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PHLC95 CHP1and2 dialectic.docx

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University of Toronto Scarborough
Sonia Sedivy

CHAPTER 1 Mind body problem: consciousness, particularly phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness) P consciousness= experience p conscious properties have experiential properties p conscious state have experiential state hence; a state is p conscious just in case it have experiential properties. pc states; hear smell taste pain pc properties; experiential prperties of sense,perception, feelingsn thoughts, wants, emotions. experience + feelings= inherently conscious states experience= phenomenally conscious experience= info + phenemenal character info and PC are entirely separable + anything external to the experience itself. 1.2 self representational view=conscious states represent themselves. Experience represents the thing and the experience itself. Peripheral awareness and Focal awareness. Attention shift. Focal attention requires formation of belief. Thus shifting attention serves as a foundation of knowledge of our own phenomenal states via introspection. SRV= weak because:1)experiencing an experience is not a matter of being conscious of the experience. 2) Does not fit the phenomenological facts. 3) driver case 4) content of exp.no single content; external directed content + self- referential content Qualia freak view= introspection= awareness of token experience + phenomenal properties Horgan and kriegel says its incoherent to suppose that one is having an experience of green but was aware of it as being reddish. To this tye, answers with a case of experience having some surface has a certain shade. He states that it is possible for this surface to appear to have a shade but in reality lack it. So t can lack the property yet appear to have it. Whatever t uses to represent red, it cannot be used because the content the specific property is representing will be left out. 1.3 phenomenal and creature consciousness Mental states are phenomenally conscious. Creature cons is cons of phenom cons states. Thus, phenom cons requires creature cons. Experiences cannot exist un-experienced. IF im phenom cons of E, then im cons of E. Having an experience is the same as experiencing. Necessarily, if one is experiencing, one is conscious. Generally, one cannot have a phenom cons state of an F unless one is cons of an F. Pheno
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