Liebmann V. Canada (Minister of ational Defense)
Liebmann applied for the position of Executive Assistant to the Commanding Officer
in the Persian Gulf Operation. Staff Officers recommended he be appointed and the
Commanding Officer agreed. When command staff became aware that Liebmann was
Jewish they decided not to select him. Liebmann challenged the decision, as well as CFAO
20-53 (an enactment for which the decision was based upon) under s. 15 of the Charter.
1. Should the court consider the constitutionalityof CFAO 20-53?
2. Does the Charter apply to the decision not to appoint Liebmann?
3. Were Liebmanns equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter infringed?
4. Could infringement be justified under s. 1 of the Charter?
1. The court should not consider the constitutionality of CFAO 20-53
2. The Charter does not apply to the decision not to appoint Liebmann
3. Liebmanns equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter were infringed
4. The infringement could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter
1. CFAO 20-53 was not the reason that Liebmann was not permitted to serve in the Persian
Gulf and was not in effect when the decision not to give him the position was made. CFAO
20-53 was not relevant to the action before the court and thus should not be considered.
2. The Charter applies to decisions made under delegated statutory authority. The decision
regarding Liebmann was made under the authority delegated by the National Defense Act
and is thus under the authority of the Charter.
3. Liebmann was treated differently from others based on personal characteristics of the type
enumerated in s. 15, and there was definite discrimination in a constitutional sense in that his
dignity was demeaned.
4. The respondents did not show that it was reasonable to discriminate against Liebmann
because he was Jewish.
The Charter applies to decisions made under delegated statutory authority
Infringement of s. 15 of the Charter occurs if someone is treated differently based on
characteristics outlined in s. 15, and as a result the persons dignity is demeaned 2
Montane Ventures Ltd. V. Schroeder
Montane Ventures (plaintiff) entered into a contract for the purchase of land from
Mr. Frank Schroeder (defendant.) After meeting all negotiated requirements to satisfy
the leasehold agreement, the plaintiffs agent inquired, via fax, as to whether additional
(separately negotiated) considerations might be provided. On receipt of this inquiry, the
defendant saw it within his rights to cancel the prior agreement and substitute for a new
contract with a substantially higher offer price. The defendants argument is that this is
valid, on the grounds that the inquiry amounted to rejection and counter-offer, thereby
terminating the original offer and agreement.
1. Does the addendum (the inquiry) constitute a rejection/counter offer to the original
2. If this does not constitute rejection/counter-offer, should specific performance for the
original agreement be awarded to the plaintiff?
1. The addendum did not constitute rejection/counter-offer to the original agreement, but
rather confirmation regarding a prior oral conversation.
2. Due to the circumstances of the contract (that it be for sale of land) specific
performance will be awarded.
1. Adequate evidence was provided that the defendant discussed the matters of the
inquiry with the plaintiffs representative while meeting all pre-negotiated commitments.
Since the addendum did not necessitate a signature or formal acceptance in any manner,
it cannot be construed as an offer or formal rejection of prior terms.
2. Seeing that the dispute involved the sale of land, specific performance is the proper
award for damages to the injured party.
Inquiring as to whether the negotiating party can provide additional
considerations to the agreement, without explicitly demanding such
considerations, does not amount to rejecting a current offer or substituting such
for a counter-offer
Specific performance will normally be awarded to the injured party, at their
request, when the dispute involves the sale of land 3
Rudder V. Microsoft Corporation
A class action was filed on behalf of two Canadian citizens, representing a
common class of Canadian subscribers to the MSN Messenger service, against the
Microsoft Corporation. The suit alleges that the corporation engaged in unfair billing
practices relating to subscription fees charged to its clients; the suit was filed in the
Ontario Supreme Court (OSC.) The defendants have filed for a permanent stay on these
proceedings, pursuant to a clause in their membership agreement referring all disputes
related to the Messenger service to the jurisdiction of King County, WA. The plaintiffs
claim that, as they were not aware of this clause when agreeing to the service, they should
not be bound by its terms.
1. If the plaintiffs did not knowingly consent to the forum selection clause, should they
be bound by its terms?
2. Should the OSC forcibly override this clause to ensure fair and equitable justice is
1. The plaintiffs will be effectively bound by the terms of the clause.
2. The OSC will not overrule the clause, and a permanent stay will be granted to the
1. The plaintiffs were repeatedly notified of the forum selection clause when registering
for the service, and by agreeing to this online contract they should be bound by its terms.
As law school graduates, the plaintiffs should especially be aware that agreeing to the
terms of a contract equates to agreeing to each and every term stipulated within the
contract (bar fine-print that is not effectively communicated to the parties.)
2. There is no evidence that the courts in King County, WA will rule in a biased or
inequitable fashion. Furthermore, it will be easier and more efficient to claim any awards
that the class may win as a result of the action when the hearings are within Washingtons
Legally defensible exemption clauses will bind parties to all terms and conditions
provided within the clause (where defensible means that the clause has
Hong Kong Bank V. ew Age Demographics
Ms. Margaret Chronister (defendant) made a personal guarantee on the loan of
funds to her husbands company, New Age Demographics, provided by Hong Kong Bank
of Canada (HBC, plaintiff.) The company could not repay the debts outstanding, and
subsequently defaulted on the loans. The defendant, who is thus held liable on the debt
due to her signing of the loan guarantee, claims that the guarantee is unenforceable (as it
provides no direct benefit for her, and therefore has no consideration.) This motion is by
the plaintiffs seeking enforcement of the guarantee for repayment of the loan plus
1. Does the signing of the contract without an affixed wafer constitute signing under seal?
2. Is there consideration for the guarantee?
1. The contract is effectively signed under seal. Her argument was that it was not
sealed. She did sign though and court, taking from precedent decisions, said it was signed
2. Consideration was given to Ms. Chronister for her signing on the guarantee.
1. Contracts which state that they are under seal and are notable of this condition will
be held to be under seal, even in the event that the formal seal has not be placed on the
document when signed.
2. Referring to the Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hallgarth et al (1986) consideration does not
necessitate that benefits arise directly to the contracting party. If a benefit is provided to
a third party (in this case the plaintiffs husband) to the detriment of the promisee (in this
case HBC) then there is cause for consideration in the promisor (Ms. Chronister)s
There may be consideration for a partys promise even when there is no direct
benefit to the party as a result of the promise. All that is required is that the other
party to the contract (promisee) makes a sacrifice resulting in a benefit for some
party designated by the promisor.
When contracts are signed under seal, there is no need to establish consideration
for promises of the agreement.