WDW151H1 Chapter Notes - Chapter 5: Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Overfishing
12 May 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
Strong reciprocity : behaviour predisposition to cooperate conditionally on
others cooperation and to punish violations of cooperation norms
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Large scale cooperation among unrelated individuals
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Hobbes: social order is the product of powerful social institutions to
protect from the state of nature
▪
Rejected, fails to explain normative, etc.
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Parsons: individuals internalize social values and feel the need for
social approval to the degree of little conflict between two
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The problem of social order and cooperation
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Last round everyone cooperates --> why?
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People cooperate with punishment mechanism
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Social Order as a Public Good
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Subject exhibit strong reciprocity
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Subjects are self regarding OR cooperative
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Social Cooperation
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Social Order breaks down because SOME are self-regarding and cooperating
people lose faith
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Ernst Fehr and Herbert Gintis, “Human Motivation and Social Cooperation,” in
H&H, 26-33.
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Analogy of shepherds and pasture --> destroys land
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Mere fact that you exist entitles you to resources
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Communism or property rights
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Need to either divide property or appoint manager
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Allocation per year must be lessened - can't expect people to be infinitely
rich
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Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,”
Science
162 (1968), 1243-1248.
OR his YouTube interview in which he discusses resource allocation, available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L8gAMFTAt2M (3:18)
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Everyone owns, no one takes care of, no one cares about --> overfishing
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Aboriginals : government owns the land, privately owned is 40% more
productive
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Take land, build houses (American gold rush)
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Lack of rule of law about houses and property --> can't create wealth, no
property, can't recognize property / business
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Private property rights = prosperity
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John Stossel, Tragedy of the Commons, (11:13). Available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B0vmP7HoFI4
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Ex: ocean fishing, wasn't sustainable
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Keep taking, gone over equilibrium, crashes
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Rules that are enforced - who? When? Access
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However commons property rights: can determine how to sustain
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Presumption of state intermentioned needed
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Elinor Ostrom,
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action
(Cambridge University Press, 1990) OR “Beyond the Tragedy of
the Commons,” April 3, 2009, Stockholm Whiteboard Seminar, Available on
YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ByXM47Ri1Kc (approx 8
minutes)
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5: Equality, Inequality, and Justice
October 8, 2016
1:01 PM
READINGS Page 1
Document Summary
Ernst fehr and herbert gintis, human motivation and social cooperation, in. Strong reciprocity : behaviour predisposition to cooperate conditionally on others cooperation and to punish violations of cooperation norms. Hobbes: social order is the product of powerful social institutions to protect from the state of nature. Parsons: individuals internalize social values and feel the need for social approval to the degree of little conflict between two. Social order breaks down because some are self-regarding and cooperating people lose faith. Garret hardin, the tragedy of the commons, science162 (1968), 1243-1248. Or his youtube interview in which he discusses resource allocation, available at http://www. youtube. com/watch?v=l8gamftat2m (3:18) Analogy of shepherds and pasture --> destroys land. Mere fact that you exist entitles you to resources. Need to either divide property or appoint manager. Allocation per year must be lessened - can"t expect people to be infinitely rich. Everyone owns, no one takes care of, no one cares about --> overfishing.
