Textbook Notes (380,738)
CA (168,193)
UTSG (11,033)
WDW (80)
WDW152H1 (9)
Chapter 4

WDW152H1 Chapter 4: Cooperation I: Nuclear Deterrence
Premium

1 Page
58 Views

Department
Woodsworth College Courses
Course Code
WDW152H1
Professor
Beth Fischer

This preview shows half of the first page. Sign up to view the full page of the document.
“Technological Theories,” W&P, 128.
People are selfish --> why cooperate?
International politics not governed by central authority
Hobbes : central authority to control / police
To everyone's advantage
Assumption of self-interest is just an assumption that concern for others does not completely solve
when to cooperate
Will typically defect --> how to get to cooperate?
No mechanism to make enforceable threats / commitments
No way to be sure of other player's move
Can't eliminate other player or run away - must decide
No way to change other player's payoff
Player's not concerned for future - other player might move at any time - only want immediate
payoff
Can't assume other player is out to get you
The more likely future interaction is, more likely to cooperate
Benefits may not be the same for both parties
Exclusion of possibility of verbal communication, direct influence of 3rd parties, problems of
implementing choice, uncertainty about player's previous move
Avoidance of necessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player does
Revocability in the face of an uncalled for defection by other
Forgiveness after responding to a provocation
Thus cooperation can occur without central authority
Clarity of behaviour so other people can adapt to you
Four common properties
Prisoner's dilemma : can come out ahead or worse off
Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Cooperation,” in H&H 175-185.
Differs between societies
Direct reciprocity : evolution of cooperation among individuals who encounter one another repeatedly
Neighbours form clusters of cooperators, becoming more competitive with defectors
Spatial selection : not uniformly distributed
Kin selection : making sacrifices for relatives
Indirect reciprocity : one individual helps another based on the needy individual's reputation --> they
help others
Group selection : individuals being selfless for the good of all
Mechanisms occur in all organisms - cooperation is a driving force in evolution of life
Language and indirect reciprocity (reputation)
Public goods : many people defect --> environmental issues
Humans are most cooperative --> achieved most
More generous when publicly donate (reputation at stake)
People need to be convinced environment is a real problem
Cooperation is intrinsically unstable
Martin A. Nowak, “Why We Help,” Scientific American (July 2012), 34-39. Follow either of these links to find
it in the U of T library system: http://simplelink.library.utoronto.ca/url.cfm/412266 or
http://web.ebscohost.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ehost/detail?sid=707c9861-
a677-4945-875d-1fce45fe4693%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=126&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%
3d%3d#db=buh&AN=77340785
Reading 2.4: Cooperation I: Nuclear Deterrence
February 1, 2017
7:06 PM
READINGS Page 1

Loved by over 2.2 million students

Over 90% improved by at least one letter grade.

Leah — University of Toronto

OneClass has been such a huge help in my studies at UofT especially since I am a transfer student. OneClass is the study buddy I never had before and definitely gives me the extra push to get from a B to an A!

Leah — University of Toronto
Saarim — University of Michigan

Balancing social life With academics can be difficult, that is why I'm so glad that OneClass is out there where I can find the top notes for all of my classes. Now I can be the all-star student I want to be.

Saarim — University of Michigan
Jenna — University of Wisconsin

As a college student living on a college budget, I love how easy it is to earn gift cards just by submitting my notes.

Jenna — University of Wisconsin
Anne — University of California

OneClass has allowed me to catch up with my most difficult course! #lifesaver

Anne — University of California
Description
Reading 2.4: Cooperation I: Nuclear Deterrence February 1, 207:06 PM Technological Theories, WP, 128. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, inH 175185. People are selfish > why cooperate? Hobbes : central authority to control police International politics not governed by central authority People cooperate when they expect cooperation in return To everyones advantage Assumption of selfinterest is just an assumption that concern for others does not completely solve when to cooperate Prisoners dilemma : can come out ahead or worse off Will typically defect > how to get to cooperate? No mechanism to make enforceable threats commitments No way to be sure of other players move Cant eliminate other player or run away must decide No way to change other players payoff Players not concerned for future other player might move at any time only want immediate payoff Cant assume other player is out to get you The more likely future interaction is, more likely to cooperate Benefits may not be the same for both parties Exclusion of possibility of verbal communication, direct influence of 3rd parties, problems of implementing choice, uncertainty about players previous move Four common properties Avoidance of necessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player does Revocability in the face of an uncalled for defection by other Forgiveness after responding to a provocation Clarity of behaviour so other people can adapt to you Thus cooperation can occur without central authority Martin A. Nowak, Why We Help, Scientific American (July 2012), 3439. Follow either of these links to find it in the U of T library system: http:simplelink.library.utoronto.caurl.cfm412266 or http:web.ebscohost.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.caehostdetail?sid=707c9861 a6774945875d1fce45fe469340sessionmgr115vid=1hid=126bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ 3d3ddb=buhAN=77340785 Direct reciprocity : evolution of cooperation among individuals who encounter one another repeatedly Differs between societies Spatial selection : not uniformly distributed Neighbours form clusters of cooperators, becoming more competitive with defectors Kin selection : making sacrifices for relatives Indirect reciprocity : one individual helps another based on the needy individuals reputation > they help others Group selection : individuals being selfless for the good of all Mechanisms occur in all organisms cooperation is a driving force in evolution of life Humans are most cooperative > achieved most Language and indirect reciprocity (reputation) Public goods : many people defect > environmental issues People need to be convinced environment is a real problem More generous when publicly donate (reputation at stake) Cooperation is intrinsically unstable READINGS Page 1
More Less
Unlock Document


Only half of the first page are available for preview. Some parts have been intentionally blurred.

Unlock Document
You're Reading a Preview

Unlock to view full version

Unlock Document

Log In


OR

Don't have an account?

Join OneClass

Access over 10 million pages of study
documents for 1.3 million courses.

Sign up

Join to view


OR

By registering, I agree to the Terms and Privacy Policies
Already have an account?
Just a few more details

So we can recommend you notes for your school.

Reset Password

Please enter below the email address you registered with and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Add your courses

Get notes from the top students in your class.


Submit