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Political Studies
POLS 264
Kim Richard Nossal

The state and the nation: changing norms and the rules of sovereignty in international relations J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin  Sovereignty (John Ruggie): the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains  Thomas, Krasner: sovereignty a constant; not at all likely to change  Sovereignty is a social construct and its location is subject to changing interpretations  Giddens: international relations are the bases upon which nation-states exist Sovereignty: the state and the nation  Type different types of entities: 1. States defined by territories over which authorities exercise legitimate control  Supreme power within a defined juridical border  State sovereignty is self-justified; historical possession legitimates continued jurisdiction 2. Nations defined by communities of sentiment that form the political basis on which state authority rests  Developed after understanding of the state  Modern nationalism – nation should be politically self-determining and national solidarity should serve as the sole criterion in defining the nation  Since modern nationalism, tension between state-sovereignty and national sovereignty o State sovereignty: stresses link between sovereign authority and set of political institutions; stable o National sovereignty: link between sovereign authority and a defined population; unpredictable & destabilizing because of minority populations  Understanding of sovereignty is redefined after war o Gilpin: necessary component of the governance of an international system in a set of rights that govern or influence the interaction among states  Tension between state legitimization and nation legitimization and cannot be fully resolved – ideal of each are contradictory State Sovereignty and the post-Napoleonic order  Challenge of Westphalian sovereignty  French tried to export revolution throughout Europe (1792-1815)  Cause of Napoleonic war = nationalism & Jacobism (French radicalism that advocates the spread of liberty, equality, and nationhood through the use of force  Nationalism of French Revolution based on historic ties and added to nation requirement of citizen rights  War against Napoleon had 3 aims: 1. Restore a balance of power 2. Stop spread of French radical ideas 3. Prevent liberal revolution in Europe  Favoured the state over the nation – decrease in number of states in Europe, joined smaller territories into existing states o Peace of Paris (1814), Treaty of Vienna (1815) – Congress of Vienna territories bartered  Metternich: community interests made sovereignty less absolute o Government can intervene if fear that will be dragged into a revolution; prevented many wars till 1856 WWI and the triumph of the nation  Cause: old alliance politics gone out of control  International order at end of Napoleonic war different than from post- Versailles o Empires collapsed, territories distributed, victorious states to balance power  Socialism = feared ideology  Post-WWI lead to more countries  Wilson: purpose of WWI was to end all other wars and causes of war – balance of power, alliances, denial of self-determination and democracy WWII and its aftermath  Cause: fight against fascism; linked with nationalism – together formed the desire of some people to dominate over others  Allies united over opposition to nationalism  Self-determination of peoples: people within boundaries have equal access to government and the government does not try to control anyone outside boundaries o Speaks against colonial empires  Nationalism: boundaries = the state should match the nation; expand wherever nationals live, creates interstate conflict  UN charter: as long as state represents its people as individuals, other states cannot claim to represent these people as members of its ”nation”  Legitimacy of states based on good government and not national self- determination Sovereignty after the cold war  Change in the understanding of sovereignty underlying discourse in international relations has taken root Think Again: Sovereignty Stephen D. Krasner The sovereign state is just about dead  Wrong; sovereignty remains attractive for both strong and weak states  Sovereignty provides international recognition = access to international organizations and finance Sovereignty means final authority  Not anymore, if ever: Hobbes and Bodin thought the words of the sovereign was law – this invited tyranny but they were concerned with maintaining order and that’s it  Supreme power useless in practice  Sovereignty = states independent from one another o Non-intervention: one state does not have the right to intervene with internal affairs of another  Sovereignty – control over transborder movements o Technological change made it hard for states to control the movement of things over borders (cocaine, Hollywood movies)  Sovereignty = political authorities can enter into international agreements o Endorse attractive contracts The Peace of Westphalia Produced the Modern Sovereign State  No, it came later  Westphalia - ended 30 years war against Holy Roman Empire o Delegitimized the role of the Catholic church o New constitution for the Holy Roman Empire o Established rules for religious tolerance in Germany o Undermined the power of prices to control religious affairs within their territories Universal Human Rights Are an Unprecedented Challenge to Sovereignty  Wrong  Struggle has been going on for a long time  Some states voluntarily introduce international supervision; weak sided with preferences of the strong  Holocaust an example of international constraints on domestic practices = failure o Post WWII, human rights focus o UN Charter endorsed human rights and non-intervention – few enforcement mechanisms and ineffective ways to report violations Globalization Undermines State Control  No  States are better able to respond now than in the past  The introduction of the printing press bigger impact on political authority o Martin Luther nailing theses to Wittenburg church door o Sovereign monarchs could not contain spread of concepts  Its easier for states to manage the flow of goods and services now Globalization Is Changing the Scope of State Control  Yes  Rulers enhance effective control by leaving issues they cannot resolve o Leaders surrendering control over religion during Peace of Westphalia  Monetary policy – expanded then contracted o Short term capital flows and inability of some states to control inflation  Erosion of national currencies and erosion of national citizenship o Citizens and noncitizens both entitled to rights even if cannot vote  Extent of a countries social welfare program = the level of integration within global economy NGOs Are Nibbling at National Sovereignty  To some extent  200 in 1909 to 17,000 today o Technology made easier to get group together and make impact on public policy and international law o Activist who lose in own territory can pressure foreign gov’ts to influence decision maker in nation  Power of influence low when compared to governments, international organizations, and multinational corporations  Smaller, weaker state are usually target of NGO’s o But still can have impact in US because of openness of political system Sovereignty Blocks Conflict Resolution  Yes, sometimes  Sovereignty for rulers = exclusive control within a given territory  Political importance of conventional sovereignty = harder to solve problems o Jerusalem; obvious alternatives: divide city, divide Temple Mount, establish international authority, divide control over issues o Cant do this because subject to attacks by counter elites who can wave the “sovereignty flag”  Conventional rules for Tibet problematic o Better off it regaining autonomy; no guarantee of gaining support of constituents even if settlement was created The European Union is a New Model for Supranational Governance  Yes, but only for Europeans  Not conventional international organization because member states are closely linked that withdrawal is not option o Diversity preventing it from becoming like the United States  Inconsistent with conventional sovereignty rules; member states created supranational institutions that can make decisions opposed by some member states  Product of sovereignty because created through voluntary agreements among member states o Contradicts sovereignty because undermine autonomy of individual members Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism Jerry Z. Muller  US – ethnic nationalism not important in politics  Europeans = nationalism a tragic detour on the road to liberal democracy  Since Cold War, ethnonationalism reshaping European borders The Politics of Identity  Two ways of thinking about national identity: 1. All people who live within border are part of nation regardless of ethnic, racial, religious origins (liberal, civic nationalism) 2. Shared heritage (common language, common faith, common ethic ancestry) ethnonationalist The Rise of Ethnonationalism  Propelled by modernity (Gellner) o Military competition between states -> demand for resources = economic growth o Economic growth + need for literacy and communication = promote education and common language  Ethnonationalism had psychological & economic basis o New relationships with gov’t weakened traditional bonds with family The Great Transformation  Making the state and the nation commensurate = voluntary emigration (motivated by gov’t discrimination against minorities), force deportation, genocide  WWI unleashed explosion of ethnonationalism o Ottoman Empire – mass deportations and murder of Armenian minority = ethnic cleansing/genocide o Greek invading soon to be Turkey and looted and burned villages (killed 400,000 people); Turks did same back (killed 1.5 million)  Deadlier turn during WWII o Nazi regime to rip Europe of Jews Postwar But Not Postnational  Political settlement of WWI achieved by moving borders, WWI by moving populations o Germans moved as Red Army massacred way to Berlin o Jews moved to US or Israel vanishing from central and eastern Europe o Process of “ethic unmixing”: each nation in Europe has its own state made up of single ethnic nationality The Balance Sheet  Analysis usually look at costs of ethnic segregation but also has many benefits  Adam smith: big market = better economy; break up of Austrian-Hungary empire economically irrational  Forced migrations = losing skilled people who take knowledge elsewhere  Also source of cohesion and stability o Mutual trust and sacrifice within ethnic groups o Coinciding ethnic and state boundaries after WWII = most stable Europe yet o Need for collective determination satisfied = want to participate in transnational frameworks (EU) New Ethnic Mixing  Brought about by voluntary emigration; from poor areas to rich ones Future Implications  Wealthier and higher-achieving regions might try to separate from lower Path dependence in historical sociology James Mahoney Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics Paul Pierson Counterfactual History: A User’s Guide Martin Bunzl  History matters – the past influences the future  Deviant outcomes: outcome predicted by the theory did not occur  2 dominant sequences in path dependence: 1. Self-reinforcing: (aka increasing returns) formation and long-term reproduction of institutional pattern; increasing returns = pattern delivers more benefits with continued adoption and becomes difficult to change despite the fact that other options may be more ‘efficient’ a. Unpredictability (Multiple equilibria): early events are important and random; many outcomes possible b. Inflexibiliy (inertia): hard to shift paths once far along; may lock in one solution if far enough along the path, single equilibrium c. Nonergodicity (contingency): small events are remember because they feed back into future choices d. Potential path inefficiency: the path that becomes “locked in” may not be the most efficient 2. Reactive sequences: chains of temporally ordered and causally connected events; reactive = each step dependent on other steps Conceptualizing path dependence  Sewell- path dependence: “what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time”  Steps down one path means continuing on that path, with every step taken in a direction the higher chance one will continue in that direction  Path dependence has 3 defining features: 1. Involves the study of causal processes that are highly sensitive to events that take place in the early stages of an overall historical sequence – Urn filled with coloured balls  Inertia: mechanisms that REPRODUCE a particular institutional pattern over time 2. In a path-dependent sequence, early historical events are contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior events of “initial conditions” – only until after first ball drawn do we get a sense of future outcomes  Inertia: reaction and counterreaction mechanisms that give an event chain and “inherent logic” in which on event “naturally” leads to another 3. Once historical events take place, path-dependent sequences are marked by relatively deterministic causal patterns (INERTIA): once processes are set into motion and begin tracking a particular outcome, these processes tend to stay in motion and continue to track this outcome Self-reinforcing sequences (aka increasing returns, positive feedback process)  2 key elements of increasing returns: I. Pinpoint how the cost of switching from one alternative to another will increase over time II. Draw attention to issues of time and sequence, distinguishing between chain of events from periods that reinforce different paths  Persistence -> self-reinforcing sequences  Reproduction that REINFORCES early events  Stinchcombe’s model: 1. Particular circumstances which caused a tradition (institution) to be started 2. General process by which social patterns (institutional patterns) reproduce themselves Institutional genesis  “Critical junctures”: adoption of a particular institutional arrangement from among 2 or more alternatives o Assessed through counterfactual analysis: imagine an alternative option had ben chosen and attempt to rerun history accordingly (“If…. then,) condition statement; tend to make up implausible counterfactuals with our imagination o When the counterfactual has no direct evidence, it is connected to the laws that apply to it o Marked by contingency: inability of a theory to explain, deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence of a specific outcome  Initial adoption of B during the critical juncture period if a contingent event Institutional reproduction  Explained by mechanisms derived from predominant theories  Trigger rapid reproduction = better chance of seizing opportunities before alternative institutional options can recover Reactive Sequences  Chains of temporally ordered and casually connected events; reaction to prior events and a cause of subsequent events  Ex. King's death (Event A) caused the failure of the Poor People's Campaign (B), which in turn led to massive summer riots (C), which heightened welfare militancy (D), which brought about an increase in AFDC applications and court rulings that liberalized AFDC acceptance criteria (E), and which fostered an explosion in the AFDC rolls in the late 1960s (F)  Backlash processes that TRANSFORM and perhaps REVERSE early events; chain of tightly linked reactions and counterreactions Contingency and conjunctural causation  Can’t identify beginning point of reactive sequence, investigators keep going back to when societies not developed  Initial event that starts chain cannot be predicted; usually a intersection of two sequences of events  Intersection and the timing of the intersection impact subsequent effects  Path can change when two events overlap Unpredictability, narrative, and inherent sequentiality  Final outcomes can’t be predicted from early events; only sometimes in smaller intervals  Able to look at historical alternatives through “key choice points” and counterfactual evidence  Components of inherent sequentiality: 1. Necessary or sufficient conditions for reactive sequences; sufficient: project forward in time (how events make other events happen), necessary: project backwards (what events might have prevented the present state of things from happening) 2. Analysis of “causal mechanisms” that link initial conditions with final outcomes; intermediate events represent causal mechanisms & causal mechanisms connect consecutive events 3. Clear temporal ordering among events in a sequence; reactive sequence needs to be arranged in precise chronological order Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History William C. Wohlforth Balance of Power Theory dictates that hegemonies do not form in multistate systems because perceived threats of hegemony over the system generate balancing behavior by other leading states in the system. -The theory only focuses on modern Europe and its global successors. -Systematic outcomes and state behavior contradict the core balance of power hypothesis that balancing behavior prevents systematic hegemony. – However, hegemonies routinely do form, and when they do not, balancing is usually fairly insignificant. Theories and Expectations -Because units in anarchic systems have an interest in maximizing their long term odds of survival, they will check dangerous concentrations of power by building up their own capabilities, known as Internal Balancing, allying their capabilities with other nations (External Balancing) or by adopting the power generating practices of the prospective hegemon. (Emulation) -The theory states that balancing will occur in any anarchic system. -There are however, no logical grounds for the assumption that the balancing proposition takes precedence over other incentives. 3 systematic impediments to balancing 1) the theory of collective goods predicts chronic free-riding and a consequent under supplying of external balancing via alliance formation – 2) The new institutionalism in economics, sociology and political science generates the expectation that increasing returns, path dependence, barriers to collective identity change, and other domestic-level institutional lags will raise the real costs and thus lower the supply of internal balancing via domestic self-strengthening reforms. 3) Decades of cumulating research on decision making would predict pervasive uncertainty before the event concerning the identity and severity of the hegemonic threat would exacerbate the other system- and unit-level barriers to balancing – “Units are members of a common international system if the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculation of others” Two Exogenous causes of balance 1) State expansion: occurs when new units appear from outside the system (either a new state is created on territory previously outside the system, or existing states that previously had little or not interaction with the system begin significant interaction with the system; or peoples outside the system migrate closer and begin significant interaction. 2) Administrative capacity: A hegemon does not only need to defeat opposing military forces, but also most administer conquered territory so that they can expand further. – states capable of conquering are not capable of maintaining occupied territory. 3 Countervailing expectations about great power behavior: 1) efforts to form effective balancing alliances will frequently fail due to collective action problems 2) political obstacles inside states will frequently lead to failures to emulate power generating innovations by potential hegemons 3) uncertainly about which power poses the greatest threat of a hegemon will frequently impede or prevent efforts to balance. Systematic hegemony is likely under two historically common conditions 1) When the rising hegemon develops the ability to incorporate and effectively administer conquered territories 2) When the boundaries of the international system remain stable, so no new major powers emerge from outside the system Examples: Assyrian Empire: expanded beyond its capacity, and eventually motivated the emergence of a Median empire as a peer rival. The Greek City-State System and Persia – appears to back up balance of power theory, as it was a group of city-states balancing each other out. However, if you look at it as a part of the larger system with Persian hegemony, it becomes less supportive of this – what appeared to be balancing was in fact bandwagoning and coalition breakdown the face of persistent Persian threat. – the ability to keep the Persians at bay likely had more to do with internal problems within Persia. -attempts at hegemony were put down by enlisting help from Persia -in later years, they were unable to coordinate well enough to prevent a Macedonian hegemon under King Phillip II, and Persia failed in internal balancing, as Alexander the Great would eventually become hegemon of the region The Eastern Mediterranean System – Rome was able to establish hegemony by defeating the Macedonians, with the help of Greek states who feared Macedonian dominance – Rome owes much to its institutions however, as it had a strong middle class backbone of small farmers to a mass mobilization army at least as disciplined as the Hellenistic states could muster. – also, Rome could include foreigners more effectively, which allowed them to gather large social resources with which to face competition for security and power The Ancient Indian System – The Mauryan Empire became the hegemon, and was opposed through small “forest polities” which managed to maintain autonomy throughout the whole era. – The presence of these polities were a problem for a serious of aspirants to hegemony in the region, thus demonstrating a continuing source of counter-hegemonic pressure in this and other systems: actors that promote and thrive on limited state capacity Ancient China – Qin was able to maximize administrative capacity. He introduced universal conscription and national taxation, as well ad establishing a four layered administrative structure of preferences, counties, townships and villages which allowed for Qin to not just mobilize national resources, but also consolidate conquests and prevent rebellions. This allowed for the incorporation of conquered territory – The Qin dynasty did not last, but its institutional contributions would last for thousands of years, thus making China known as a universal empire, rather than a multi-state system The East Asian System – Stable hegemony until it was forced into the Western- dominated global system of the 19 century – It was neither a balance of power system or Chinese Empire, but rather a system of east Asian states that had developed formal treaties, political relationships, extensive economic interactions, and cultural exchanges that helped to signal deference to each other, to communicate important interests and to resolve conflict. – So long as China was stable, so to was the system, as the states had no desire to fight, and China respected a certain level of independence. American Systems – The presence of oppression on the tributary states to Aztec and the Inca were responsible for the smaller states willingness to move from bandwagoning on the empires, to balancing in alliance with the Spanish invaders. Primarily because of disease, these smaller states were unable to take advantage of the situation to create a new hegemon, and the region fell into the hands of Spanish hegemony. Conclusions; Systemic outcomes are inconsistent with the theory. Stable system dominance by a single overwhelmingly powerful state that falls short of universal empire is as much a historical norm as multipolarity. Causal processes predicted by competing theories systematically overwhelm balancing. States did engage in internal an external balancing to try and oppose the rise of almost every hegemon, but in almost all cases behavior predicted the theory of collective goods and the new institutional theory undermined the effectiveness of balancing. Pervasive free riding by prospective balancers allowed the empires discussed to employ a divide and rule strategy, and domestic impediments to change rendered internal balancing via self-strengthening reforms useless. Also, the uncertainty about who will rise to be the hegemon stands in the way of balancing. Most of the explanation for why systems become more or less concentrated lies in the leader’s administrative capacity and the systems special parameters. When the initial conditions of balance of power theory of present, hegemony is likely. The main forces against hegemony are system expansion and administrative constraints. Hegemony likely when the systems spatial parameters are constant, and power can cumulate. October 9 The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal Henry A. Kissinger  Efforts to establish international disputes; need to look at when seeking peace from nuclear extinction  Absolute security for one power means absolute insecurity for another = never a legitimate settlement  International settlement will always appear somewhat unjust; if one power was completely satisfied, all others would be completely dissatisfied = a revolution  An order accepted by all major powers is legitimate (265)  An order considered having an oppressive structure is revolutionary  Legitimizing principle establishes the relative “justice” of competing claims and the mode of their adjustment o Defines the marginal case: 1919, Austro-Hungary Empire disintegrated – legitimacy of state depended on linguistic unity  Stability depends on commensurability between the maxims of the legitimization principle and the conditions of the settlement  Those who have the most gain from stability become the advocates of revolutionary policy (example of nazi Germany)  International settlement is a problem because cannot predict powers who will act aggressively, and there are no forces to deter aggression  Two types of equilibrium: o General: makes it risky for one power or group to attempt to impose its will on the remainder; deterrent against a general war o Special: defines the historical relation of certain powers among each other; condition of smooth cooperation  International order is not harmony; even if agreement on legitimacy, security will differ depending on geographical location and history of contending powers  Problem at Vienna, general agreement between France and Europe lead to disagreement within Asia, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain; different conceptions of equilibrium o Castlereagh (British Foreign Minister): equilibrium means a Europe in which hegemony is impossible; wanted to create a Central Europe that would be strong enough to resist attack from the West and East (Metternich concerned about this as well); equilibrium was an expression of the balances of forces o Metternich: equilibrium includes a Germany in which Prussia predominance was impossible  Myth of Talleyrand’s (French diplomat) role at the Congress of Vienna; broke up hostile powers and regrouped them into a pattern of his liking through claiming legitimacy and emerged as the arbiter of Europe  France was the only uncommitted major power but eventually came to participate in European affairs II  Talleyrand was against excluding France and minor powers from the Congress of the “Big Four” (Austria, Prussia, Russia, Great Britain)  The Big Four wanted to continue making decisions on their own, and treat the “Eight” (including France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden) as on for settle peripheral issues  Interviews between Castlereagh and Alexander; could never agree on basic premises o Alexander: proposed to keep all of the Duchy of Warsaw with a small portion to be ceded to Prussia; claimed it was moral duty and motivated by the desire of happiness of the Polish people o Castlereagh: Russian appendage deep into central Europe, would cause unrest for the rest of Europe III  The Tsar (Emperor of Europe) could not be resisted without a united front of the rest of Europe, but the powers did not realize this danger  Wanted to maintain the general and the special equilibriums  Talleyrand afraid that the problem of Poland would be settled without him, or against him  Metternich did not want to resist because then most of the effort would fall on Austria  Hardenberg memorandum illustrated Prussia’s dilemma: Russian support might gain it Saxony but not legitimacy; Austrian support might yield it Poland, but not Saxony  Metternich: Castlereagh concern with the balance of power and Hardenberg’s obsession with Saxony  Metternich finally got Prussia to agree to a common plan of action against Russia on the basis of Metternich’s memoranda  Alexander appealed to the Monarchs against their ministers; Prussia King demanded no further secret negotiations  November 5 contest over Poland ended for a while IV  Procrastination on the issue maddened Castlereagh, but allowed Metternich to overcome his dilemma, showing that legitimacy implies agreement, not imposition  Austria interested in the closest relationship with Prussia  Metternich: maintain a small part of Saxony, give much of it to Prussia  Saxony governed by Prussia now  Congress of Vienna seemed to reach a stalemate but stalemate cannot exist unless all factors are engaged and France still uncommitted o Allied unity seemed more important than threat of France during negotiations o Equilibrium was indivisible o Europe saved in the name of Saxony V  Powers tend to identify threats to their equilibrium as threats to their security o Danger to equilibrium can never be seen until demonstrated because aggressors can justify all the steps taken  Britain did not want anything to do with Poland denying the reality of Russian danger  Prussia threatened war  Castereagh proposed a defensive alliance between France, Austria and Britain  Talleyrand’s greatest achievement at Vienna was refusal to sell French participation in the alliance for territorial advantage; gained end of the isolation of France and the real recognition of its equality  Defensive alliance created and solved the crisis of Vienna  Threatening to use force ruins negotiations o Prussia was confronted by 3 determined powers; series of partial settlements isolated Prussia  Prussia would not carry out threat of war; given part of Saxony and extensive territories in the Rhineland  January 3 1815, Metternich and Castlereagh would not negotiate without Talleyrand  June 9, 1815 final acts of Vienna were ratified by Europe assembled in congress; only meeting of the Congress of Vienna VI  Two ways of constructing international order: o Will/renunciation o Force/legitimacy  25 years Europe trying to achieve order through forces (Napoleon and the Grande Armee); thought the success of legitimate monarchs depended on this army’s success  Diplomacy can only function when each major power accepts the legitimacy of the existence of others  Vienna Congress reflected the skill of diplomats in making use of their opportunity (first reason why successful) o Castlereagh: ability to reconcile different point of view and singlemindedness enabled him to keep discussion focused on essentials o Metternich: art of defining a framework which made concessions appear as sacrifices to a common cause  The importance of power relations was never lost sight of (second reason why successful)  Vienna settlement took into account legitimacy and security; created a structure which was sufficiently balanced and took into account historical happenings  RESULTED IN A CENTURY WITHOUT A MAJOR WAR The 19 Century International System: Changes in Structure Paul W. Schroeder Common explanations for Peace in the 19 century: widespread exhaustion, war- weariness, fear of revolution, desire for peace produced by decades of war; a moderate peace settlement, a stable balance of power, a system of diplomacy by conference, a concert of Europe, the prevalence of monarchial conservative ideology; international cooperation to preserve the existing order, and prudent, skilled statesmanship. The explanations involve an explicit or implicit denial of any systematic change in international politics in this more peaceful, stable era in three ways. 1) 1815 settlement is commonly interpreted as a restoration of an 18 centuryh th style balance of power and 18 century political principles: 2) Most historians see the post-1815 change in the character of international politics as temporary, with stability and harmony beginning to vade by 1820 and in definite decline by 1830, and normal politics returning in 1848. 3) Peace and stability are usually explained as volitional and dispositional rather than structural. i.e a matter of what statesmen choose to do in international politics, rather than what the prevailing system allows them to do. -Nineteenth century international peace and stability derived mainly from systematic change, reflected in major institutionalized arrangements and practices divergent from 18 century norms. -the 19 century is notable not because of the absence of war, but because of the results achieved by international politics during the time. The Congress of Vienna was a huge part of that, and accomplished the following; evacuation of the allied armies from France, France’s quick reintegration into the European concert, the completion and implementation of the federal constitution of Germany, suppression of revolutions, creation of and independent Greece, and a largely successful effort to avoid fighting. -This contradicts the notion that it was simply a return to 18 century politics, as it simply does not have the same record of diplomatic successes. The notion that it was a return to conservative thinking, or the establishment of the ‘Holy Alliance’ (Russia, Prussia, Austria) is also flawed. 3 Implications of 1848 Revolutions 1) Discredited the Metternich system which attempted to repress liberalism, nationalism, and revolution purely through authoritarian means. After 1848, even authoritarian governments tried to deal with discontent through modernization and economic development, tending to promote rivalries between states. 2) It undermined the alliance between Austria, Russia and Prussia, as they all once again entered into international competition with one another. 3) It made long strides away from the pacific, legalistic internationalism of Metternich’s generation, and towards nationalism. Despite this, the system was not overthrown, thus demonstrating that it was in fact structural factors primarily behind the peace. Even though wide spread upheaval was experienced through Europe throughout the rest of the century, no two majors went to war, and no international boundary had been altered. All of the factors that were said to have produced peace and stability after 1815 had been suspended or destroyed, yet peace remained. Crimean War: All factors were in place for a massive war between Britain and Russia, but none occurred. The war was unpopular in Britain, and was persuaded by France to end the war and make peace before it had intended on doing so. Two years of fighting resulted in no border changes, with its only implications being a weakened Russia, an isolated Austria and opened up the Balkans. The system survived through several periods of upheaval. Efforts to wage 18 century style warfare were unsuccessful. Europe as a whole was not tolerating any attempts at expansionist warfare. In attempting to unify both Italy and Germany, the leaders, Cavour and Bismarck both had great difficulty in starting the wars required for unification. Both managed to achieve their goals after short wars, which were notably brief because of the international response to them. Both countries were rapidly integrated into the European system and no effort was made to reverse the outcome. This openness to th peaceful accommodation was simply not present in the 18 century. -19 century politics lacked a power attempting to achieve complete mastery of Europe. Instead, it was characterized by defensive coalitions. The alliances were non-aggressive. -Unlike other eras, the 19 century was a struggle for advantage that never broke down into a struggle for mastery. th -The proportionally calculated ratio for battle field deaths from the 18 century to 19 century is either 7:1 or 8:1 Three problems faced by 18 century 1) How to assure a reasonable amount of mutual security and status for all the great powers 2) How to insulate Europe from extra-European sources of conflict. 3) And how to reconcile the legitimate requirements of smaller states for a secure independence with equally legitimate requirement and unavoidable quest for great powers to grow their spheres of influence. Three Features Introduced to the System to meet problems 1) The treaty system of 1815 and the European Concert – Vienna settlement guaranteed the existence, security, status and vital interests of all the European Great Powers. – Established mutually tolerable treaties to all important powers (eventually including France) – also committed the powers to certain duties, such as respect for treaties, non-interference in others states, willingness to participate in the Concerts decisions and actions, and a general observance of legality and restraint in their international actions. 2) The “fencing off” of the European state system from the extra-European th th world – 18 century wars were far more global than 19 century; as there overseas portion of the Napoleonic wars established a greater level of independence in the colonies. Despite minor issues with the Ottomans, all European powers focused primarily on Europe. Fighting in colonies was minor, and never threatened to break the system into war. – British sea supremacy was also accepted by all powers; and unlike previous centuries, never challenged. Others accepted that Britain’s naval dominance was integral to their survival, and threatened no one. Britain’s sea dominance allowed them to set up and protect trade routes. Britain did not maintain the balance of power in Europe, and in threatened it a few times, but the way they ran their empire was conducive to the system. 3) Establishment of a system of intermediary bodies between the great powers. – Smaller states situated and organized to serve as buffers and spheres of influence. – Made it more difficult to fight, and linked them by giving them something in common to manage. – less a product of deliberate planning than it was the ultimate outcome of arrangements reached mainly for other, more immediate purposes. Why “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers’’ Was Wrong Henry Nau - Paul Kennedy argued that “the global productive balances…have already begun to tilt in certain directions: away from Russia and the United States, away also from the EEC to Japan and China. The rise of the pacific region is likely to continue” He argued that the United States and Soviet Union would decline due to being overstretched, and due to the “spiraling costs of the arms race” -The predictions have not fared well; as Russia was the only one to decline, and not for the reasons Kennedy argued. Japan and China both experienced economic downturns in the 1990s. What accounts for these poor results from such sophisticated analysis? -Kennedy claimed that he was not proposing a “general theory” about economic cycles and the causes of war. He claims he had no prior theory with which he was bending the facts to accommodate -However, Kennedy still selectively chooses the facts he puts in his book -He did not predict that the American military spending of the 1980s would bankrupt the Soviet Union, rather than the United States. – By the late 1990s the American budget was almost balanced. -Kennedy was basing his theory off of the political fragmentation and anarchy that characterized Europe after 1500. – According to Kennedy, economic and technological advantages were evolved arbitrarily and unevenly, giving advantage to different regions at different times. Nations that tried to dominate others would become over committed, and draw resources away from the economy, thus allowing other nations to grow and challenge them. – this account ignores the domestic political and historical factors that motivated states to acquire and use their military might and economic power. -Kennedy’s account assumes that no state can experience growth due to internal factors; he argues that a nation grows to respond to an external threat, not due to a more efficient domestic policies. -Kennedy ignores a great deal of factors: internal and external policies, differing domestic political and economic systems as well as differing amounts of national power, does not allow for the possibility that international behavior is a function not only of how much power one state has in relation to another but how effectively that power is used -Does not account for the phenomenon of democratic peace; democratic nations, never, or almost never fight one another (reference the Rise of Illiberal Democracy and the case for ‘Liberal Peace’ over Democratic peace) -Tracking domestic factors and relative national power – Nations compete to motivate citizens to accumulate and use power. The capacity of nations to inspire their citizens dictates their capacity to possess arms and wealth, as the citizens have to believe that their government is legitimate –In the 1980s the people of the Soviet Union became disillusioned with the government, and the people in the United States regained faith in theirs. -Paul Kennedy did not account for the competition among states to legitimate their power. -Protestant reformation created, rather than reinforced the divides in Europe after 1500 – these divides remained present, but culture, rather than religion soon defined them. – the result of this was nationalism, as people became attached to their state because they were allowed greater participation -After the French Revolution, nationalism became the primary source of authority and legitimacy in Europe. – People began to be conscripted into national armies, participate in bureaucracy etc. -This helped to give birth to Liberal ideology in England and the United States, where individual freedoms were to be protected by a constitution -Alternatively, conservative ideology which looked to maintain tradition took hold in Russia and Austria -Germany and Italy forged governmental authority on the basis of heroic myths and wars of conquest As society progressed into the 20 century , ideology became the primary uniting and dividing factor throughout the world. – Fascism, Communism, and socialism all swept across the world, but none seriously threaten democracy, which has become widespread throughout the world. -National identities change and redistribute the motivation to use power, just as national power changes and redistributes the capacity to use power. – when national identities diverge among great powers, they may exacerbate the struggle for relative power. – when national identities converge, they may eliminate the struggle for power. -Prior to the French revolution, Europe was a ‘community of shared values’ -The Napoleonoic wars, and the advent of Nationalism, shattered this. -Post Napoleonic system was created with balance of power in mind. – it was also reinforced by a shared interest in maintaining peace after a long period of fighting – they looked to reinforce conservative values -Kennedy ignored the convergence of domestic identities around democratic ideals, and the technological revolution that both restrained the prospects of interstate war and accelerated the interstate social and economic interactions – this contributed to the democratic peace -Following the Cold War, former Communist countries are increasingly becoming democratic; thus lessening the need for a balance of power -The United States power is proportionately declining, but because of the new democracies, it has less need for so much power. -The US hegemony will not last forever, but it will be a shift in national identity, rather than a shift of relative power that brings about the change. Democracies will weaken and diverge, and as a result may engage in arms competition and wars. The internal and external motivations will determine who produces ‘the ships and firepower with which to achieve their ambitions, not exogenous forces such as uneven rates of economic growths and technological breakthroughs -Power in the information age is generated by internal change which is a product of intensive economic and technological development, shaped by domestic institutions and policies, not by external competition over territory. Example: 1980s USA focused on domestic market, rather than international market. -Countries have to adapt to the changing market, as the world is shifting away from manufacturing jobs and towards skilled technological jobs. -Countries with the best domestic institutions are best suited for the information age. -All political societies motivate people by some combination of appeal to individual development and self-interest and community development and collective interest -Domestic policy choices are important. Material growth is not only a exogenous phenomenon, it is also a product of how societies organize politically to produce wealth. -Basic economic detriments to growth: chronic fiscal deficits, runaway inflation, protectionist trade policies, state monopolies, or severe restrictions on foreign investment. The Clash of Civilizations Samuel P. Huntington The Next Pattern of Conflict  Great division between humankind and dominating source
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