of such acts and their residues
any act of cooperation needs to be interpreted within the context of related actions and
of prevailing expectations and shared beliefs
Defining and Identifying Regimes
regime: set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and
financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states; set of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of int’l relations
principles: beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude
norms: standards of bhv. defined in terms of rights and obligations
rules: specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action; more specific than norms,
indicating in detail the specific rights and obligations of members; more easily altered
decision-making procedures: prevailing practices for making and implementing
collective choice
example: int’l balance-of-payments regime post-WWII
principle: liberalization of trade and payments
norm: injection of states not to manipulate their exchange rates unilaterally for
nat’l advantage
they all contain injunctions about bhv. (some far-reaching and important and hard to
alter, others technical and altered easily)
some intermediate injunctions
politically consequential but specific enough that violations and changes
can be identified
the essence of int’l regimes
we regard the scope of install regimes as corresponding to the boundaries of issue-areas
(sets of issues that are in fact death with in common negotiations and by the same
issue-areas depend on actors’ perceptions and bhv., so boundaries change over time
Self-Help and International Regimes
injunctions of int’l regimes rarely affect eco. transactions directly
state institutions, not int’l org., impose tariffs and quotas and intervene in exchange
must be exerted on nat’l controls and on the specific interstate agreements that affect
the exercise of nat’l controls
sovereignty and self-help mean that the principles and rules of int’l regimes will be weaker in
domestic society
balance-of-power theory: cooperative endeavours such as pol.-mil. alliances necessarily form
in self-help systems
regimes facilitate the smooth operation of decentralized int’l pol. systems
Hegemonic Cooperation in the Postwar Era (p.135-150)
powerful states seek to construct int’l pol. economies that suits their interests and ideologies
converting resources into outcomes is not to easy
how does hegemonic leadership operate?
sufficient mil. power to protect an int’l pol. economy from incursions by hostile powers is
necessary to succeed
i.e. US containment policy for Soviet Union (liberal capitalist pol. economy)
hegemonic leadership builds on the interests of states
hegemon seeks to persuade others to conform to its vision of world order and to defer
to its leadership
secondary leaders accept b/c think they are benefitting from the structure of order that
is created by hegemony
formation of int’l regimes helps ensure hegemon’s legitimacy
hegemon must invest some of its power resources in building of institutions
American Century
period of hegemonic cooperation baed on common commitment to openness and non-
1947-1963 (ish)
then US started to get a bit protectionist (mandatory il import quotas, interest
equalization tax, textile fiber restrictions)
Am. influence b/c 3 major benefits that partners received
1) stable int’l monetary system
facilitate liberal int’l trade and payments
2) provision of open markets for goods
reduce tariffs and restrictions
3) access to oil at stable prices
US provided oil to Europe and Japan from Middle East, where US had sway
less common to expand the trade-money pair to include oil
the open, non-discriminatory monetary and trade system the US sought depended on
growth and prosperity in other capitalist countries, which depended on readily
available, reasonably priced oil (most from M-E)
oil was at the centre of the redistributive system of Am. hegemony
US sought to construct formal int’l regimes in money + trade + oil
reacted to initially weak IMF and failure of Br. Loan of 1946 by creating Marshall Plan
and supporting European Payments Union (EPU)
reconstituted an int’l monetary regime with IMF in the centre
made up for defeated Int’l Trade Org. (ITO) by supporting General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
led to increasing reliance by US on int’l oil companies and int’l regimes that they dominated
oil is the exception to the rule that hegemonic power should seek to institute int’t
regimes on an int’l basis to control actions of other states
Hegemonic Cooperation in Finance and Trade
Bretton-Woods 1944
US, UK, and allies formed IMF and IBRD (later WB)
institutional centre of a new int’l monetary regime
designed by Keynes and Dexter White
to facilitate liberal trade and payments in postwar world
US thought that establishing multilateral rules for world eco. would mean they
could draw back large and continuing aid
BUT European economies too weak for this
Marshall Plan 1947
Truman changed US policy from demanding quick sterling convertibility on the bases
of loans to provision of billions in aid to Europe
administer by Eco. Cooperation Agency (ECA)
overshadowed the young IMF
US turned from passive and tightfisted hegemon to active and relatively openhanded
provide US with pol. leverage to achieve hegemonic cooperation
US too lead in creating and maintaining a new set of post-Bretton Woods rules
for world fin. system
ITO 1948
would institutionalize non-discriminatory trade on a global basis
developed by Br. and Am. at Havana Conference 1948
proposed ITO carefully designed not to infringe on state sov., but more flexible and
ambiguous than a traditional leg system (resting in a series of escalated normative
rejected by US Senate w/o a vote
objected to it making allowances for eco. planning and state trading
end of 1940s, IMF inactive and ITO dead
European Payments Union (EPU) 1950
institutional response to shortage of dollars restricting trade and hampering eco.
complemented Marshall Plan by reducing need for dollars and increasing efficiency
with which scarce resources were used
sum up each country’s surpluses and deficits vis-a-vis other members to get a single
reduced transaction costs associated with financing intra-European trade
coupled with a Code for the Liberalization of Trade, providing for almost immediate
elimination of most quantitative import restriction intra-Europe
BUT short-term, EPU did not promote liberalization
legitimated discrimination ag. US exports b/c shortage of dollars and availability
of EPU’s multilateral clearing arrangements in Europe
in both Marshall Plan and EPU, US gave up its usual demands for reciprocity
MP was grants, not loans (countries never had to reciprocate benefactions)
EPU not quid pro quo but basis of faith in the future (US made short-term sacrifices
like giving fin. aid and permitting discrimination ag. US exports)
GATT 1947
success of GAAT was indicative of the conditions facilitating successful hegemonic
appropriate institutional design which stressed reduction of uncertainty and
decentralized coordination
if Japan were to prosper, it would need to trade with other industrialized countries; so
US markets had to open to Japanese exports
US was set on keeping Japan in the American-led system
persuaded allies to help
European Economic Community (EEC) 1958
entailed discrimination by ECC ag. exports from outsiders, including US
US endorsed it b/c believed European integration would contribute to eco. growth and
world trade
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