PHIL 111 Chapter Notes - Chapter 5: Leo Strauss, Political Philosophy, Avail
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 6 April 20, 1967
112
Session 6: April 20, 1967
Leo Strauss: So before we turn to the text of Kant
1
and afterward to Miss Perkins’s
paper, I would like to indicate in an easily intelligible way what Kant’s moral and
political philosophy is about. I’m taking as examples phenomena
2
with which you all are
familiar. The key point which Kant makes, and which no one prior to Kant has made in
the same way, is this: that moral philosophy or ethics must not be based on experience.
The same applies to the principles of political philosophy. It must not be based on any
consideration of the human nature, at least in its fundamental parts. Now this sounds very
strange and yet it affects all our lives today, especially in the Western countries. What
does it mean? In the first place, experience is of no benefit, ultimately. It means that the
past cannot tell us anything as to what can be done, should be done in the future, or what
is possible in the future.
3
If there are a priori principles of morals and politics, the pos-
sibility of acting in accordance with that morals and politics is guaranteed by the a priori
law itself. Thou canst for thou oughtst. There is no need for an additional proof of the
possibility.
Compare this with Plato or Aristotle. They describe or figure out a best social order and
they are compelled according to their principles to prove the possibility of this best order
by referring to the nature of man. For Kant that is not necessary. We will find specimens
when we come to his more detailed writings . . .
Now, but if you ask people who are not Kantians and who consider possibilities of human
living together which have no basis in past experience,
4
well, they would say that
ultimately our basis is experience. For example, say psychology, let us assume, teaches
us something on the conditions under which aggressiveness emerges in individuals or
groups, and on the basis of this empirical knowledge we can plan a society without any
aggressiveness. And so our project is based on experience and not on any a priori
considerations. But there is only this difficulty: this, letting me take this simple example,
say, a society free from aggressiveness, has of course never been actual—that is
admitted—and therefore we cannot possibly foresee what bad side effects this apparently
very desirable goal might have. And
5
the only way to guarantee the feasibility and the
moral necessity is the way in which Kant is trying to do that. Whether the Kantian way is
a good way is, of course, an open question, but it has at least this great advantage
compared with other modern competitors in this respect. So this much about that. And
6
since I trust that this will arouse some interest in certain quarters which otherwise would
not be interested in Kant.
Now we have begun to study the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, and what
Kant said there, especially in the first section, right at the beginning, about the good will,
which is (as one might say) the core of morality. Now at least a bit more precisely: that in
human actions which alone can make these actions morally good. We are not morally
good if we do the right things for the wrong reasons, for example, out of the calculation
of our advantages or in order to improve our image. We must do the right thing because it
is right and for no other reason. We must choose to kalon, in Latin honestum, the decent
or noble, because it is decent or noble and for no other reason.
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 6 April 20, 1967
113
Now Kant is concerned with isolating this core of morality because he is concerned with
the purity of morality, with distinguishing morality itself from the morally indifferent
ingredients of our actions.
7
First of all, let us look at Kant
8
at the beginning, in the first
section, third paragraph. Here, all right, read this.
Mr. Reinken:
The good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or
because of its adequacy to achieve any
i
proposed end; it is good only
because of its willing, i.e., it is good of itself. And, regarded for itself, it is
to be esteemed incomparably higher than anything which could be brought
about by it in favor of any inclination or even of the sum total of all
inclinations.
LS: I.e., happiness.
Mr. Reinken:
Even if it should happen that, by a particularly unfortunate fate or by the
niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should be wholly
lacking in power to accomplish its purpose—
ii
LS: Now this is a key point, now listen. Go on.
Mr. Reinken:
and if even the greatest effort should not avail it to achieve anything of its
end, and if there remained only the good will (not as a mere wish but as
the summoning of all the means in our power), it would sparkle like a
jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself.
Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither diminish nor augment this worth.
Its usefulness would be only its setting, as it were, so as to enable us to
handle it more conveniently in commerce or to attract the attention of
those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to those who
are experts or to determine its worth.
iii
LS: Ya, this point—now let us compare this with a passage towards the end of the
Nicomachean Ethics, 1170A23 following. Aristotle speaks here of the two lives: the
practical or political, and the theoretical life. And he says here
9
the theoretical life is the
higher. And one reason why it is higher is because it needs much less of external
equipment than the practical life. As far as the necessary things are concerned, say, the
minimum of food, both the theoretical man and the practical man need it equally,
although the political man has more to toil with his body. But this wouldn’t make a great
difference. But it makes a very great difference as far as the actions are concerned, for the
liberal man needs money in order to do the liberal actions, and the just man needs money
i
In original: “some”
ii
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 10.
iii
Ibid.
Document Summary
Leo strauss: so before we turn to the text of kant1 and afterward to miss perkins"s paper, i would like to indicate in an easily intelligible way what kant"s moral and political philosophy is about. I"m taking as examples phenomena2 with which you all are familiar. The key point which kant makes, and which no one prior to kant has made in the same way, is this: that moral philosophy or ethics must not be based on experience. The same applies to the principles of political philosophy. It must not be based on any consideration of the human nature, at least in its fundamental parts. Now this sounds very strange and yet it affects all our lives today, especially in the western countries. In the first place, experience is of no benefit, ultimately. There is no need for an additional proof of the possibility.
