POL326 FINAL EXAM NOTES
Chapter 7 – Intelligence community
Three functions now: data collection and analysis (intelligence cycle),
counterintelligence, pol and paramilitary intervention.
o Five activities of intelligence cycle – it requires direction.
Planning and direction
Analysis and production
o First they get requirements, then use collection techniques to gather data. 4
SIGINT (electronic signals)
PHOTINT or IMINT (photography)
HUMINT (human sources)
Open sources (radio, television, newspapers)
o Info then processed by allsource analysts ▯finished intelligence. E.g. National
Intelligence Estimates (regular, updated synthesis on imp topics), Intelligence
Community Briefs (shorter, special document on urgent issues).
o 2 important function – counterintelligence: protects nat sec bureaucracy from
o 3 : covert paramilitary and political operations – propaganda campaigns, psych
warfare, secret financial assistance, destabilization, assassinations, coups. CIA.
Major organisations: NSA, Army Navy Air Force intelligence, National Reconnaissance
Office & National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, State
Dept Intelligence and Research Bureau, FBI, CIA, ODNI. Loosely coordinated by DNI
initially ▯since 2004, more powers to DNI and his office.
o Some focus on analysing and disseminating intelligence, some on collection and
processing, others on research and devpt as well (NRO).
Within the DOD, there’s NSA and NRO:
o NSA: created 1952 officially. ‘No Such Agency’.
Collection and exploitation of SIGINT (commn, radar, telemetry), has
listening posts for interception
Cryptology, making and breaking codes (useful in WW2, Iran nuclear)
o NRO and NGA: not well known, growth since end of WW2. Renamed to NGA in
NRO created during Cold War to help manage recon flights, U2 planes in
Now NRO develops and supervises highaltitude surveillance mechanisms
(IMINT), NGA processes the data.
o Defense Intelligence Agency: created in 1961 in response to the Bay of Pigs, used
for coordination within DOD activities. Provides COCOMs with specific
o Each mil service also has its own organisations. Army intelligence (G2), Air Force intelligence, Office of Naval
Intelligence. Army and Air force now have unmanned aerial vehicles
Army intelligence also has counterintelligence
NonDOD organsiations: CIA (had tasking authority, now DNI), State Dept INR, FBI.
o Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
Analyses cable traffic from abroad, produces NIEs
Considered weakest, but actually influence depends on SoS.
Part of dept of Justice, began as Bureau of Inv in 1908.
US domestic counterintelligence and internal security
Since CIA, jurisdiction limited to within US
J Edgar Hoover director from 192472 was huge influence
Not adept at dealing with terror (used to Cold War anticommunism), so
regorganised after 9/11 ▯Natl Security Division and trying to streamline
o Depts of Energy and Commerce: small part, nuclear weapons and Commerce used
to conduct overt intelligence activities through commercial attaches over the
o CIA: created by NSA 1947, imp role in collection and analysis of data,
counterintelligence and pol & paramilitary
Until 2005, CIA director also DCI ‘dual hatted’ – now DNI created
Intelligence, science & tech, operations i.e. national clandestine service
Intelligence directorate (DI) produces CIA internal assessments, and helps
Sciences and tech does mechanisms and gadgets
Clandestine does covert operations
o Office of the Director for National Intelligence: established 2004 by Intelligence
Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act
Coordinates intelligence comm, has budgetary control
Supervises National Intelligence Council, National Counterterrorism and
o Initially intelligence stuff developed in GB in 1920s, 30s. US more slowly.
o Small operations yes, no big involvement till OSS during WW2.
o NSA 1947 expanded FP bureaucracy, also after 9/11 budget increased again (went
down at end of Cold War)
o 2003: congressional hearings and national commission to examine workings and
failures of intelligence community up to 9/11 ▯9/11 commission report ▯
Intelligence Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2004
o ODNI and director more central, budgeting and tasking authority than DCI
o CIA director role diminished, and no longer participates in NSC process
o Still, change to formal structure doesn’t ensure changes in practice o Problem 1: Difficulties in coordination
19472004 under DCI, but limited control over day to day activities.
Hhuge number of people under DOD, FBI under Justice ▯stovepiping
(agencies ▯policymakers, no coordination).
Decentralized system, bur infighting.
Coordination of ODNI helps, new counterterr and counterproliferation
However, ambiguous legislation ▯fragmentation of agencies. Technically
DSec controls DIA, NSA, NRO, NGA so is a big challenge.
DNI uses Community Management Staff (CMS) and National Intelligence
Council (NIC). CMS enlarged in 1997, transferred to DNI in 2004. NIC is
supposed to disseminate info, produces NIEs but these often only reflect
lowest common denominators.
Considerable independent action performed by various intelligence
agencies e.g. NRO and CIA fighting over who had to take responsibility
for U2 planes (CMC).
Differing cultures of lawenforcement and intelligence. CIA purpose is
policy, FBI is conviction. After 1995 they’ve tried to coordinate, but 9/11
shows how much more is needed.
After 9/11, also creation of Dep of Homeland Security 2002 (initially an
office). Coordination and centralization of intelligence among numerous
organisations involved. Consolidated FEMA, Customs Service,
Immigration and Naturalization service, transportation security
administration, Coast Guard, Secret Service.
DHS also unsuccessful, now part of the larger exec bureaucracy. FBI, CIA
and DOD agencies don’t succumb to their authority. Under Rice NSA and
NSC staff also refused to give in to them.
2004 creation of counterterrrorism center under DNI also subdues their
o Problem 2: producerconsumer problems
Intelligence producers = analysts, consumers = policymakers (esp pres and
high level officials)
Producers get ambiguous guidelines, consumers don’t get actionable
intelligence – frustration all around.
Analyst vs consumer priorities not always the same. Antiterrorism not
high on agenda until 9/11 despite analysts suggesting it…
Politicization of intelligence: when policymakers exert pressure on the
intelligence community to produce evidence that suits their preferences
AND when policymakers cherry pick from raw intelligence
E.g. Reagan officials pressured CIA to say that El Salvadoran guerrillas
and Nicaraguan govt were a threat to US security
o Problem 3: variation in intelligence success
Signal to noise problem: so much information, hard to tell what to collect,
process and analyse Failures: North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, USSR missiles
Persian Gulf War: intelligence community warned, Bush chose to ignore.
Same with Gorbachev’s 1991 overthrow and 9/11.
CIA and covert operations:
o Office of Strategic Services, 1942, disbanded after the war until NSA 1947
o Put it under civilian leadership – either DCI or deputy had to be a civilian. Also
tried to restrict FBI to domestic issues, CIA to areas outside US borders.
o Directorate of Operations (National Clandestine Service) responsible for covert
operations: espionage + pol & paramiltary covert operations create 2 subcultures.
o DCIs tended to come from the operations side of intelligence within govt and
military, US policymakers relied on CIA covert action as a US FP tool since
o The ‘Good ol’ days’ (194770s)
Covert actions not intended, soon became a part of it. NSC 5412/I allowed
them to do anything and everything under an anticommunist, ends justify
the means type of national security ethos.
Secrecy essential because these operations clashed with US liberal
democratic pol culture.
Under Director Allen Dulles (195261) was the heyday of covert
operations, no oversight from Congress on CIA
• Manipulating foreign democratic elections (France, Italy 1948);
• Organizing partisan resistance movements (Albania, Poland sent
• Overthrowing foreign governments (Guatemala, Arbenz replaced
with military dictator Armas 1954);
• Participating in foreign assassinations (Castro, Allende, Phoenix
• Supporting friendly, often authoritarian governments (Iran,
Nicaragua, Indonesia – Suharto after 1958);
• Training foreign mil, intelligence and police personnel (CIA
‘retainers’ offered to foreign leaders);
• Pursuing various covert actions at home (stifling dissent, spreading
anticomm message through journalism, education, philanthropy,
large spying operations. Late 1950s Project MKULTRA, mind
control experiments to acquire brainwashing techniques like those
used by China, North Korea, E Eur govts.)
o Fall and reform (early 1970s1979)
Vietnam war, Watergate
Rockefeller Commission in 1975 created by Ford to investigate
intelligence community and suggest reforms – little credibility.
Simultaneously Ford and Kissinger running a covert operation in Angola. Pike and Church Committee investigations revealed scale of CIA
intelligence operations, CIA power declined.
Congressional oversight: 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act established new,
permanent intelligence committees in both chambers to which presidential
findings explaining the need and nature of any covert actions had to be
o Resurgence (1980s)
Carter approved covert sending of money and arms to support Afghan
resistant forces fighting Soviet Occupation in his last year ▯Reagan
William Casey became the new head, bigger budget now and major
operations – Afghan Mujahideen, Contra war
o Adjustment (post CW and post 9/11)
No purpose left to CIA once USSR had collapsed. But since 2005, when
National Clandestine Service was strengthened, its central role in
coordinating intelligence etc has became important again
Budget slowed under George HW Bush, began to decline under Clinton.
But some traditional things continued (1990s against Iraq, Kosovo)
CIA also starting drug trafficking, economic intelligence and
counterterrorism stuff. Increased coordination with FBI, Drug
After 1993 WTC bombing, counterterrorism center and ‘bin Laden station’
After 9/11, resurgence. CIA counterterrorism became much more
heightened, budget doubled, no restrictions at all. Accompanied by
passage of the Patriot Act.
Little congressional oversight till 20034, but in 2004 they found out about
treatment of prisoners in Guantanomo Bay, Iraq , Afghanistan in violation
of domestic and intl law, secret CIArun prisons in other countries, spying
activities at home.
CIA also under attack for failing to prevent 9/11, etc.
Nat sec vs democracy issues:
o When perceptions of enemy threat are high, demands of nat sec prevail. National
security ethos during Cold War, less after Vietnam and once again resurgence
o Independence versus accountability: how answerable should they be
o Secrecy versus availability of information: do they have a right to know this
o Legitimacy of covert operations
Chapter 8 – Foreign Economics and the NEC
o Focused on intl econ development, protection of domestic industries and
expansion of US commerce esp in Latin America and Asia. o After Great Depression and onset of WW2: realized that open door policies and
dollar diplomacy depended on US ability to maintain global peace and stability ▯
o During Cold War, nat sec > econ policy. General prosperity in 1950s and 60s,
expansion of US multinational presence. Hence econ = low policy.
o PostCold War: it’s high policy now. Failure of Bretton Woods in 1971, US
economy messed up and protectionist sentiment, OPEC.
o NAFTA, WTO under elder Bush and Clinton indicate US FEP.
o Economic culture based on free market ethos and classical liberal economic
o Free market ethos: faith in the power of the private market to promote growth and
prosperity with minimal government intervention. Only came up after WW2 (they
were quite nationalist + protectionist before).
o Both cons and liberals want the same things for the intl economy, just diff tactics
(less govt intervention versus multilateral approaches)
Globalization, interdependence and contemporary economic involvement
o US now much more interdependent with global economy, trade deficits becoming
massive in the past few years.
o Lots of US investment abroad is in private assets, also a lot in emerging markets
i.e. Latin America and Asia.
o Total national debt going up, surpluses under Clinton for the first time but quickly
gone through Bush and Obama.
o Larger impact of other countries: collapse of peso in 1995, Asian financial crises
late 1990s. US had to intervene to ensure financial stability.
o 2007 unique because it began in the core, the US itself. Globalization!
o Energy consumption of US very high, dependence on foreign oil.
Govt institutions involved:
o Executive dept:
Treasury Department most important, secretary of the treasury is a major
adviser to the president and US rep in IMF, World Bank, WTO, Inter
American and African Development Banks.
Other imp people = undersecretary for international economic affairs and
Office of the Assistant Secretary for intl econ affairs control the
Dept of State has influence too, but that’s declined. Also has USAID.
Bureau for Economic and Business Affiars has primary daytoday
responsibility to make and implement policy.
Dept of Agriculture and Office of International Cooperation and
Development work with intl food organizations, provide technical
assistance. Foreign Agricultural Service has counselors, attaches and trade
officers overseas who maintain an intelligence system.
Department of Commerce: contains an International Trade Administration
that deals with import, trade promotion etc.
Tourism and Travel Office within commerce, and Bureau of Export
Administration for license applications, laws etc. Department of Energy: Office of the Assistant Sec for Intl Affairs and
Dept of Labour: Bureau of Intl Labour Affairs, represents US in ILO,
o Other agencies:
Federal Reserve Board – monetary management by independent agency,
the central bank. Affects US BOP and foreign econ policy too.
US International Trade Commission also independent agency dealing with
customs laws, export and import trade, foreign competition. Adjudicates
disputes between US industry and international corporations.
ExportImport Bank (Eximbank): subsidizes US company exports abroad,
started in 1934 to originally promote trade with Soviet Union. Guarantees
Foreign Credit Insurance Association.
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC): stimulates foreign
investment, helped support E Eur economies.
Trade and Development Agency, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, SEC, Federal Trade Commission…
Council of Economic Advisers within Executive Office of the Presidency,
created 1946, sends people to OECD.
Coordination efforts and challenges:
o Presidents usually rely on Office of Management and Budget, United States Trade
Representative and interagency committees coordinated within exec office to
coordinate FEPmaking process.
o Bureau of the Budget created 1921, placed within Exec Office in 1939 ▯OMB in
o Office of the US Trade Rep became more important in late 1970s, was created
1962 as part of Exec Office under Carter. Limited success, depends on trade rep
and his relationship with president.
o Interagency committees help with interaction and coordination. Usually chaired
by lead agency (Treasury mostly). Mixed success.
o Since Cold War, pres have been more comfortable doing nat sec policy and don’t
quite get the finance stuff.
o This meant a growing andextremely independent foreign economic bureaucracy ▯
lots of confusion.
o Reform: Stephen Cohen proposed Dept of International Trade and creation of
permanent assistant to pres for intl econ affairs, 1988.
Clinton and NEC:
o Clinton interested in econ issues, created NEC by executive order in 1993.
Coordinate econ policymaking process – domestic and international
Coordinate econ policy advice to the president
Ensure econ decisions are consistent with pres goals
o National Economic Adviser leads it, small staff. Honest policy broker – low
profile but pwoerful. o Forefront of Clinton’s mind even during transition process – first head was Robert
Rubin. He minimized conflict, open process and teamwork. Rubin helped mold it
into a central policymaking org, selected staff carefully.
o Initially little institutional clout. But good relationship with Treasury Department
was needed, which Rubin worked out.
o Structured like NSC, two exceptions: domestic + intl policy, very small staff.
o Three basic interagency committees – core group of senior officials (principals
committee), deputies committee and working groups.
o PC is the power base, meet fairly frequently. NEC more consistent at DC level,
multiple times a week meetings. Ad hoc WGs.
o Interagency coordination difficult, depends on presidential style as well. Formal +
George W Bush:
o Decided to keep and strengthen NEC, had trouble staffing it, some of the real
power of his policies came from outside the NEC.
o Relied on NEC, tried to integrate NEC and NSC, added some foreign economic
experts to the joint staff.
o Turnover in senior FEP officials, especially Treasury Sec and NEC adviser.
Lawrence Lindsey headed it, changed team in 2002. Friedman, new NEA was
Stephen Friedman, more centrist but didn’t work – Allan B Hubbard, finally sort
Obama and future:
o Econ crisis, foreclosures, unemployment – needed to restore confidence in
o Bush measures like Troubled Asset Relief Program to restore liquidity didn’t
work for this. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 made govt
purchase distressed assets, injections into banks. ‘Too little, too late.’
o Obama also trying to stimulate economy, American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 – tax cutes, unemployment benefits, domestic spending. Also health
o Influential econ policymaking comes from NEC and NEA Summers, Treasury
Dept and Tsec Geithner, Federal Reserve Board and chief Ben Bernanke.
o Tried consensus, open discussion stuff. Overlap between these three key
personalities. Summers sort of clashing with others within US govt + G8 and G20
countries as well.
o Relative success in helping US manage econ policy, coordination problems.
Chapter 12 – Electoral Politics
Presidential election 1992 was a big surprise – GHWB expected to win, suddenly it was
Clinton. 2000 also a surprise – Al Gore had high public approval and then 2004 was the
reverse surprise. 2008 was surprising because Obama was the first AfricanAmerican
Pol parties and electoral process:
o Two party system, but tradition of shortlived third parties e.g. Perot 1992 and
1996. o Election outcomes affect US FP making because a) president and members of
Congress elected and b) longerterm electoral cycles established – differing
relative strengths of the party etc.
o Three cycles of party politics over time: 1930s party realignment where
Democrats became prominent; cold war era bipartisanship and lc consensus;
postVietnam is dealignment, no dominant party and no consensus.
o New Deal realignment:
End of civil war till Roaring Twenties, Republicans dominated. Congress
Great Depression ▯realignment (change in majority minority status)
because Hoover (Republican) was in power in 1929.
1932 FDR victory = loss of confidence in Republicans. Democrats
represented prosperity and hope.
Democratic New Deal coalition, strengthened by WW2 and also his New
Deal plan helped restore econ prosperity. Four terms for FDR, woo!
GD created major ideological splits, rise of internationalist mentality
(Roosevelt was NOT an internationalist). WW2 signalled end of
New Deal realignment lasted through 1950s and 60s. Bitter fight between
Dem and Rep after WW2 but then bipartisan relationship based on lc
Truman led to containment just by chance.
Concern about Soviet Union etc made this coalition unstable. 1946
election saw a counterattack by conservatives and Reps.
1948 elections: Truman surprise reelection. His anticomm politics ▯
1952 elections: redbaiting most prominent, Rep win but small change in
seats in HofR and Senate. Eisenhower accused Dems of being too soft on
communism. Eisenhower ▯lc consensus by mid1950s.
Dems became more conservative (McCarthyism) and Reps were okay
with limited govt involvement because the economy had recovered.
1960 elections: Kennedy and Nixon, lc consensus. Both tried to
demonstrate anticomm, so FP was the same.
Minimal differences between candidates and their policies all through
1950s and 60s.
1964 election: Johnson and Goldwater, big differences regarding Vietnam
– Goldwater wanted roll back. Johnson afraid of the right.
o PostVietnam Dealignment Era
Increase of independent voters created movement towards party
dealignment. Abandoned Dem, didn’t become Rep. Two minority parties
Regional realignment in the South rejuvenated the Republicans. South
except Florida were Democrats (but slightly more conservative ones). Rise
of civil rights and antiVietnam war movements ▯shift to Republicans. This meant twoparty system in the South by 1980s, and Republicans
taking over the South. Affected the success of every Rep from Nixon to
GWB because now Reps have over 1/4 of the votes in the electoral
Democrats who won the White House since postVietnam have also been
successful in the South e.g. Carter, Clinton, Obama.
Realignment took longer to affect Congress because power of
congressional incumbency: members of Congress usually safe from
challengers. But Rep strength has grown in Congress.
198186 under Reagan Senate was Rep, HofR was Dem. 1994 Rep had
Bipartisanship ▯ideological diversity, partisanship, differences in FP.
First because of liberalism and new left in 1960s and 70s (e.g. Kennedy,
pushed Dem to the left). Then rise of conservatism and far right (Nixon
1968, Reagan in 1976 and 1980). Liberal ideology and internationalist
perspective vs conservative internationalism.
Now unstable coalitions.
Contemporary electoral & campaign pol
o Party leaders lost control of nomination process – last one Dems selected was
Humphrey in 1968.
o Caucuses ▯state primaries, so importance of funding in campaigns increased +
imp of mass media increased. Obama used it to be nominated over Clinton. Also
Carter, Reagan were outsiders who used this as well.
o Primary elections (elite public, nominations) vs general (mass public, president
and members of Congress)
o Key: three groups in voting electorate: standpatters (regular voters for one party),
switchers and new voters.
o Retrospective voting: tend to vote for an incumbent running for reelection based
on previous performance, not future plans.
o Campaign strategies: now more ideological. Primary elections – candidates tend
to be more ideological to get support from within the party and then general
elections – more ‘moderate and popular’ positions.
o Campaign financing: increased greatly. Mem of Congress fundraise too,
incumbents have to be able to raise money. 2008 Obama spent over $700 million
o Symbolic campaigning and negative campaigning have taken on a bigger role.
Personalities, symbolism, leadership skills etc. Marketing of the candidate
through mass media. E.g. FP issues to do with ‘nationalism’ end up favouring
Republicans. Can take it too far e.g. Nixon in 1972, Watergate. Also Obama and
o 1996 Clinton and 2008 Obama were taking more popular positions while
displaying Dole and McCain as men of the past. Appealed to mass public better.
o 2000 and 2004 were close instead. Gore and Bush split independent and
moderates in 2000, Bush did well with white males and used ‘compassionate
conservatism’ to appear moderate. Gore didn’t have a consistent message. FP implications:
o Wideranging policy preferences, more options.
o Decline in voter turnout but increase in voter impact.
o Role of electoral politics in US FP making much greater now.
o Liberal vs conservative internationalist views, FP now more prominent in voters’
minds as well, supported by 2006 and 2008 elections which were Dem victories in
Congress and then presidency.
o PostWatergate congressional elections of 1974: Democratic gains, strong liberal
positions. 1978 and 1980 weakened Dem.
o Republican revolution of 1994: congress taken over by Rep fully. 2000 narrowed
the gap, until 2006 when unpopular Iraq war policies switched it around again.
o Congressional membership, party control and politicization of congress now
affected by electoral politics.
o Divided govt now increasingly the norm, FP no longer a source of consensus.
More resistance from opposition to president, more damage to public prestige etc
and hence lessened ability to govern FP.
o Most presidents forced to moderate their policies over time, and so the candidates
were from diff parties in succession. Johnson ▯Nixon ▯Ford ▯Carter ▯Reagan.
o Post CW FP issues died down until 9/11. George HW Bush lost reelection despite
o Bush’s war on terrorism after 9/11 helped him though.
o Contradictory electoral patterns since Vietnam – more competition but also lack
of continuity in producing coherent FP. Woo. 2006 and 2008 and 2012 may
indicate the start of a new electoral alignment!
Chapter 13 – Group Politics
Social movements, group origins, development:
o Interest groups: organizations that possess an overriding concern with the political
process and policy outcomes. Form in waves, usually in response to negative
o Periods of pol instability and turmoil produce social movements: large coalitions
of individuals and groups that loosely unite around certain issues, usually in
opposition to the status quo.
o Social movements have a short life span, interest groups tend to have a longer life
o You also have challenging groups: unhappy with leadership of group, status quo
and then established groups which are older, been around longer and seen as more
o In more stable periods, established groups dominate. Only around half of
challenging groups are successful in gaining legitimacy and achieving some of
their goals (40%) – have the biggest impact on salient and visible domestic
Influence strategies: o Lobbying by providing information, money, mobilizing support ▯in turn affecting
pol agenda, public belief and behaviour and electoral politics. Older groups
already have close relationships with govt.
o Approach 1: accesstopower approach: highpowered brokers, law firms, PR
firms etc give access to top policymakers in govt.
o Approach 2: technocratic approach: direct lobbying as well, using lawyers and
technical consultants to target midlevel decisionmakers in govt, media etc.
o Approach 3: coalitionbuilding: indirect, group alliances based on mutual interests
to politicize issues, place them on govt agenda.
o Approach 4: grassroots mobilization approach: rallying mass support.
o Initially inside politics, now outside politics since Vietnam.
o Wellorganized groups supporting mainstream positions are very effective in
implementing policy change. But outside politics e.g. those who oppose
detrimental effects of globalization on market forces are engaging in the indirect
strategies to get their way.
Group politics in the Cold War:
o Before the issues were trade and protectionism, but after WW2 this changed. In
1940s and 50s new and established groups became involved in FP making, and
most of them were overwhelmingly anticommunist and conservative (e.g.
McCarthyism is the prime example).
o Consequence 1: rise of foreign policy and coldwar oriented groups
Included nat sec and pub pol groups, veterans and mil support, businesses,
labour unions, religious and ethnic groups. All shared cold war
Nat sec and pub pol like Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace, Council on
Foreign Relations, Rand Corporation – limited mostly to proponents of US
Cold War policies – business leaders, academics, journalists. Group
seminars, policy research – imp source of ideas for FP.
Veterans and military support were anticomm, wanted large defense
buildup. Also broadbased pol and civic orgs e.g. Americans for
Democratic Action in early 1950s.
Business and labour groups: business leaders often got govt positions, esp
given US open door policy. Chamber of Commerce, Committee for Econ
Devpt began to support containment + businesses involved in defense
production also support CW policies. Banks etc moved to countries with
strong US presence – e.g. Marshall plan stimulated investment in W Eur.
American Federation of LabourCongress of Industrial Organisations
(AFLCIO) was umbrella org of unions, supported econ prosperity and the
current status quo.
Rel and ethnic groups: Catholic church hated communist atheists,
Protestant fundamentalism in late 1940s and early 1950s. Ethnic diversity:
Polish (and Catholic) Americans didn’t like USSR consolidation of power
China lobby (Taiwan lobby): prominent during CW. Nationalist Chinese
officials, US govt officials, missionaries, journalists and general anticomm groups who wanted Chiang Kai Shek’s govt to be China’s govt. Wanted
Asia as a market and wanted Truman for Eurocentric policies.
o Consequence 2: development of militaryindustrialscientific infrastructure
Before WW2 no real nat sec institutions, but then econ and society had to
fully equip itself for a very large scale war.
Militaryindustrial complex: popularized by Eisenhower, talked about diff
elements of society with complementary interests – the inevitable outcome
of this complex of private and governmental bureaucratic institutions was
a society permanently mobilized for war, because of containment and
Militaryindustrialscientific infrastructure: military within exec,
businesses, Congress and academia/scientific community. Military needed
arms for containment, industry wants to make money, Congress want
defense + securing jobs and votes, scientists want prestige.
Mil establishment e.g. DoD grew immensely after WW2, contracted out to
private industry. Industry involved in mil production because of Cold War,
starting in WW2. By 1950s, many Fortune 500 companies = defense
contractors. Provides jobs, prosperity.
Then Congress approves defense programs etc, they get support from big
names – in exchange they persuade Pentagon to build big military bases,
create econ growth and jobs. Scientific connection with govt consolidated
since Manhattan project. Further militarization of Research (they had
facilities responsible for designing nuclear weapons etc).
This was a more revolving door system – members of mil hired by defense
industry upon retirement, defense industry people appointed to DOD and
Helped establish anticomm consensus, but also waste, corruption, vested
interests and resistance to any challenge to the status quo.
o Consequence 3: rise of an FP establishment.
FP establishment all around had a common history (not socioeconomic,
though that helped) of working around government organisations, etc.
Networking at work.
Also shared common emphases on antiisolationism and anticommunism
in FP. Driven by realpolitik, worried about USSR, China.
Shared a commitment to global moral and political leadership: US wanted
to be liberal democratic representative of the world, military and econ
hegemon etc. Postwar = American century, reached its peak under JFK ▯
arrogance of power soon after.
Preference for the political center
Also liked to operate out of public view, within executive branch: didn’t
run for office, appointed by pres to positions within bureaucracy. No
women. Some infighting, but general consensus till 1965.
o All these led to rise of pres power, expansion of FP bureaucracy, acquiescent
congress and supportive public, bipartisanship, anticomm FP.
Rise of movements from Left and Right: o Left:
Civil rights movement, late 1950s: MLK Jr and Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee. Also accompanied by black nationalism, power
(Malcolm X and Black Panthers). Civil Rights Act passed 1964, but seen
as too little too late.
Antiwar movement in mid1960s as a result of Vietnam: broad coalition
against intervention in Vietnam. Lots of them influenced by civil rights
movement. Draft dodging etc a result of the resurgence of liberalism.
1968 Democratic National Convention got Humphrey as a candidate,
endorsed Johnson’s Vietnam policies – happened after Tet offensive,
assassination of MLK Jr and RFK. Silent majority turned towards Nixon.
Both these movements responsible for new social movements and
politically active groups. Women also became involved – hence pro
choice. Also antiapartheid, human rights.
Appalled by loss of Vietnam to communism, increasing power of Soviet
Union, rise of govt intervention, individualism and sexual promiscuity etc.
Thought US was in moral decline ▯aggressive and militant FP. Nixon’s
election helped this happen.
Christian right e.g. Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson wanted to defeat ‘secular
humanism’ through promoting anticomm and religious behaviour.
Effective counter to the left, but no consensus within right.
Group politics since Vietnam to the present
o FP establishment collapsed
March 1968 Johnson’s ‘wise men’ were the last remnants of the FP
establishment. By early 1970s, bitter diversity.
E.g. Rostow and Rusk, Johnson’s NSA and SoS thought Vietnam was
justified. Then McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s NSA, thought there were
mistakes made in it. Clark Clifford, Johnson SoD thought it was a mistake.
o Proliferation of groups, ideological diversity and political activism
Issue and cause oriented groups increased by a lot. Liberal and left groups
supporting human rights, selfdetermination, arms control, poverty
eradication etc, while right supports defense buildup, security threats,
After 9/11 divided on how to deal with the problem.
Also now many more FP organizations – Carnegie Endowment, Council
on FR etc continued to function but these centrist groups joined by more
conservative and liberal ones now. More think tanks, policy initiatives, op
ed articles and media influence. No monopoly over information and
Commercial interests: once Bretton Woods stopped working, labour and
business interests splintered from govt’s. AFLCIO turned against free
trade, pushes for protectionist measures expanded. Expansion of
commercial interests ▯bigger presence in Washington. Religious groups also turned more towards human rights, poverty
alleviation e.g. got International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Sudan
Peace Act 2002 passed
Ethnic groups grown much more, more sophisticated and better funded.
Old China lobby died, new ones since 1978. Cuban American groups still
opposed to Castro.
Jewish lobby: American Israel Public Affairs Committee and a bunch of
other people. Not popular till 1967. Mearsheimer and Walt: gained
backing of Congress, pres for Israeli support. Balancing act for president
(large numbers of Jewish voters in critical states like California, Florida).
Carter had Camp David Accords (1978), GWB proIsraeli, Obama two
Cuban Americans: again located in swing states like Florida. Fights
normalization, got sanctions extended in 1990s. Recent success was
passing of LIBERTAD legislation i.e. HelmsBurton Act, in mid1990s.
Indians going to become more popular in lobby world.
Consulting firms e.g. Kissinger Associates (1982) have become important
– was part of USIraq business forum in 1980s.
Also growth of foreign lobbies – rely on US expertise e.g. Jewish lobby
has strong ties with Israel. Saudi Arabia, Japan form a part of these foreign
lobbies – Japan has cultural ties and business interests – very varied.
Questions of ethics, conflicts of interest e.g. Deaver 1985 established a
consulting firm (can’t lobby for one year)
Direct international activities e.g. missionary activities and business
activities from MNCs mean that they do some charity/missionary work
Some think tanks now ‘action tanks’ (e.g. in E Eur) that take on hands on
work, also private voluntary organisations like CARE, Lutheran World
Relief do some work.
Another thing is private military contractors and the outsourcing of war by
o MIS infrastructure continued to pervade society
Military establishment still requires equipment, Congress approves
programs and members of scientific community still offer nat sec expertise
From 1970s1990s, institutions of MISI were more likely to be challenged
Military downsizing and impact on nat sec infrastructure
9/11 ▯resurgence of US mil buildup and MISI
Defense employs more than 25% of scientists and engineers, in California
it’s the highest source of income etc. Decline at end of Cold war ▯
resurgence after 9/11.
Pork barrel politics of defense spending: beltway bandits (private defense
think tanks, lobbying offices, law firms etc) springing up around
Washington – perpetuates revolving door system.
E.g. of B1 bomber – desired since 1950, Congress gave permission under
Reagan. Rockwell International got the contract, but subcontractors are the
same defense people so all have a vested interest. Still new weapons system procurement is problematic today, takes a long
time and involves different bunches of people over many years.
Since end of CW, greater concentration of defense industry e.g. Boeing
acquired McDonnell Douglas Corporation in 1997 and overtook Lockheed
1990s emphasis on ‘peace dividend’ and cutting military spending, but
after 9/11 MISI has resurged.
20072009 econ crises complicate the decisions.
Chapter 9 – Decisionmaking theory
Context: patterns and policymaing stages
o Globalization of US FP after WW2 and Cold War, US as preeminent global actor,
rise of presidential power and then fall postVietnam, Watergate, Bretton Woods
collapse. NSC system now more powerful, rise in nat sec bureacracy since WW2,
NEC and econ bureaucracy more prominent since Vietnam.
o Three stages:
Agenda setting: issue catches attention of govt officials or as a result of
efforts by officials or president. Importance of keeping the power loop
small. Old issues tend to remain on agenda, become routinized. New
issues brought in also by domestic and intl crises.
Policy formulation: identifying and weighing goals and options
Policy implementation: carrying out of policy
o Rational actor (Allison)
CMC: Kennedy assembles trusted advisers, SoS, Attorney General, DSec,
DCI, Tsec, NSA… etc. Debated potential policies for five days, discussed
etc, then finally chose blockade.
Ideal type of model, hierarchical and relies on formal guidelines. Exec
branch operates on a pyramid of hierarchy with president at the top.
Advice comes from others, but pres makes the decision.
Pres in charge, process is open and responsive to presidential beliefs and
wishes. Centralized and rational.
o Groupthink (Janis)
196468, Johnson and his small group of advisers made decisions that led
to escalated US involvement in Vietnam war. Decisions made based on
how much force should be used, no other policy alternatives considered.
Johnson’s dominant personality made this happen, but also the high
cohesiveness and esprit de corps that develops in small groups, esp when
they have similar backgrounds and beliefs.
Shares a similar structure to rational actor, but groupthink is not rational –
tends to overestimate competency and morality of the group, stereotypes
outgroups and pressures members towards uniformity. Usually
maintained by one strong leader. Janis said the more a decisionmaking process resembles groupthink, the
less likely it is to succeed. Rigid policy develops regardless of changing
Example: Reagan Iran 19856. Initially supported, but when Shultz and
Weinberger were against it, Reagan still didn’t change his mind. Also
GHWB and Persian Gulf crisis. Also GWB post9/11, that’s how he
decided on such an aggressive response.
o Governmental politics (Allison)
May 1968: Russians agree to arms limitation talks with Johnson ▯SALT I.
Wanted to present a consensus position to USSR and not involve the
White House, left it up to bureaucracy.
Pluralistic poliymaking environment, where power is diffused and process
revolves around pol competition.
Diff goals, objectives, no dominant person or organisation. Used for
important issues that trigger involvement of number of policymakers etc.
Worked for SALT because exec branch was preoccupied with Vietnam
Presidential management style also helps e.g. Reagan downplayed NSC
role and tried to delegate a lot – so govt politics worked.
Not so efficient e.g. US intervention in Lebanon – decisionmaking turned
into political battles and resulted in a contradictory, fractured policy.
Other example: Carter about whether or not to intervene in Iranian
revolution, couldn’t dominate policymaking process because of so many
Worked for Clinton a lot, because he didn’t like nat sec affairs much and
Also decisionmaking within GCS before GoldwaterNichols.
o Organizational process (Allison)
1986: Challenger space shuttle explodes after liftoff. Shows problems with
organizational routines and SOPs.
Bureaucracy and org behaviour – decentralized, done by organisations.
Feudal policymaking because diff orgs work independently.
Could produce contradictory policies, confusion e.g. CIA covert
operations being very confusing, using people in the drug trade etc despite
govt fighting a longstanding war on drugs.
Bureaucracies based on hierarchy, specialization, routinization – reflected
in structures and subcultures. Incremental organizational behaviour, habits
and SOPs. Used for small issues that pres shouldn’t be bothered by or just
need to be rubber stamped.
Still dependency on bur persists.
It is the implementation stage of policymaking that the organizational
process model describes most powerfully. E.g. Reagan decided to invade
Grenada in 1983, but mil bureaucracy messed up the operation (eventually
succeeded). Bur factors and momentum buildup through military prep etc also made it
hard for GWB to not invade Iraq in 2003 (although civilian leadership i.e.
RUMSFELD basically revised mil plans and stuff as well)
o Rational actor talks about pres and his advisers, groupthink about beliefs and
personalities of leaders, GP about beliefs, personalities, roles of policymakers and
organizational process about bur, organizational missions, subcultures, SOPs.
o RA seen as ideal because it seems like pres etc are more receptive to new info,
and adapt a bit more.
Two levels of policymaking:
o 1970s and 1980s saw rise in popularity in other three models, not RA.
o They were criticized as not being realistic, rigid discussions of the models, their
being treated in isolation, oversimplification.
o Newgroup syndrome: newly formed groups or groups subjected to drastic changes
in membership/mode of operation being susceptible to ‘pathologies of group
deliberation’. Which basically means that they’re confused when things change.
Need a multilevel approach.
o Presidential politics
When pres becomes active on an issue, through direct involvement or his
staff. Informal and formal process.
Topdown policymaking, e.g. Obama with regard to recession or Bush
Pres involvement may create closed policymaking process, groupthink,
dependent on personalities.
o Bureaucratic politics
When pres is uninvolved, and orgs are predominant. E.g. US FP towards
Japan, where State Dept, Pentagon and NSC see Japan as a geopolitical
asset, Dpet of Commerce and Trade Rep more concerned about US
economy, Treasury and Council of Econ advisers want free market
Also US in terms of China – nat sec versus economic and human rights
Usually involves bargaining, coalition building, compromise. Tends to
prevail for most US FP issues.
Sometimes implementation and pres involvement important e.g. Kissinger
backchannels to China and USSR under Nixon. But mostly they’re not.
Personality, beliefs and crises
o World of Cognition and Images
Cognition and perception: people simplify reality, close minded towards
new information. E.g. failure of deterrence in CMC was because the mind
thinks it’ll still work, and to keep trying, even if objective considerations
say otherwise (Snyder)
People organize beliefs etc, especially around central ideas; selective
memory; selective attention and perception; causal inference; cognitive
stability (internal beliefs maintained once formed) Cognitive consistency theory: says people try to make sense of the world
by fitting things into a belief system, and hence avoid incorporating
information that doesn’t fit in.
After 1970s, cognitive miser idea: that people rely on schemas (mental
constructs representing different clumps of understanding about different
facets of their environment). Simplification, so that you can absorb things
to these clumps and make sense. More likely to rely on these in a complex
In FP, people tend to categorize and stereotype, simplify causal inferences
and use historical analogies.
‘Enemy image’: we are good, they are bad e.g. Cold War. E.g. John Foster
Dulles, who tended to ignore info, be selective, wishful thinking etc.
May lead to mirror images: each party thinks they are the diametric
opposite of the other. A ‘diabolical enemyimage’ as found in Vietnam
war, or both World Wars ▯misperception, escalation, intervention, war.
Oversimplification comes from tendency to over/underestimate internal
and external causes, one’s own importance, overestimate the degree to
which other people’s behaviour is planned or centralized, tendency to
overindulge in pessimistic and wishful thinking. E.g. Vietnam predictions
fluctuated all through the 60s.
Historical analogies e.g. Vietnam was made from lessons learnt from Dien
Bien Phu and especially Korean war.
Enemy images also significant to post9/11 Bush.
Policymaker as a ‘motivated tactician’. Role of personality highlighted by
Alexander George: powerseeker and powerholder. E.g. Woodrow Wilson
initially initially conformed to dominant beliefs to fit in and get power.
Once he had power he was rigid and closeminded often.
Lyndon Johnson: impact of individual’s personality and beliefs on FP
making process. He was driven by need to do well, power, love etc. Bad
family life, couldn’t please his mother. So when he was president he hated
being alone and had to be in control. Used to use friendship, bargaining,
gifts to win people’s loyalty, very sensitive, insecure.
Also heavily dependent on advisers for some issues, delegated authority
but was domineering on issues he was interested in (idealist and ideologue
in FP, esp over Vietnam). Ended up choosing Rostow and Rusk as his
main advisers, who agreed with his stance on Vietnam ▯insulated himself.
George W Bush after 9/11 – fiery, impatient, a gut player – so he liked this
kind of approach towards the war on terror too.
Obama: collaborative, team player, open minded, selfconfident. But too
early to tell.
o Role of crises
Catapult an issue onto the agenda e.g. CMC, 1979 invasion of
Afghanistan, Gulf War, 9/11. George W Bush after 9/11 very shaken, Scowcroft saying maybe he
realised it was his divine mission to fight terrorism. Emotional and
psychological stress inhibits decisionmaking process.
Crisis tends to heighten the salience of time, reduce size of policymaking
group, reduce tolerance for ambiguity, make process more rigid,
encourage selective memory and searching, minimize communication with
adversaries, increase usage of ad hoc communication channels, increase
chances of a polarized choice.
Doesn’t happen in all crises, just most
Complex reality of policymaking
o All issues being considered simultaneously, so lots of overlap. Interactions,
o Also bigger governmental, societal, global context.
Relationship with FP in conflict
Up until 14th amendment US constitution only applied to Fed and not the states (so
considerable invasion of privacy at