PHIL 111 Chapter Notes - Chapter 5: Categorical Imperative, Hypothetical Imperative, Presupposition
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 6 April 20, 1967
127
did the original sources.
88
So in other words—but it is the whole classical position. And
what is Kant’s objection?
89
I mean, he rejects hedonism and other things without any
question, yet it is not this easy. But why is this notion of this kind of morality which takes
its bearing by the perfection of our nature—why is this, even this, inadequate?
Same Student: I think for two reasons that I can recall at the moment. One is that saying
that our natures go toward perfection is already assuming what you would like to prove at
the end. In other words, we are moral in order to make us perfect, but we are perfectible
by the fact of our human nature.
LS: Yes. Could one not state it as following: the traditional doctrine
90
which speaks, for
example, of man’s natural inclinations as good and the basis of goodness,
91
how do we
know that the natural inclinations are good? In other words, is there not a dogmatic
assumption underlying traditional morality? The goodness of nature. Must this
assumption not first be established? And Kant’s general view is only this: yes,
92
we
cannot presuppose the goodness of natural inclinations.
93
We cannot presuppose that
there are any good ends, natural ends. For that they are good has to be established by a
primary reflection, which he is giving in his moral works, especially The Foundation of
the Metaphysics of Morals and The Critique of Practical Reason.
So here, in a way, if we disregard the theoretical morality, all these other doctrines are
based on nature. I mean hedonism for example. But Kant is the first who tries to liberate
man (to use an expression used by him) from the apron string of nature. And therefore,
the key word is now no longer “nature” but “reason.” And therefore also the whole
question of the formalism, you know, the formal law, because every content would be
taken from nature or from experience.
Now as to the categoric imperative, what is the relation of the good will
94
which has been
the key word in the first section to the categoric imperative of which he speaks in the
second section?
Same Student:
95
Well, the unconditionally good will is that which does not need the
categorical imperative as an imperative because it is in its nature to act this way and only
this way.
LS: In other words, only God’s will would be a good will simply. And
96
[what] is a
characteristic difference of human will, and why does the characteristic of the human will
make necessary an imperative?
Same Student: Because the human will has a subjective element, which is connected
with the sensible world in which contingencies which our inclinations for example lead
us to, which we go against . . .
xviii
Christian Wolff (b. 1679), rationalist philosopher, called by Kant in his Preface to The
Critique of Pure Reason “the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers.”
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 6 April 20, 1967
128
LS: More simply, the human will is not necessarily good, ya, whereas God’s will is
necessarily good. And therefore the law applies equally to all rational beings. But in the
case of man the law has a character of a command, whereas it does not have the character
of a command in the case of God. And what is the relation of command and imperative?
Same Student: . . .
LS: So
97
the moral law has only in the case of man or other finite rational beings the
character of a command. But what is the relation of command and imperative?
Same Student: Is the command given by the will? Is that—
LS: Ya,
98
but that’s not the point here.
Same Student: I don’t—
LS: Well,
99
what is the imperative?
Mr. Reinken: Is objective in the commands—
LS: No.
100
The imperative is a formula for the command . . .
101
But in order to understand
the categoric imperative, one must distinguish it from the alternative, the other kinds of
imperatives, and which are?
Student: The hypothetical of skill and the hypothetical of prudence. I—
LS: Yes.
Same Student: He has particular names for them. The assertorical is the prudence and—
LS: Ya, but
102
it is not necessary.
103
In other words, the categoric imperative is
distinguished from hypothetical imperatives. Of hypothetical imperatives there are two
kinds, the imperatives of skill and the imperatives of prudence. Now what is the
imperative of skill?
Same Student: That’s the hypothetical that commands you what to do if you wish to
achieve any given purpose that your will is able to achieve.
LS: An example.
Same Student: For example, if you should want to become a doctor,
104
the hypothetical
imperative would say: If you want to become a doctor then you must go to medical
school.
Document Summary
127 did the original sources. 88 so in other words but it is the whole classical position. And what is kant"s objection?89 i mean, he rejects hedonism and other things without any question, yet it is not this easy. Same student: i think for two reasons that i can recall at the moment. One is that saying that our natures go toward perfection is already assuming what you would like to prove at the end. In other words, we are moral in order to make us perfect, but we are perfectible by the fact of our human nature. And kant"s general view is only this: yes,92 we cannot presuppose the goodness of natural inclinations. 93 we cannot presuppose that there are any good ends, natural ends. For that they are good has to be established by a primary reflection, which he is giving in his moral works, especially the foundation of the metaphysics of morals and the critique of practical reason.