PHIL 111 Chapter Notes - Chapter 5: Practical Reason

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11 Jun 2018
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The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 7 April 25, 1967
142
LS: No. More! He steps forward, as it were. Yes?
Mr. Reinken: he makes the experiment
whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His
maxim, however, is: For love of myself, I make it my principle to shorten my life
when by a longer duration it threatens more evil than satisfaction.
xxvi
LS: No: than it promises satisfaction. All right.
Mr. Reinken: promises satisfaction. But it is questionable whether this principle of self-
love—”
xxvii
LS: No. The only thing still questionable is this. This is his maxim, stated . . . . There is
only one question left, namely:
Mr. Reinken: “But only this is questionable: whether this principle—”
xxviii
LS: This principle of self-love as stated, namely, if life threatens more evils than it
promises good, whether this principle of self-love can become a universal law of nature.
Mr. Reinken: “One immediately sees—
xxix
LS: No. “Soon.” Kant is not so rash. Then one sees soon—”
Mr. Reinken:
sees soon a contradiction in a system of nature whose law would be to destroy life
by the feeling whose special office is to impel the improvement of life. In this
case it would not exist as nature; hence that maxim cannot obtain as a law of
nature, and thus it wholly contradicts the supreme principle of all duty.
xxx
LS: Yes. Now you see the point which you must understand
34
and which Kant has made
clear (although very insufficiently clear in this particular work), that this is an argument
based on the typic and not on the categoric imperative proper. The key point is this: the
man who makes this reflection is already prepared to obey the moral law. He
35
[is] still in
the possession of his reason to that extent that he can ask himself. In other words, he has
not become insane or almost insane through the sufferings.
36
He still can consult his
conscience and, of course, he is willing to consult his conscience. That is the point.
Otherwise, he would simply obey this maxim of his self-love.
And there is another point. The principle of self-love, that is a form of the principle of
happiness. And it has a vagueness that is, [as]
37
Kant implies here, which the principle of
xxvi
Ibid., 39-40.
xxvii
Ibid., 40.
xxviii
Ibid.
xxix
Ibid.
xxx
Ibid.
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The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 7 April 25, 1967
143
happiness is. What does he really know here? That from now on he will have only evils
or much more evils than good? That we cannot know. Life threatens evils and promises
less pleasures. But he cannot know it. And therefore
38
what the moral reflection does is,
in the first place, to make him distinguish between what he knows and what he believes to
know. And as a sane civil man, he would of course not act merely on what he believes to
know, but on what he knows. In other words, he cannot possibly know whether five
minutes after he has committed suicide his presence there may be of the greatest value to
other human beings, and therefore perhaps indirectly to himself because of the
satisfaction he would derive from having helped fellow human beings. Take a single
example. Now let us take the next example.
Mr. Reinken:
Another man finds himself forced by need to borrow money. He well knows that
he will not be able to repay it, but he also sees that nothing will be loaned him if
he does not firmly promise to repay it at a certain time. He desires to make such a
promise
xxxi
LS: In other words, he is tempted. He is tempted. Yes?
Mr. Reinken: “but he has enough conscience to ask himself—”
xxxii
LS: But he has still enough conscience, although the temptation is very great. So in other
words,
39
these reflections which Kant sketches here are made only by men to the extent to
which they are willing to consult their conscience. An unscrupulous crook would not
even begin to make such reflections. This is the meaning, that this is the sphere of
practical reason; these are not theoretical perceptions. Now, let us first finish this. Yes?
Mr. Reinken:
He asks himself whether it is not improper and opposed to duty to relieve his
distress in such a way. Now, assuming he does decide to do so, the maxim of his
action would be as follows: When I believe myself to be in need of money
xxxiii
LS: You see here also the qualifier, “When I believe to be in need of money.” How does
he know that? Now you will say we know it very well. But that’s a question, no? Repeat
again.
Mr. Reinken:
When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise
to repay it, although I know I shall never do so.
xxxiv
LS: That he knows, whereas the first thing he believes. Yes? [Laughter]
xxxi
Ibid.
xxxii
Ibid.
xxxiii
Ibid.
xxxiv
Ibid.
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