DANIEL DENNET INTENTIONAL SYSTEMS
a thing is an intentional system only in relation to the strategies of someone who is trying to
explain and predict its behaviour.
DESIGN STANCE: function, purpose-relative or teleological. System is composed of larger or
smaller functional parts. Predictions involve the assumption that each part will function properly.
Generally adopted when predicting about mechanical object behaviour. Essentially, predictions
are about system's functional design irrespective of physical constitution or conditions.
PHYSICAL STANCE: predictions based on actual physical state of the object worked out by
applying knowledge of the laws of nature.
INTENTIONAL STANCE: prediction based on the assumption that the system's rationality is
relative to a number of things. OR PLAINLY, ASSUMPTION OF RATIONALITY. Predictions
are based on one's view that the thing is an intentional system.
Ascription of certain information, supposition that the system is directed by certain goals, and
lastly, working to take the most reasonable action. Info possessed is beliefs and desires.
chess playing computer- artificial rationality
Intentional stance is good when it is warranted to suppose optimal design.
Behaviour manifests beliefs as actions which, given desires, would be appropriate to such beliefs
as would be appropriate to environmental stimulation
Desires will be manifested in behaviour as those appropriate desires, given the needs of the
creature, to which the action of the creature would be appropriate, given the creature's beliefs. Austria2
ascription of beliefs and desires must be interdependent.
he argues that all we transport from our world to theirs are the categories of rationality,
perception, and action.
in virtue of their rationality, beliefs about logical truths can be shared.
Theory of behavior for any system:predicting behaviour by citing its beliefs and desires.
How is intentional theories of behaviour relate to other theories of behavior?
Commonsense explanations and predictions of behaviour are intentional. We assume rationality.
irrational behaviour causes us to adjust our strategies shifting to intentional into design
prediction of animal behaviour by commonsense is also intentional. The mouse example
suggests that we ascribe beliefs and desires in order to predict its actions.
belief of trths of logic=follow rules of logic
any imperfect intentional system must not be ascribed with all logical truths. Not all inference
rules of an actual intentional system may be valid.
we end up predicting from the design stance when the assumption of rationality is dropped. Austria3
theory-event-signal-signal reader-loan of intelligence.
SKinner: what is borrowed is worthless to begin with. Intentionally couched claims are
empirically vacuous because they are